The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy 1941-1942 A Lesson in Military Incompetence by Evans, David
The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy 
1941-1942
A Lesson in Military Incompetence
By
David A Evans B. Asian Studies, BA (Hons) History.
History
Faculty of Arts and Humanities
A dissertation submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at
Murdoch UniversityDeclaration
Except where I have indicated, I declare that this dissertation is my own work and is an 
account of my research that has not been submitted for assessment for a degree at a 




I acknowledge that a copy of this dissertation will be held at Murdoch University 
Library.
I understand that, under the provisions s51.2 of the Copyright Act 1968, all or part of 
this dissertation may be copied without infringement of copyright where such a 
reproduction is for the purposes of study and research.
This statement does not signal any transfer of copyright away from the author.
(Signed)
David A Evans
Full Name of Degree:    Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation Title:    The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy 
         1941-1942: A Lesson in Military Incompetence
Author:         David A Evans
Year:         2010
iiAcknowledgements
I acknowledge Senator Chris Back for facilitating my entry into tertiary education at Curtin 
University’s Muresk Agricultural College in Western Australia. Under Senator Back’s 
mentorship I developed a lifelong interest in learning that led to the completion of my university 
studies at Murdoch University. 
I also acknowledge Associate Professor Lenore Layman and Professor Michael Durey for their 
professional approach in mentoring and guiding me through my education as a historian at 
Murdoch University. Furthermore, acknowledgement is given to Murdoch University for 
providing me with a scholarship and all the welcoming support required to complete this 
dissertation.
Finally, I acknowledge the Australian Army Research Grants Scheme for providing a financial 
grant for field research conducted at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.
iiiAbstract
In October 1940 and in February 1941, the Australian Chiefs of Staff agreed to supply a 
task force (Gull Force) and an air strike group to garrison the small Dutch Island of 
Ambon. The decision to send troops to support the Dutch was made at Singapore where 
Australia ostensibly agreed to send three squadrons of aircraft to support Ambon in 
exchange for the Dutch sending four of their squadrons to support Malaya and 
Singapore should they be attacked. Under closer examination, however, the reasons for 
sending Australian troops and aircraft to Ambon become more obscure. 
Historians and writers in the past have provided various explanations for Australia’s 
commitment to Dutch Ambon as being; because the Island was a steppingstone for the 
Japanese to use in approaching Australia; because it was necessary to delay the Japanese 
for a couple of days; because Australia required a forward operating base; because 
Timor and Ambon were necessary for maintaining an open air route between Java and 
Australia; and, because Australia needed to demonstrate to its allies that it was prepared 
to fight the Japanese regardless of the disproportionate cost in doing so. Considering the 
paucity of facts regarding the Ambon case, the aim of this dissertation is to examine the 
question of why the Australian Government knowingly made the decision to send an 
under equipped, under-strength and unprotected task force to an isolated island in the 
Malukus to face overwhelming Japanese forces without any hope of reinforcement, 
rescue or withdrawal. 
The conclusions show that the Australian Government and its military advisors were 
unequal to the task of successfully formulating grand war policy and military strategy in 
the Ambon Island case during 1941-1942. The minimum aim of war strategy is to 
formulate a decisive war plan in balance with the attainable political objective and the 
military’s ability to achieve those ends. The Ambon strategy failed these criterion where 
Gull Force was sent to garrison the Island without any stated aims other than fighting to 
hold the Japanese advance for no longer than a few days to demonstrate Australia’s 
willingness to fight. Gull Force was given an impossible task to fulfil at a price that 
could not be justified under any conventional strategic principles of the time.
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viiiIntroduction
Ambon fell into Japanese hands on 3 February 1942. Since that time the battle of 
Ambon has remained, to a greater or lesser degree, obscured from mainstream 
Australian military history and consequently the consciousness of many contemporary 
Australians. Although this history is recorded in books such as Lionel Wigmore’s 
contribution to the official histories Australia in the War of 1939-1945 - Volume IV, 
Joan Beaumont’s Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945, Peter 
Henning’s Doomed Battalion: Mateship and Leadership in War and Captivity, The 
Australian 2/40 Battalion 1940-1945, Christopher Wray’s Timor 1942: Australian 
Commandos at War with the Japanese and Courtney Harrison’s Ambon: Island of Mist, 
little has been written in-depth about why Australia decided to send its troops to Ambon 
Island in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). This dissertation aims to examine the 
question of how the Australian military leaders came to make the decision of sending an 
ill-equipped task force of Australian troops to protect the small isolated Ambon garrison 
933 kilometres north of Darwin.
The fact that the 2/21st Battalion (Gull Force) of the 23rd Brigade 8th Division was sent 
to Ambon following Japanese attacks on Malaya/Thailand, Hong Kong, the Philippines 
and Hawaii points to the importance that must have rested behind that decision at a time 
when Australia itself was threatened by Japan’s actions. This was especially the case 
when the 2/22nd Battalion (Sparrow Force) and the 2/40th Battalion (Lark Force) had 
also been dispersed to Timor and Rabaul respectively at a time when no other 
adequately trained forces remained to defend Australian shores with the resources then 
available. If no rational general would dissipate and isolate poorly armed forces miles 
1from supply, support or chance of rescue against overwhelming forces and without just 
cause, why did Australia’s Chief of the General Staff dispose of the 2/21st Battalion to 
an isolated Dutch garrison at faraway Ambon Island?
In the official history, The Japanese Thrust, Wigmore explained that the task set for 
Gull Force was based on the strategic importance of Ambon to Australia’s defence and 
on a long-standing agreement with the Dutch. Ambon Island had a newly constructed 
airfield at Laha on the Hitu Peninsular, which was of ostensible strategic importance to 
both the Allies and the Japanese. Notwithstanding its importance, Wigmore explained 
that the Australian Chiefs of Staff sent an inadequately resourced Gull Force to defend 
the island.1 This raises the question, if Ambon was so important why was it reinforced 
with such an inadequate task force? Wigmore’s chapter on The Loss of Ambon does not 
reveal the answer to this question.
The nearest explanation Wigmore gave for the Australian Chiefs of Staff sending Gull 
Force to Ambon stemmed from the Singapore Conferences. Notwithstanding Wigmore’s 
examination of the 22-25 February Singapore Conference in his chapter Plans and 
Preparations,2 in regards to Ambon he vaguely explained that Australian Chiefs of Staff 
were anxious to establish air force bases as far north of Australia as was possible and 
that an Australian infantry force was needed on the island to protect those RAAF assets. 
Then in contradiction to the above, Wigmore went on to claim that General Vernon 
Sturdee, Chief of the General Staff, had only reluctantly agreed to send a battalion 
2
1 Wigmore, L., The Japanese Thrust: Series One - Australia in the War of 1939-1945, (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 420-24.
2 Ibid., pp. 420-24.group to Ambon and one battalion group each to Rabaul and Timor and that it was 
initially done on the basis that the islands were ‘stepping-stones’ to Australia.3
When Gull Force was finally confronted with the Japanese invasion at Ambon, the 
Advisory War Council decided it would be too difficult to withdraw the battalion from 
the garrison and that it remained imperative to delay the Japanese at the island for as 
long as possible.4 Considering the supposed importance of Ambon to Australia’s higher 
strategy, it seems enigmatic that Wigmore could not provide a more detailed explanation 
regarding that strategy or explain the Chiefs of Staff’s provision of such a small 
commitment to defend Ambon in the form of Gull Force, especially when Sturdee was 
supposedly reluctant to send troops there in the first place. Rather than clarify the reason 
for sending under-equipped troops to Ambon, it seems Wigmore only served to confuse 
the issue; either Ambon was important or it was not.
Beaumont also skipped over the question of why inadequate Australian forces were sent 
to Ambon in the face of overwhelming forces. The reason for this was perhaps that her 
thesis was directed more to the question of why some Gull Force men survived the 
stresses of Japanese internment where others did not. Beaumont’s explanation for the 
disposal of Gull Force to Ambon was simply that the island was strategically important 
to Australia and that Australia had committed itself to defending the Netherlands East 
Indies against Japanese attack.5 This brief explanation is no clearer than Wigmore’s 
3
3 Ibid., pp. 69, 76.
4 National Archives of Australia, Advisory War Council Minutes (Original Set) Chronological Series, 
A5954, 812/1 to 815/2, 29 October 1940 to 30 August 1945, Meetings 16 Dec to Mar 1942. Minute No 
724.
5 Beaumont, J., Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945, (North Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1988), pp. 5. 19.above. Nevertheless, Beaumont noted that only a large well-equipped force could 
defend Ambon and that Gull Force was under equipped and therefore unlikely to have 
been able to defend the island.6 This observation only lent support to the question of 
why, when Ambon was so strategically important, did the Chiefs of Staffs knowingly 
send such a small ill-quipped battalion to defend the island against an expected 
overwhelming Japanese attack.
Henning, on the other hand, seems to come closest to explaining the dispersal of the 
23rd Brigade to the islands. He explained that the strategy of sending Australian troops 
to the islands was derived from the British led Singapore conferences, where Malaya 
Command was required to examine the Japanese threat to the Far East and especially 
Malaya and Singapore. Here, he made it clear the conferences had decided that, without 
a fleet to protect Singapore, a modern air force was required to deter the Japanese from 
attacking the island even though few modern aircraft were available for Far East 
deployment. 
Henning explained that, in the context of those meetings and where Australia was 
relying on Britain’s inadequate defence of Singapore, the Australian Chiefs of Staff had 
agreed to send air forces to the islands north of Australia such as Rabaul, Timor and 
Ambon. To protect the air force assets on the islands the Australian Chiefs of Staff had 
decided that two battalion groups should be dispersed to garrison the island airfields. 
According to Henning, the Australian War Cabinet accepted the Chiefs of Staff’s 
recommendations to garrison the islands on 14 February 1941 and committed one 
4
6 Ibid., p. 35.battalion group each to Ambon and Timor along with an air striking force that was 
earmarked for operations over these islands from Darwin.7 Although Henning provided 
a little more detail to the question, the reasons behind sending Gull and Sparrow Forces 
to the islands still remain obscure.
Wray also came no closer to explaining why under equipped forces were sent to defend 
such strategically important outposts as Timor and Ambon. He explained that the 
Singapore Conference had found it was in a position where it had too few aircraft even 
with the addition of those held by the NEI Government.8 Wray provided no in-depth 
analysis on why the Australian chiefs of staff had decided to send the under equipped 
troops to the islands and particularly in his case to Timor.
Although Harrison was a member of Gull Force and experienced the privations of 
captivity, he refrained from commenting on whether Sturdee had made the right 
decision or not in sacrificing Gull Force. In his book Ambon: Island of Mist -2/21st 
Battalion AIF (Gull Force) Prisoners of War 1941-45 Harrison stated that:
It was  a  well  kept  secret that the  future  plans  for their  ultimate  destination  had  been 
established  because  of  a  long  standing  agreement  by  Australia  with  the  Netherlands 
Government should Japan enter the war and, when this did eventuate, Gull Force moved to 
Ambon a  small  island  N/W  of  Darwin and  a  comparable  distance  from  Melbourne  to 
Sydney. Together with a regiment of poorly trained native troops led by Dutch officers, they 
were given the impossible task of defending it against a Division of experienced well trained 
enemy with modern arms and equipment, aided by Naval ships and carrier-born [sic] aircraft 
which made the result never in doubt.
As to the correctness or otherwise of the conception of Australian troops being sacrificed in 
such circumstances, I refrain from comment with the  understanding  that any war means 
sacrifice.9
5
7 Henning, P., Doomed Battalion, (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1995), p. 21.
8 Wray, C. C. H., Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, (Port Melbourne: 
Mandarin Australia, 1990), p. 10.
9 Harrison, C. T., Ambon: Island of Mist - 2/21st Battalion AIF (Gull Force) Prisoners of War 1941-45, 
(North Geelong: TW & CT Harrison, 1988), Post Script.The problem with Harrison’s failure to comment on the sacrifice of Gull Force is that 
he, for whatever reason, has served only to obscure whether the Australian Government 
was justified in that sacrifice in the wider context of the war.
A better explanation for Australian participation in occupying the garrisons at Ambon 
and Timor comes from Jack Ford in his book Allies in a Bind: Australia and the 
Netherlands East Indies in the Second World War. Ford revealed in more detail how the 
agreement between the Australians and the Dutch was made at the Singapore 
Conference of 22-25 February 1941. According to Ford, the Dutch committed to 
transferring three Glen Martin squadrons and one Buffalo squadron (24 aircraft) to 
Singapore at the outbreak of war with Japan in exchange for a similar commitment from 
the Australians for three squadrons to operate over Ambon and Timor. It was suggested 
that the Australians garrison Ambon because it was an important link between Australia 
and Java.10 However, Ford failed to clarify why, if Ambon was so strategically 
important, did Australia commit to protecting the airfield at Ambon with only one under 
equipped battalion.
In The Supplement to The London Gazette in January 1948 Air Chief Marshall Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham, the architect of the mutual air defence scheme at Singapore, 
gave his account of the Singapore Conferences and Australia’s commitment to Malaya 
Command’s principle of mutual air support in the Far East. As part of this agreement the 
Dutch promised to provide one fighter and three bomber squadrons in the defence of 
Malaya should it be attacked in exchange for a similar British commitment in the NEI. 
6
10 Ford, J. M., Allies in a Bind: Australia and Netherlands East Indies in the Second World War, 
(Loganholme: Australian Netherlands Ex-Servicemen and Women's Association, 1996), pp. 20, 31.Under this agreement Australia promised to provide Army units and an air striking force 
to Ambon and Kupang at Timor. This was agreed to on the basis that a Japanese attack 
on one would be an attack on all. As the Australian Chiefs of Staff were left with the 
planning of the sending of reinforcements to Ambon and Kupang, Brooke-Popham was 
unable to report further on the outcome of Australia’s commitment to the mutual 
support scheme in the Far East, leaving it for the Australians to report.11
It seems counterintuitive that the Australian Government would send an under equipped 
inadequate force to face overwhelming forces only to protect such a strategically 
important island, as Ambon was described, without any hope of holding the island and 
at a time when Australia needed all the military resources it could retain on the 
mainland. The answer to this question must lie with Australia’s Chiefs of Staff, the high 
strategists in Australia at the entry into the Second World War. Accordingly, to find the 
answer to the above question, this dissertation will focus on the Chiefs of Staff and the 
records they have left behind.
The first chapter of this dissertation, Ambon: Grand Strategy and the Anglo-Dutch-
Australia Mutual Air Defence Scheme, examines in detail the proposals that were settled 
upon at the Singapore conferences of October 1940 to February 1941. During this 
period Australia initially agreed to provide the Dutch garrison of Ambon with an air 
striking force and a brigade of infantry as part of its commitment to the mutual air 
7
11 Brooke-Popham, R., "Operations in the Far East," Supplement to the London Gazette, 22 January 
(1948), p. 543.defence scheme along the Malay Barrier. It was on this basis that the Chiefs of Staff 
formalized their strategy to defend not only Ambon but Timor and Rabaul also.
Chapter Two, Ambon: The Position and Line Holding Strategy, in the context of Carl 
von Clausewitz’s book On War, examines Roach’s questioning of the Chiefs of Staff’s 
strategy of retaining Gull Force at Ambon to face overwhelming forces for no gain other 
than a few days delay to the Japanese advance. This chapter demonstrates how Roach 
exposed the weaknesses intrinsic to the Chiefs of Staff Operation Instruction No. 15, 
under which Gull Force was required to operate. The reader is also made aware of the 
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Roach and his replacement with Lieutenant 
Colonel John Scott, while exposing the reason why the Chiefs of Staffs disposed of Gull 
Force against such insurmountable odds.
Both Chapters Three, The Japanese Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics on Ambon, 
and Four, The Australian Story, are presented to juxtapose the Japanese offensive with 
that of the Dutch and Australian defence of Ambon. The stark difference in approach to 
Japanese and Allied strategies is used to reveal the commitment, or lack there of, of the 
respective combatants to the strategic importance of Ambon. The description of the 
Japanese attack is taken from Japanese as well as Australian accounts of the battles. The 
description of the Australian story is taken from various Australian archival sources.
The final chapter, Incompetence in Command, demonstrates General Sturdee’s lack of 
competence as Chief of the General Staff and self appointed nominal Commander-in-
8Chief and architect of the Australian commitment to the Malay Barrier strategy, which 
later became known as the Forward Observation Line strategy. It will be argued that 
Sturdee was incompetent for sending Gull, Sparrow and Lark Forces as isolated penny 
packet garrisons lacking the means to carry out their duties to defend the islands of 
Ambon, Timor and Rabaul during 1941-1942. 
9Chapter One: Ambon: Grand Strategy and the Anglo-Dutch-
Australia Mutual Air Defence Scheme
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to a given case. As a 
total  phenomenon  its  dominant  tendencies  always  make  war  a  paradoxical  trinity  – 
composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind 
natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to 
roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject 
to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and 
his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already 
be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the 
realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and 
the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.12
Carl von Clausewitz
Clausewitz divided his theoretical concept of strategy into three basic categories: grand 
strategy, the realm of government in harnessing the moral passions of the people, in 
implementing policy to guide the conduct of war, in coordinating the people and the 
utilisation of national resources and in attaining the political objects of war; strategy, the 
realm of military leaders in implementing policy to overcome the enemy’s will to fight 
by using the means provided to it by government in achieving the objects of war; and 
tactics, the realm of field commanders who practice method and routine, or ways in 
which to engage in or to avoid battle.13
Acting in agreement with these principles of grand strategy the Australian government 
initially created the War Cabinet on 15 September 1939 to forge policy and grand 
strategy in a war with Germany. The Prime Minister, Treasurer, Ministers for External 
Affairs, Defence, Supply Development and Commerce all held permanent seats in the 
10
12 von Clausewitz, C., On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Peter Paret, (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1993) p. 101.
13 Liddell Hart, B. H., The Classic Book on Military Strategy, 2nd ed., (London: Meridian, 1991) pp. 
321-32.War Cabinet. The service chiefs and various ministers of departments later became 
integrated into war cabinet meetings to conjoin wartime military, civil and economic 
imperatives.14
The War Cabinet needed to frame its strategic deliberations on defence in accord with 
long standing Imperial Conference agreements concerning British Commonwealth 
predominance in the coordination of foreign policy, security and joint defence. These 
arrangements called for Australia to act in concert with British strategic concepts 
regarding ‘when, how and with what means that united action could be taken’ during the 
war.15
On 28 October 1940, Prime Minister Robert Menzies established a supplemental 
advisory war council to help engage bipartisan support in Australia’s strategic approach 
to the war. He had previously invited opposition groups to unite in all party government 
as contributors to the decision-making processes of policy and grand strategy. The 
opposition leader John Curtin refused because he believed a unity government could 
intrinsically bind the Labor Party to government policy and stifle independent critical 
debate in opposition. 
At the first sitting of parliament after war on Germany was declared, Curtin expressed 
the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) policy in opposition. In part it stated:
11
14 von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Peter Paret, p. 68.
15 Hasluck, P., The Government and the People, 1939-1941, vol. 1, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 
1952), p. 36.The democratic rights of the [Australian] people must be safeguarded to the maximum. The 
very minimum of interference with the civic liberties of the people should be the objective of 
the Government in carrying through its measures for national security. To ensure that this is 
done, it is essential that the Parliament of the Commonwealth should remain in session … 
The suggestion that here should be a government composed of all parties in this Parliament 
appears to me to be one which, if carried out, would not be in the interests of either the 
Parliament, the Government, or the people of Australia.16
The Labour Party’s intention in stating their policy was to inform the parliament that the 
opposition wanted to maintain independent scrutiny of the government’s war measures 
and to ensure democratic processes were maintained.17
To relieve Curtin’s concerns Menzies formed the Advisory War Council to act as an 
advisory body only in allowing the opposition to contribute to formulating government 
policy without compromising their political independence or integrity. Between 1940 
and 1942, the Advisory War Council had four cabinet ministers and three opposition 
members provide policy recommendations to the war cabinet. Albeit an unusual 
augmentation of policy and grand strategy, the Advisory War Council remained in 
service until 30 August 1945.18
In agreement with contemporary principles of grand strategy the Government passed the 
National Security Act in September 1939 to address its concerns regarding military 
training and organisation, civil liberty and democratic process, financing the war effort, 
inflation and interest rates, the mobilisation of economic resources and administrative 
organisation. These arrangements allowed the War Cabinet and the Advisory War 
Council to become instrumental in the organisation of war policy and grand strategy. In 
12
16 Ibid., pp.159-60.
17 Ibid., p. 160.
18 Dennis, P., Grey, J., Morris, E. et al., The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, 2nd ed., 
(South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 7.conformity with the Clausewitzian principle cited above, that ‘the political aims [of 
war] are the business of government alone’, the War Cabinet and the Advisory War 
Council established their roles in producing the strategic object of war in continuing 
Australia’s political interests and national security. 
The second layer of strategy, except in historical precedents where the same person 
embodied the office of both government and military leader (for example Napoleon and 
Fredrick the Great), belongs to the military. Military leaders under Australia’s 
democratic government had the responsibility of applying the object of war in the areas 
of higher war policy and the use of force in the theatre of operations assigned to them. 
The Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) in overseas theatres, for example, were placed 
under the control of the C-in-C of the theatre in which it served, as in the case of 1941 
and early 1942 where both Gen Thomas Blamey in the Middle East and Gen Gordon 
Bennett in Singapore, subject to Australian and British war policy, reported directly to 
the Minister of the Army. These units remained independent of the responsibilities of 
the Chiefs of Staff in operational affairs. 
The role of the of Chiefs of Staff was to advise government on operational matters, 
strategic appreciations and to act in the implementation of orders stemming from War 
Cabinet decisions. Under these arrangements the Chiefs of Staff had responsibility for 
the administration of their respective services only. The only exception to the rule seems 
to have happened after Lt-Gen Vernon Sturdee took over full control of operations for 
Ambon-Timor-Rabaul from the 23rd Brigade in December 1941. In his capacity as Chief 
of Staff, Sturdee had advised the Government on grand strategy in the Far East and 
13Australia stemming from the Singapore conferences, prepared plans for operations at 
Ambon, Kupang and Rabaul and personally directed those operations from staff 
headquarters in Melbourne.
In 1941, and before the war in the Far East began, the governments of Great Britain, the 
United States (US), the NEI and Australia held few illusions about the Japanese 
intention to expand southward. Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the 
Shanghai Incident in 1932, the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany in 
1936, the invasion of China in 1937 and the Japanese occupation of French Indochina in 
1941, concerns were mounting that Japan would soon open war in the Far East and 
Southwest Pacific theatres. There was a prospect of war with Japan if it expanded both 
its political and economic aspirations deeper into Southeast Asia under its 'Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' policy. In response to this threat, Britain and the United 
States began secret discussions in Washington in early 1940 to develop a common 
strategic approach to protecting Anglo-American interests in the Far East and South 
Pacific regions.19 
In August, the British Chiefs of Staff produced an appreciation of the Far East situation, 
which outlined a secret proposal for Britain (and its dominions), the NEI and the United 
States of America (USA) to combine forces if Japan declared war in Southeast Asia. In 
advancing this policy, the Secretary for Dominion Affairs, Lord Caldecote, sent a series 
of cables to Australian Prime Minister RG Menzies on 11 August 1940 summarising the 
14
19 Hayes, G. P., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War against Japan, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 13; National Archives of Australia, War Cabinet Minutes 
(Original) Chronological Series, A5954, 803/1 to 811/2, 27 September 1939 to 19 January 1946, Minute 
1073, 16 May 1941.British Chiefs of Staffs strategy for defending its Far East outposts. Assumption 3 in the 
strategic paper considered the question whether Britain 'should go to war with Japan if 
she attacks the NEI'. Caldecote explained to Menzies that the defence situation in the 
Far East 'would be better served' with the mutual support of the Dutch; however, he 
wrote, 'with our present limited resources … we could not offer the Dutch any effective 
military support against Japanese aggression'.7 
To engage Dutch cooperation Caldecote recommended that staff conversations with the 
NEI should begin once the security position in Singapore and Malaya had improved. 
Menzies knew that Australia’s strategic defence was intrinsically tied to Singapore’s and 
agreed to raise talks with Dutch authorities.20 To begin the process the British Chiefs of 
Staff organised a staff conference at Singapore for 22 October and invited delegates 
from Australia/New Zealand and the USA (as a neutral military observer).
Except for local defence issues that remained under Australian control in its theatre of 
operations, the October conference set out to coordinate the overall defence 
requirements of the Far East region. Considering the assumption that Japan would most 
likely invade Malaya, the NEI or the Philippines, but not simultaneously and not 
Australia initially, the conference came to the conclusion that without a main fleet at 
Singapore it would use its available air forces to deter Japan. This policy was:
To prevent or at least deter the Japanese from establishing naval and air bases within striking 
distance of our vital interests in Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Australia and New 
15
20 DFAP, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1945, <http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/
historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView>, Menzies to Caldecote, 29 August 1940, Vol. IV, No. 65, Cable 
263, Caldecote to Menzies, 11 August 1940, Vol. IV, No. 84; Robertson, J. and McCarthy, J., Australian 
War Strategy 1939-1945: A Documentary History, (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1986) 
p. 169.Zealand. By using advanced operational bases throughout the area, we should aim at being 
able to concentrate aircraft at any point from our collective air resources in the Far East, 
Australia and New Zealand.21 
This policy, however, remained contingent on convincing the NEI authorities that it was 
in their interests to support the October conference plan for a combined air resource 
scheme in the first instance and receiving enough Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft from 
Britain to deter the Japanese in the second.
On 16 November 1940, the Australian Chiefs of Staff produced a report to the 
Australian government that endorsed the combined air resources plan. The Chiefs of 
Staff explained to the War Cabinet that British planners had previously designed the 
defences at Singapore and Malaya based on symmetrical army, navy and air force scales 
and that without a main fleet coming to Singapore the army and air force defences in 
Malaya would be unbalanced.22 Far East Command had decided to replace the fleet 
component of their plan with a combined air resource scheme to rebalance its defences 
as a deterrent to Japanese designs on Southeast Asia.
The Chiefs of Staff also recommended that two brigades of the 8th Division should be 
temporarily sent in support of Far East Command on its way to the Middle East. Its role 
would be to assist Far East Command in reinforcing Malaya Command until either an 
Indian division could be organised for Malaya, or a fleet became available to Singapore. 
Under these arrangements the Chiefs of Staff informed the government that the Royal 
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21 National Archives of Australia, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940. Report, British Staff 
Conversations with Officers from Netherlands East Indies 26th to 29th November, 1940. Combined Far 
Eastern Appreciation of Australian Chiefs of Staff. Feb 1941. Anglo - Dutch - Australian Conference, 
22nd - 25th February 1941, A5954, 565/4, 1940-1941, p. 23.
22 Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941 p. 298.Australian Navy (RAN) would need to be recalled from overseas duties in the 
Mediterranean to protect Australian convoys and trade routes in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans.23 
The October conference estimated the minimum numbers of aircraft needed for the Far 
East. They calculated the number of aircraft required at 534 for Malaya and Burma, 278 
for Australia, 50 for New Zealand, 8 for New Guinea-Solomon Islands-New Hebrides, 9 
for Fiji and Tonga, 87 for the Indian Ocean and 187 for the NEI. Considering their 
estimate of existing stocks, including outmoded aircraft, this amounted to a total 
deficiency of 1,153 modern aircraft. Despite being informed about the large shortfall in 
aircraft, the Australian War Cabinet nevertheless approved the Chiefs of Staff 
recommendations to prepare aircraft facilities at Darwin, New Guinea, Solomon Islands 
and the New Hebrides in readiness for the scheme and in the hope that aircraft numbers 
could be increased before war broke out. 
To address the shortfall in aircraft, the Australian War Cabinet decided to ask Britain for 
the additional aircraft supplies so that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) could 
fulfil its commitment to the combined air concentration scheme.24 The allotment of 
aircraft for Australia, however, remained contingent on the progress of war in Europe 
and the Mediterranean, conflicting demands with Far East Command and the rates of 
aircraft production in the British Commonwealth and USA.
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Indies Government. Singapore 1941 Batavia 1941, A981, DEF143, 1941 -1942, pp. 295-98.
24Ibid., pp. 9, 28, 36-37; National Archives of Australia, War Cabinet Minutes (Original) Chronological 
Series, Minute 632, 26 November 1940.Interestingly, the Anglo-Dutch-Australian air defence scheme, now based on limited 
aircraft supplies, defied common sense when all military services in the Far East 
dominions were short of armed forces equipment and especially aircraft. At the 
conference the British Chiefs of Staff estimated that Japan controlled an expeditionary 
force of ten battleships and seven aircraft carriers (with cruiser and destroyer escorts), 
six to ten army divisions with troopships and 336 to 432 aircraft, which Far East 
Command then could not match.25 The war in Europe had besieged Great Britain and 
ruled out any immediate or longer-term hope of sending more ships, munitions or armed 
forces to Singapore, let alone modern aircraft to Australia. It seems that the Australian 
War Cabinet and Far East Command were being ambitious if they thought Britain could 
make these supplies available to them at that time.
Far East Command nevertheless maintained their optimistic outlook although its 
combined dominion air force consisted of 118 outdated aircraft only. Malaya and Burma 
had 48 (40 obsolete), Australia 42 (40 obsolete) and New Zealand 28 (all obsolete). 
Moreover, Australia's projected output for aircraft manufacture in 1941 was 180 
outmoded Beaufort torpedo bombers of which the first 90 were destined for the 
undersupplied RAF in Malaya.26 The British Chiefs of Staff considered the October 
conference recommendations but informed Far East Command that 336 aircraft would 
be sufficient for their defence. They also explained that it was unlikely that further 
aircraft could be made available for Malaya before the end of 1941.27
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Vol. 5, No. 66.
26 Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the Far East," , p. 551.
27 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust: Series One - Australia in the War of 1939-1945 p. 51.The British and dominions' aircraft numbers in the Far East were clearly unable to fulfil 
the needs of the Singapore conference’s combined air scheme plans. Even with the 
expected addition of the Dutch Militaire Luchtvaart Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische 
Leger's (the Dutch Army Air Corps or MLKNIL) 137 mostly obsolete aircraft, they 
were unlikely to be enough to balance Allied military forces and effectively deter the 
Japanese. Furthermore, the MLKNIL's aircraft needed maintaining and, after Germany’s 
invasion of the Netherlands on 10 May 1940, there remained no hope of drawing on 
spare parts for its Dornier aircraft from the Netherlands or its German suppliers.
The NEI’s best option for getting munitions was from Australia, which was also 
suffering war supply shortages. The governor general of the NEI, Jonkheer Tjarda Van 
Starkenborgh Stachouwer, nevertheless approached the Australian government to 
acquire munitions supplies for the Royal Netherlands-Indies Army (KNIL). Menzies, 
probably considering previous British requests for Australia to help open talks with the 
NEI, used this opportunity to approve Van Starkenborgh Stachouwer's request and a 
KNIL commission travelled covertly to Melbourne on 2 October 1940 to begin the 
negotiations.28 These talks opened the way for further discussions between Australia, 
Far East Command and the NEI.
With meetings continuing between Australia and the NEI, Far East Command invited 
the Dutch Chiefs of Staff to talks at Singapore on 26 November 1940. Major-General 
ter Poorten (Chief of General Staff), Capt Van Staveren (Chief of Naval Staff) and Capt 
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September 1940; Ford, J. M., Allies in a Bind: Australia and Netherlands East Indies in the Second World 
War (Loganholme: Australian Netherlands Ex-Servicemen and Women's Association, 1996), pp. 19-20. Buurman Van Vreeden (of the General Staff) represented the Dutch. The aim of the 
meeting was to discuss cooperation between Dutch and British air forces in case the 
Japanese attacked either the NEI or Malaya. From Far East Command’s perspective, 
however, the conversations seemed more about getting the Dutch to commit to 
supplying air support for Malaya rather than providing British support to the defense of 
the NEI, because the British at Singapore could not fulfill that obligation without further 
reducing its own badly needed resources.
The Dutch Chiefs of Staff accepted the plan in principle and approved the mutual 
redistribution of the region's air forces between Malaya, Borneo and the NEI. They 
agreed that command of the air forces would transfer between British and Dutch control 
depending on their respective areas of responsibility in Malaya and the NEI and that 
each party could recall its air forces as required.29 These talks encouraged Far East 
Command and further talks were scheduled with the Dutch at Singapore for 22 
February 1941. 
On 14 February, in preparing for the upcoming talks at Singapore, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief (C-in-C) Far East, travelled to Sydney to 
brief the Australian War Cabinet on the Singapore situation. Brooke-Popham presented 
the War Cabinet with a positive outlook on the defence of Hong Kong, Malaya and 
Singapore. He told the meeting that his expectations were that, if Japan attacked, Hong 
Kong would hold out for four months, that Singapore would hold out for up to nine 
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Conversations with Officers from Netherlands East Indies 26th to 29th November, 1940. Combined Far 
Eastern Appreciation of Australian Chiefs of Staff. Feb 1941. Anglo - Dutch - Australian Conference, 
22nd - 25th February 1941, A5954, 565/4, pp. 45-48.months and, with the Indian Army’s 9th Division scheduled to arrive in Singapore in 
March and April, he believed he had reached the minimum requirement of ground 
forces for Malaya. 
The War Cabinet questioned Brooke-Popham about Britain's policy of protecting 
Britain and the Mediterranean ahead of Singapore. Brooke-Popham assured the meeting 
that Singapore could hold out until capital ships arrived and that he had Churchill's 
assurance that Britain 'will not let Singapore fall'.30 He also explained that the Japanese 
were poor pilots, 'not air-minded' and no match for British pilots and aircraft and that he 
regarded Japanese fighter planes as comparatively inefficient and inferior to the 
Brewster Buffalo aircraft, which he now had on order from the USA. 
This seems misleading, however, as the British Chiefs of Staff had already informed 
Brooke-Popham that Britain, the battle for the Atlantic and the Middle East all took 
precedence over the Far East.11 He was also aware that the Singapore Strategy had been 
in transition from 1937 to the time he arrived in Singapore on 14 November 1940. In 
1937 the British Chiefs of Staffs had assumed that a fleet would arrive in Singapore 
within 70 days of the outbreak of war with Japan and, despite the situation in Europe, 
automatically end any threat to Singapore. After a reappraisal in 1939, 180 days became 
the benchmark. By August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staffs secretly accepted that it 
would be impossible to send a large fleet to Singapore.31 
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1948), p, 1250.These changing circumstances had forced a review of Far East Command's strategic 
policy, which now called for all available forces to not only protect Singapore but the 
whole of the Malayan Peninsular. It is also clear that Brooke-Popham was conscious of 
the shortage of modern aircraft in Malaya, the lack of trained pilots to fly them and, as 
far as he was concerned, the ignorance of the RAF about modern warfare conditions. 
His true opinion was that ‘what the R.A.F. lacked in Malaya was a good proportion of 
pilots with practical war experience and these were not yet available to Far East 
Command’.32
On route to Singapore on 21 February, Brooke-Popham met Van Starkenborgh 
Stachouwer at Batavia to discuss the upcoming Anglo-Dutch-Australian conference. At 
this meeting the Australian delegates raised the strategic importance of Dutch Timor to 
Australia's northern defences. In discussions with the Gen Berenschot, the NEI’s 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), the Australians suggested that if war opened with Japan 
it would be in Australia’s interest to defend the Dutch air and port facilities at Kupang.
Berenschot agreed and suggested that Australian officers should visit Kupang to assess 
the military garrison. He told the delegates that Australian officers could also take over 
command of the garrison at Kupang. Moreover, he informed the delegates that he had 
already given orders to prepare new barracks for one thousand European troops, 
however, he made it clear to the Australian delegates that there were no anti aircraft 
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32 Brooke-Popham, "Operations in the Far East," pp. 550-52, 544.artillery (AAA) or coastal defence guns on the Island.33 This meant that Australia would 
need to supply its own guns to cover the airfield and littoral approaches to Kupang 
when garrisoning the Island. 
Berenschot then raised the issue of Dutch-Australian cooperation in the greater Darwin-
NEI area. He explained that the MLKNIL might move its air force commitments to Java 
and possibly Malaya, leaving the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago unprotected. 
He asked whether Australia could provide bomber squadrons to defend sea 
communications between the Celebes (present day Sulawesi) and northwest Dutch New 
Guinea. The defence of this area would depend on holding Ambon as an advanced air 
base instead of Kupang. He added that Ambon was close to the important strategic areas 
at the north-eastern end of the NEI archipelago and that four 6” guns and 1,600 garrison 
troops were already present on the Island. 
From the Australian delegates' viewpoint, despite Australia having limited munitions, 
arms, troops, aircraft, and naval resources, this seemed a sensible proposition. It 
projected Australia's defences further north; it was in range of bomber aircraft stationed 
at Darwin; and it allowed Kupang to become a secondary support base for offensive 
operations north of Ambon while maintaining communications between Australia and 
Java. The Australian delegates agreed to the proposition, but remained cautious about 
maintaining control over their bomber squadrons by telling Berenschot that the RAAF 
would provide patrols to Ambon and Kupang from their base at Darwin.
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22nd - 25th February 1941, A5954, 565/4, pp. 117-19.Air Chief Marshal Charles Burnett, however, insisted that if Ambon became a forward 
air force base of operations he wanted Australian troops to reinforce the garrisons at 
both Ambon and Kupang. This was not necessary, however, as the Dutch were already 
preparing to send an additional KNIL Battalion to the Island. This point was noted by 
Australian authorities when later referring to the unified command of troops at Ambon 
by cable:
In view  of Ambon being  important adm centre existg  there of coast defences  and naval 
estabs and adm of larger Malay garrison, Dutch desire retain control. If pressed on cmd point 
Dutch  are  prepared  to send  Malay  bn instead  and  dispense  w[ith] Aust land  forces  at 
Ambon.34
Berenschot had had forces available for reinforcing the Ambon garrison, but 
nevertheless accepted the offer of Australian troops and agreed to supply two or three 
Dutch troopships to take the AIF to the Islands from Australia if required.35
On 22 February the Australian delegation met in Singapore with Brooke-Popham and 
admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, C-in-C of the China Station. They discussed the upcoming 
defence conference with the Dutch and the USA to ensure that the British and 
Australian representatives spoke with one voice. Layton began by criticising the 
Australian Chiefs of Staffs appreciation, which he thought overestimated Japan's 
potential to launch large-scale simultaneous actions across the Southwest Pacific 
without excessively dissipating its forces. In dismissing the Chiefs of Staffs 
appreciation, Layton sought to persuade the Australian delegates that RAN destroyers 
and sloops operating in the Mediterranean and Red Sea should remain there, but 
24
34 National Archives of Australia, Court of Inquiry Vol 1, with Reference to the Landing of Japanese 
Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon - Volume 1 - Reports Part 1, AWM113, MH1/121, 1942-1942, 
p. 14.
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22nd - 25th February 1941, A5954, 565/4, pp. 117-19.suggested that RAN cruisers serving with imperial forces in the Middle East should 
return to Australia to protect its convoys. 
Brooke-Popham also persuaded the Australian delegation that in persuading the Dutch 
to concentrate their air force in Malaya, Australia would need to provide similar support 
to the NEI at Ambon. He suggested that two brigade groups; two Hudson bomber 
squadrons and possibly a third reinforcing squadron of shorter-range Wirraway light 
bombers were needed to operate in the Darwin-Ambon-Timor area.36 Brooke-Popham 
suggested that an Australian contribution to the area was advantageous to its own 
defence as well as to the promotion of Dutch cooperation. He concluded that RAAF 
operations in the Darwin-Ambon-Timor region would project regional air defence 
further forward and provide greater depth in defence. 
This meant that if Australia acted in support of Ambon and Kupang it would open the 
way for the Dutch to commit to a combined air defence scheme between Singapore/
Malaya and the NEI. This agreement was an integral part of Brooke-Popham’s plan to 
ally all parties concerned in Far East defence to enter the war as one, instead of standing 
alone and facing the prospect of defeat in detail.37 For Australia, the ostensible 
advantages of Ambon over Kupang were that the former already had a garrison, coastal 
defences and deep-water port in situ. Working from this basis the meeting agreed to 
upgrade Ambon to first-line defence in protecting communications between Australia 
and Java and other strategic areas in the NEI’s eastern archipelago.38 
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38 Ibid., pp. 118, 120.The full Anglo-Dutch-Australian conference met at Singapore on 22 February. Subject 
to the ratification of the governments concerned, the delegates approved the mutual 
Anglo-Dutch-Australian combined air defence scheme where the NEI agreed to supply 
three Glenn Martin and one Buffalo squadrons to Malaya. In return Far East Command 
promised to reciprocate in providing four RAF squadrons to the NEI when required 
while Australia agreed to base two Hudson and one Wirraway squadrons at Darwin to 
cover the Darwin-Ambon-Timor theatre of operations. 
The assumptions underpinning these talks were consistent with the previous October 
conference, which stated Japan would not launch major simultaneous attacks on 
Malaya, the NEI and Borneo, that the USA was unlikely to intervene initially and that 
Japan’s first objective would be Singapore. It was also assumed that the threat of the 
Soviet Union to Japanese forces in Manchuria combined with the possible intervention 
of the US on the side of the Anglo-Dutch allies in the Far East was enough to deter the 
Japanese from attacking Singapore. With these assumptions in mind, and while 
accepting that a threat to one constituted a threat to all, the conference agreed to 
coordinate the combined air defence scheme within three theatres of responsibility 
under British, Dutch and Australian control.39 
The British area of operations rested above the Dutch line. The Dutch area of operations 
included the NEI bounded by a line north of the equator running east from Aceh and 
below Malaya, across Borneo, the Sulu Sea and down through to the south coast of 
Dutch New Guinea, but excluded the Islands of Roti, Semau, Timor, Mulu and Cape 
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39 Ibid.Valsche. The Australian area of operations lay south of the Dutch theatre of operations 
and included Roti, Semau, Timor, Ambon, Mulu, Cape Valsche, Papua New Guinea, 
islands in the Solomon Sea and Nauru. Under these arrangements, Australia was 
committed to providing two brigades of infantry and three squadrons of aircraft to the 
Darwin-Ambon-Timor area of operations.40
The Malay Barrier Map
On 22 March, Sturdee and Burnett recommended the Singapore strategy agreements to 
the War Cabinet for approval where they were accepted in full. The War Cabinet 
noticed, however, that owing to demands elsewhere Sturdee had independently reduced 
the number of Australian troops allocated to the Darwin-Ambon-Timor area from two 
brigade groups to one brigade group, one battalion and one artillery battery. At the time 
there were no other 2nd AIF brigades available apart from the 23rd Brigade and Sturdee 
explained that he had since agreed with the Dutch CGS to provide one task force each 
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40 Ibid., pp. 110-11, 120.of 1,200 troops for Ambon and Kupang combined with an allotted air strike force 
operating out of Darwin.41
Sturdee also explained the Dutch had stipulated at the Singapore conference that the 
movement of Australian troops to Ambon and Kupang could not take place until after 
war with Japan had been declared. He told the meeting that this condition would greatly 
affect Australia's ability to transport troops and organise defences on the Islands at short 
notice. Because of the political implications connected with maintaining Dutch 
cooperation in the combined air scheme, and owing to the possibility that it could 
provoke Japan with a pretext for war, the War Cabinet considered it important to seek 
advice on both the political and military considerations from Britain before approaching 
the NEI authorities on the matter. Meanwhile, the War Cabinet approved the despatch of 
materials to Ambon and Kupang ahead of time. To avoid provoking any 
misunderstanding between Dutch and Japanese authorities the War Cabinet decided the 
goods shipped to the Islands should be labelled with Dutch markings.42 
The War Cabinet also learned from the Chiefs of Staff report that despite asking Far 
East Command to coordinate a naval plan for the Far East this had not happened.43 The 
War Cabinet viewed this failure in planning as a substantial setback in organising a 
coordinated defence plan for the Far East and the Southwest Pacific theatres generally 
and Australia in particular. Menzies was in England at time when he also discovered 
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March 1941.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.that no coordinated naval plans had been arranged by Far East Command and he cabled 
the Australian war cabinet from London on 12 March to express his concern. 
Menzies wrote that the discussions he had held with the British Admiralty regarding a 
co-coordinated naval plan for the Far East were troubling:
It was stressed  to me that such a step would  not be practicable until after the lapse of a 
considerable period, and might not be possible even then. It was urged that it was imperative 
to resolve a general declaration of this nature into a plan of specific measures that really 
would  be possible in event of such a  contingency arising. There are  large forces in the 
Middle East, including three Australian divisions, and they could not just be left to their fate. 
To withdraw them, however, would take time, shipping would have to be provided, convoys 
organised, and  naval protection afforded in the meantime. Much could  happen in the Far 
East during  that period, and  it was  unwise to delude ourselves regarding  the  immediate 
dispatch of a fleet of capital ships to Singapore if such reinforcement was impossible. It was 
far better to face the facts by preparing  a definite plan of naval reinforcement east of the 
Suez  on  a  progressive  basis  according  to  the  probable  outcome  of  events  in  the 
Mediterranean. I have asked that this be done.44 
This cable demonstrates that Menzies’ confidence in Britain's determination to defend 
Singapore and by implication Australia had been shaken. 
He informed his cabinet that 'in general reference to reinforcing our position in the Far 
East with capital ships we have only been deluding ourselves'.45 He maintained this 
concern notwithstanding Churchill’s earlier assurance that 'It always being understood 
that if Australia is seriously threatened by invasion [not just subjected to raids] we 
should not hesitate to compromise or sacrifice the Mediterranean position for the sake 
of our kith and kin’.46
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Churchill to Menzies, 23 December 1940, Vol. V, No. 236.At an Admiralty meeting in London the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Phillips, 
further dispelled Menzies' confidence in Britain's commitment to Singapore when he 
stated that:
We should not go to war with Japan over their occupation of any part of Netherlands East 
Indies-this would only add  to the number of our enemies, and if Germany could  first be 
defeated we could turn to Japan later and deal with her. [As far as he was concerned] [h]e 
would bluff up to the point of telling Japan that if she went into the Netherlands East Indies 
we would fight … if we had adequate air strength in the Far East Japan would not attempt 
such an operation.47 
The fact remained, however, that Far East Command did not have an adequate air force 
in the Far East large enough to deter Japan. Arguably, Philips was voicing Britain's 
higher policy of which Churchill wrote following the War: 'I would not tolerate the idea 
of abandoning the struggle for Egypt, and was resigned to pay whatever forfeits were 
exacted in Malaya. This view was shared by my colleagues'.48
Menzies nevertheless remained determined in his outlook and responded to Phillips that 
the political implications of not aiding the NEI against Japanese occupation were a 
powerful threat to Australia's security as well as to that of Singapore. He explained that 
if Japan invaded the NEI 'Australian public opinion would undoubtedly insist on 
military action to eject her' to prevent attacks on Northern Australia. He also made it 
clear that the Australian Chiefs of Staff had based Australia's local defence on the 
hypothesis that Singapore, protected by the British Navy, would remain a powerful 
deterrent to Japan. 
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48 Churchill, W., The Grand Alliance, vol. III, (London: Cassell & Co, 1950) p. 379.As it was there were no substantial naval forces or aircraft destined for the Far East in 
the near future. Without a naval force or adequate numbers of aircraft, Menzies was 
justified in pointing out that Far East Command needed a 'definite plan' for naval and air 
force reinforcements at Singapore to deter Japan from encroaching on the Far East 
region. To these ends, he vainly made his case to the Admiralty to increase aircraft 
shipments to the Far East and to create an adequate naval plan for reinforcing both 
Singapore and Australia.49
In support of Menzies' concerns the Australian War Cabinet immediately asked British 
authorities to convene a meeting of Naval Commanders-in-Chief to address the 
alarming gap in the overall Far East strategic defence plan. Even though the War 
Cabinet was reluctant to keep Australia's naval forces in the Mediterranean, they 
nevertheless remained committed to the agreements made at the Singapore conference. 
Australian ships would remain in the Mediterranean depending on unfolding events in 
the Middle East and the Far East.50
The meeting agreed, however, that this would remain policy only on the proviso that the 
British Government considered the possibility of providing alternative naval assistance 
for the defence of the sea-lanes in Far East waters. In reaching this decision the War 
Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff were aware that Australia was depriving itself of naval 
protection and that extricating their ships from the Mediterranean in the future would be 
problematic. In addressing this problem the War Cabinet instructed the Chiefs of Staff 
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March 1941.to report to Far East Command on the particular importance of defending the strategic 
port of Darwin and its forward operations bases to the north with adequate naval forces. 
They believed the success of these measures would be crucial to Australia's defence in 
the Darwin-Ambon-Timor area even though Ambon and Timor were outside Australia's 
naval operational control. This was especially the case, as the War Cabinet knew that 
the Dutch had already made plans to withdraw its ships from the eastern archipelago of 
the NEI if war came to Malaya. The War Cabinet felt ‘great concern at the failure of the 
conference to draw up such a plan’, where it had such a direct bearing in the 
organisation of Far Eastern defence.51 The War Cabinet had decided that without the 
means to concentrate adequate Australian army, air and naval forces in the Darwin-
Ambon-Timor area of operations, the defence plans for Australia's northern areas of 
responsibility would be difficult to sustain.
The problem lay in the reality that Far East Command, the NEI and Australia all lacked 
the economic and military resources to stand alone, or even combined as the case 
transpired, in a war with Japan. Far East defence weakness had been exacerbated by the 
ranking of the British Isles, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean ahead of the Far 
East in the supply of troops, aircraft, munitions and naval resources. Unfortunately for 
the Far East region, Britain was being prudent in not dissipating its forces to the point 
where their theatres of war would become 'weak everywhere'.52
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Cabinet by U.K. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Vol. IV, No. 400.The policy of Far East Command aimed to encourage Australia in gaining Dutch 
support for a combined air defence scheme to protect Malaya without necessarily 
committing itself to the defence of the NEI. The difficulty for Australia was its insecure 
dependence on a weakened 'Fortress Singapore' when that policy affected Australia's 
own strategic interests. Australia had linked its strategic defence policy to British 
strategy in the Far East through long standing mutual Imperial cooperation defence 
principles established as far back as 1926 and the combined air defence scheme now 
became the most compelling policy for Australia to follow in the absence of a 
substantive naval fleet at Singapore.
Notwithstanding the Singapore agreements, the British remained unwilling to ratify the 
Anglo-Dutch-Australia unified defence pact for fear of being forced to reciprocate with 
the Dutch if the Japanese attacked the NEI exclusively. Under such circumstances, the 
British Chiefs of Staff feared the Japanese navy would attack its British shipping lanes. 
Their main hope was in gaining support from the Americans before committing 
themselves to defending the NEI and weakening their own defences.53 
The British Government was, however, later forced to reconsider its position after the 
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, M Van Kleffens, made a radio broadcast on 6 
May 1941 stating that the NEI would support Far East Command if Japan attacked 
Malaya and Singapore and that he would welcome a corresponding assurance from the 
British Government. In making the broadcast Van Kleffens proved to the allies that the 
Dutch were not only committed to resisting Japanese aggression in the NEI but that they 
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53 Ibid., Cable, Lord Cranborne to W. Fadden, 22 May 1941, Vol. IV, No. 464.were committed to defending Malaya and Singapore also, leaving no doubt about their 
intentions of standing in solidarity with the British in the Far East. In effect, Van 
Kleffens’ broadcast forced the British to reify their grand strategy policy of unified 
defence in the Far East.
Deliberating on Van Kleffens’ broadcast the British Defence Committee of Cabinet 
finally accepted that they would have to commit in ratifying the agreement with the 
NEI. The committee decided that 'our alliance with the Netherlands and the necessity of 
safeguarding our own communications would leave us with no choice but to make 
common cause with the Netherlands East Indies'.54 They came to the conclusion that 
Britain needed to reassure the Dutch in case they changed their minds about committing 
to the combined air scheme in support of Brook-Popham’s unifying plan, which they 
knew hinged on NEI support and the aircraft they could supply. 
The defence committee also believed that a resolute united stance by Far East 
Command and the NEI against Japanese aggression would be a strong inducement for 
the USA to take corresponding action in the Far East.55 Nevertheless, rather than making 
a public declaration in support of the NEI, the British Defence Committee of Cabinet 
decided to privately reassure the Dutch government-in-exile that an attack on one would 
be accepted as an attack on all, as was initially agreed to at the February Singapore 
conference.56 The Van Kleffens affair effectively demonstrated that the object of British 
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June 1941.combined air scheme for Malaya and the NEI; and, to induce the Americans to support 
the Far East by way of demonstrating a united NEI/British resolve to fight against 
Japanese aggression.
Lord Cranbourne cabled a full account of the Van Kleffens declaration to acting Prime 
Minister, AW Fadden. Cranbourne’s cable explained in detail that the NEI had 
steadfastly resolved to ally itself with the British Commonwealth in resisting Japanese 
aggression and that as a result Britain was preparing to reciprocate. He relayed his hope 
to Fadden that this would now induce the USA to take corresponding action. On 10 June 
1941, the War Cabinet concurred with Cranbourne’s cable, in the presence of the three 
services Chiefs of Staff, and discussed the release of a private assurance to the NEI ‘that 
a line running from Singapore via the Netherlands East Indies to Australia must be 
treated as one unit, and that an attack from outside on any point situated on this line 
must be considered and dealt with as an attack on all affected parties alike’.57 In the 
context of the Cranbourne cable its is clear that the British government, the Australian 
government and the three Chiefs of Staff that the NEI authorities were determined to 
fight alongside the British dominions against any encroachment of Japanese aggression 
in their delineated theatres of operations in the Far East.
The object of the Singapore conference policy had now achieved its ends in uniting 
Allied British Commonwealth and NEI policy in the Far East. The object of the 
Australian government’s policy in supporting the Ambon strategy had also achieved its 
ends in helping to convince the NEI to ally itself with Far East Command against 
35
57 Ibid., Meetings 9 May 1941 to 18 Jul 1941. Minute No.s 1027 to 1227, p. 828.Japanese aggression in the Far East. This turning point should have prompted the War 
Cabinet to review its grand strategy commitments to Timor and Ambon as the political 
object of gaining NEI support had met its ends. A new policy was now required to 
sustain the object of grand strategy where it related to sending troops to Ambon. 
Without a political object the Ambon strategy would default back to pre-Clausewitzian 
Prussian doctrine where positional line warfare and the taking or holding territory, 
rather than defeating the enemy’s forces to achieve a political end, was the norm.58 
Clausewitz believed war was ‘not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of 
politics by other means’. He determined that grand strategy is principally political in 
nature and that the use of military force is only one of several options utilised in 
resolving conflict between states; the military objective is thereby derived from the 
political purpose and the achievable means available to accomplish it where all other 
means have failed.
In the realm of Realpolitik, war cannot be considered to exist in isolation from its 
political object and pure military strategy cannot exist in separation from the political 
object of policy, for without policy war would serve no ends other than to justify the 
absurdly of fighting war for its own sake; war without ends.59 Without a renewed policy, 
a purely military strategy involving the garrisoning of troops at Ambon now existed. For 
these reasons the Timor and Ambon strategies required a reappraisal of the policy 
objectives to justify the garrisoning of the Islands and a policy statement indicating its 
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59 Ibid.political ends. Notwithstanding these crucial principles of policy development, the 
Australian authorities continued in their resolve to support the NEI at Ambon. 
In March 1941, the Australian Chiefs of Staff began making plans to move supplies and 
troops to the forward operations bases at Ambon and Kupang. Australian AHQ in 
Melbourne produced AHQ Operational Instruction No. 15 for the defence of the 
Darwin-Ambon-Timor area. Operational Instruction No. 15 was intended to give 
Brigadier Edmund Lind responsibility for dispersing the battalions under his command 
to the Islands.60 AHQ had earmarked a copy of the instructions for Lind as commander 
2/23rd Infantry Brigade at Winnellie, but he claims it never arrived.61 
Lind, however, did receive orders from AHQ to detach the 2/22nd Bn from the 23rd 
Brigade to form Lark Force and send it to Rabaul during March and April 1941. The 
remaining 2/21st and 2/40th Bn.s were converted to a forward operations reserve at 
Darwin while awaiting embarkation for Ambon and Kupang. According to Operational 
Instruction No. 15, the objectives of the 23rd Brigade’s two remaining battalions were to 
strengthen the existing Dutch garrisons in the static defense of the airfields at both 
Ambon and Timor. Subject to these arrangements, brigade headquarters was to remain 
in control of the administration of the two battalions. Under these orders the 2/21st Bn. 
was to become known as ‘Gull Force’ and the 2/40th Bn. as ‘Sparrow Force’. 
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matters, AHQ directed Gull Force HQ to retain control of all Australian troops when 
they arrived at Ambon. The Dutch were to remain in general command of the military 
and administrative responsibilities for the Island. All operational command of local 
defences and air operations on Ambon also remained under Dutch headquarters control, 
but it later came to include both the Dutch naval and army commands acting in 
cooperation with Gull Force and RAAF commands.62
AHQ based Operational Instruction No. 15 on a report written by the 8th Division's 
senior engineer, Lt-Col ECB Scriven RAE, following his visit to Ambon during March 
1941. From a tactical point of view Scriven found Ambon a difficult place to defend. He 
described Ambon as a small rough island surrounded by littoral approaches unsuitable 
to amphibious landings where the coast rose up directly into steep jungle clad 
mountains making it difficult for anything other than small military patrols to approach. 
He also found that Ambon's food production amounted to limited pig and chicken 
production, fishing, the harvesting of tropical fruits and vegetables. Considering this 
finding Scriven decided that, apart from tropical fruit, fish, sago and rice, Gull Force 
would need to import all of their food supplies from Australia.
Scriven also reported that although water supplies were plentiful on the Island it 
required chlorination, as he had found that the local population tended to contaminate 
the streams. In addition, apart from a slipway for ships of less than two hundred tons 
there was little industry at Ambon town and the surrounding villages, although a 
38
62 Ibid., p. 47.privately operated 600 kW powerhouse supplied electricity to the town. The port 
facilities were found serviceable and amounted to a concrete wharf with 29 feet of water 
at low tide, a timber wharf with 20 feet of water at low tide and a boat jetty with 13 feet 
of water at low tide.63 
Scriven reckoned that the main strategic points on Ambon for the Dutch were the 
airfield at Laha, the seaplane base at Halong, the oil holding facilities, the towns of 
Ambon and Paso, the landing beaches at Hitulama, Hutumuri, Paso, Batugong and 
Latuhalat as well as the approaches to Ambon from these potential landings sites across 
the mountain pathways. Nevertheless, he believed that defending these points would be 
difficult owing to the lack of space for manoeuvring troops. He concluded that the 
Laitimor Peninsular was the most exposed part of Ambon to attack, because as he put it, 
'the loss of the first line of resistance will bring the enemy perilously close to the 
proposed narrowly defended bases that lay between the towns of Amboina [Ambon] and 
Paso'.64
To address the restrictive spatial issues on the Island, Scriven recommended siting a 
reserve company of motorised troops armed with Tommy guns near Ambon town. Their 
task would be to move rapidly against any points of unexpected attack. He believed that 
the Australian mobile reserve company should also support the KNIL Indonesian 
infantry units in defending Paso as well as the various fortified positions located in the 
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1.mountains. However, he recommended against sending Bren carriers to Ambon because 
he thought they were useless when bound to narrow coastal roads that ran exclusively 
along the fringes of the Island.65 
Scriven also reported that the Laha Airfield and the Halong seaplane base were of the 
highest in tactical importance to Gull Force, notwithstanding the thirty-three kilometres 
of poor quality track separating the two locations. To defend both locations Scriven 
advised AHQ that Gull Force would need to either split as a group and risk isolating its 
units or construct a new roadway between Paso and Laha to maintain rapid vehicle 
movement. He also recommended sending two Australian battalions to Ambon; two 
companies including a section of headquarters company, one troop of Howitzers and 
one section from a field company for Laha; and, one battalion, one battalion less two 
companies, two troops of mountain guns or Howitzers, one field company (less two 
sections) and all ancillary units joined with other infantry units supplied by the KNIL at 
Halong.66
Scriven's report demonstrated that Ambon was difficult to defend. This fact was 
exacerbated by the Dutch decision to prohibit Australian troops going to the Island until 
after Japan attacked the NEI. This imposition left Australian unit and sub-unit 
commanders little hope of gaining access to the defences on Ambon between war 
breaking out and their later arrival on the Island. To overcome this problem Scriven 
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Ambon so that they could study the defences on the Island for themselves. 
Scriven's final recommendations were that a GSO from Melbourne should visit both 
Ambon and Timor to acquaint himself, and through him other headquarters operational 
planners at AHQ, with a firsthand assessment of the defence problems existing on the 
Islands. To increase Gull Force’s capabilities Scriven further recommended that AHQ 
recall the 8th Division’s stocks of mountain guns from Malaya to provide extra 
firepower for Ambon.67
Despite these recommendations Sturdee dismissed Scriven's report where he advised 
sending a GSO from AHQ to do of their own reconnaissance and providing two 
battalions and mountain artillery or Howitzers to Ambon. AHQ Operational Instruction 
No. 15 formed Gull Force from the 2/21st Bn with one section from the 2/11th Field 
Engineers, C Troop of the Australian Antitank Battery, a detachment from the 2/12th 
Field Ambulance, the 104th Light Aid Detachment, the 23rd Dental Unit, a detachment of 
the 23rd Brigade signals section, a detachment each from the Intelligence Corps, the 
Australian Army Canteen Service (AACS) and the Australian Army Catering Corps 
(AACC), which included detachments of motor transport. An officer and three sergeants 
would makeup an advance maintenance party for securing the arrival of stores and 
munitions from Australia. Considering these arrangements, Gull Force came to 1,038 
men plus trucks and equipment, which amounted to half of what Scriven had 
recommended.
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67 Ibid., p. 6.AHQ Operational Instruction No. 15 also prepared Sparrow Force along similar lines to 
that of Gull Force albeit drawing on the 2/40th Bn plus detachments from disparate sub-
units and where AHQ expected Sparrow Force to gain an independent (commando) 
company as well as two 6-inch guns for Kupang when they became available. In 
addition, both Gull and Sparrow Forces would receive twenty-six 1.5 tonne trucks, 
twenty-six light machine guns (LMGs) and fourteen antiaircraft light machine guns 
(AALMG), four 3-inch mortars and ten medium machine guns (MMG) instead of 
armoured Bren carriers. These preparations concerned Lind, however, especially where 
the omission of the artillery, Bren carriers and the loss of one battalion group were 
concerned, but he refrained from commenting until after May1941 when he, Roach and 
Youl visited Ambon and Kupang to assess the military situation on the Islands for 
themselves. 
Lind was a medical doctor who turned soldier and had gained his military experience 
during and after World War I. He served as a Captain in the Medical Corps at Gallipoli 
and in France at Armentiéres, Messines, Broodseinde, Passchendaele, Hamel and the 
Hindenburg Outpost Line. He enlisted as a Captain in 1914 and returned to Australia 
after the War as a temporary Lt-Col with a DSO and two mentions in dispatches. He 
commanded the Melbourne University Rifles from 1921 to 1926 and later became a 
staff officer with the 4th Division HQ Australian Military Forces (AMF militia). He also 
commanded the 29th, the 29/22nd Bns and, after gaining the rank of brigadier, the 4th 
Infantry Brigade. In July 1940, Lind took command of the 8th Division’s 2/23rd Brigade, 
42which consisted of the 2/21st, 2/22nd and the 2/40th Bns operating under the respective 
commands of Lt-Cols Roach, Carr and Youl and eventually Leggatt.68
Roach was also a veteran of World War I. He enlisted in the 5th Bn 1st AIF as a private 
soldier in August 1914 and served in both Gallipoli and France. Rising through the 
ranks, he received a commission as a Lieutenant in December 1916. From 1918 to 
1921, he took a commission in the Indian Army and served in Persia and Afghanistan 
until he was forced to retire on medical grounds. On returning to Australia, he enlisted 
in the AMF’s 5th Bn for three months and then transferred to staff duties with the 4th 
Division’s HQ. He served in various AMF units until 1934 when he rose to the rank of 
Major and became Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster and then GSO Grade 2 with the 
4th Division HQ. During 1939, he was commanding an AMF Battalion when he enlisted 
in the 2nd AIF to become a temporary Lt-Col in command of the 2/21st Bn.69
Youl was the son of the prominent Tasmanian pastoralist and politician, Alfred Youl. As 
a young man, he had gone to Britain to join the British India Office. When war broke 
out in 1914, he enlisted in the British Army and became a Major in the Royal Field 
Artillery. Fighting in France, he received the Military Cross and the Belgian Croix De 
Guerre. On returning to Australia, Youl remained on the reserve officers list until 
October 1936 when he joined the Tasmanian 12th and later the 12/50th AMF Bns. 
Between 1937 and 1940, Youl commanded the 12/50th Bn where he rose to the rank of 
Lt-Col. In July 1940, he enlisted in the 2nd AIF and took command of the 2/40th Bn, 
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69 Ibid., Leonard Nairn Roach, ([cited 12 December 2007]).which he formed, trained and later led to the Northern Territory in March 1941.70 After 
visiting Ambon and Timor each of these officers came home with significant concerns 
about the capacity for their under-equipped forces to operate successfully on the Islands.
On 19 May, Lind, his 23rd Brigade Major Sheehan, Roach, Youl and a RAAF 
reconnaissance party left Darwin aboard a Hudson aircraft to examine the defences at 
both Ambon and Kupang. Youl deplaned at Kupang while Lind's party continued to 
Ambon. After examining the respective reports, Lind confirmed that the forces 
projected for both islands did not have the balance of arms needed to defend Ambon or 
Kupang and that the only communication lines open between the Islands and Australia 
during the early stages of a war would be dependent on RAAF aircraft stationed 
permanently at Darwin.71
Like Scriven, Lind found that stores, barracks equipment and medical supplies were 
unavailable on the Islands and that all provisions and equipment would need to be 
shipped from Australia.72 This meant that when war broke out it would be unrealistic to 
expect new supplies to come safely by ship to the Islands from Darwin. The bulk of the 
RAN was still serving in the Middle East and had a limited naval capability at Darwin 
for escorting supply ships to the Islands. The RAAF was also ruled out because it could 
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in war.
To overcome these difficulties and to enhance efficiency in making war preparations on 
the Islands, Lind asked AHQ to attach an Australian army liaison officer to KNIL 
headquarters at Bandung. His only existing connection with Dutch headquarters in 
Bandung was through a RAAF liaison officer whom, from Lind's perspective, remained 
focussed more on advancing air force preparations on the Islands ahead of the 
requirements of the 23rd Brigade. Lind suggested that an army liaison officer stationed 
at Bandung could serve the interests of the 23rd Brigade more efficiently by speeding up 
preparations for his troops to arrive on the Islands.
While on sick leave in Melbourne during July 1941, Lind made 'strong personal 
representations' to Sturdee and to express his growing concerns regarding the efficacy 
of defending Ambon and Kupang with the limited tasks forces now allocated to the 
Islands. Lind explained to Sturdee that the forces projected for Ambon and Kupang 
were inadequate in both numbers and armaments, but much to Lind's chagrin Sturdee 
disregarded those concerns.73
Henning, the author of Doomed Battalion, believed the cause of Sturdee’s lack of 
interest in Lind’s concerns was that: 
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Sturdee’s own words support Henning’s conclusion. On 8 February 1955, Sturdee wrote 
to Official Historian Gavin Long explaining that: 
With regard to the establishment of what you call the Chiefs of Staffs Forward Observation 
Line, you will realise that it was most important that we should have the earliest warning of 
the approach of the Japanese Forces, and for this purpose air forces had to be as far north as 
possible  …  with great reluctance I agreed  to send  a  battalion group to each of Rabaul, 
Timorn [sic] and Ambon …  This decision was made fairly early in 1941. I realised at the 
time that these forces would be swallowed up if the Japs made a determined attack in force, 
but these garrison[s] were the smallest self contained units then in existence … at no time 
did I consider that addition[al] troops and arms should be sent to these potentially beleagured 
[sic] garrisons, as it would only put more [of our resources] in the [Japanese] bag.75
This revelation raises the question of why, should the forces would be swallowed up if 
the Japanese made a determined attack, did he send the tasks forces to the Islands to be 
overwhelmed when that course of action was wasteful and avoidable?
This question is important where Sturdee’s responsibility in applying the most 
profitable means to the interest of higher war policy with the forces allotted to him in 
the Australian theatre of operations became paramount to his role in developing military 
strategy towards the Islands. His plan to send inadequate units consisting of 1180 men 
against a probable overwhelming Japanese force consisting of at least one division, 
while preserving what remained of Australia’s fighting forces, is contrary to the 
obtainable or the profitable use of the means to fight war and waxes in contravention of 
established standards of political and military strategy.76
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76 Liddell Hart, B. H., The Classic Book on Military Stategy, 2nd ed., (London: Meridian, 1991), p. 320.Despite telling Long that he harboured ‘great concern’ about the strategy for Ambon 
from early 1941 onward, he did not inform the War Cabinet of that concern when it 
mattered most. His obligation to the War Cabinet and higher strategy was to inform the 
cabinet when the expenditure of forces allotted to him were inadequate to the task 
indicated or indeed redundant. Under normal conventions he had the responsibility of 
explaining those issues to his masters, and if his opinion were overruled, the option of 
refusing duty or resigning; he did not exercise any of these options. 
If Sturdee’s lack of disclosure invites criticism here, so does the War Cabinet where it 
failed to readdress the object of policy towards garrisoning the Islands. The War Cabinet 
held responsibility for formulating achievable policy and the right to intervene in 
military strategy to ensure that its commanders conformed to the policy tasks allotted to 
them. It was their responsibility to Sturdee to adapt grand strategy to the changing 
circumstances and probable outcomes of war and clearly indicate any new directions in 
that policy. On the other hand, if the War Cabinet believed that Sturdee was acting 
independent of that policy in contravention to those guidelines it had the power to 
correct him or remove him from command.77 This was important when in May 1941 the 
Dutch broadcast that they were committed to fighting in common cause with the British 
Commonwealth against Japanese aggression in the Far East, which was the initial 
political object of garrisoning Ambon. This event should have prompted the War 
Cabinet to review its policy objectives where that policy had achieved its logical ends. 
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after Cranbourne asked the Australian government to unite its policy with Britain in 
supporting the NEI to those ends, but somehow this turning point seems to have 
escaped the attention of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff. Considering these 
events its seems the link between policy and its instrument had parted company where 
Sturdee had failed to fully inform his political masters of the great concern he had 
regarding the profitability of the Ambon policy and where the War Cabinet had failed to 
review its policy towards Ambon when that was required.
Sturdee’s claim to Long that the long-standing establishment of an air force early 
warning system in the Islands was policy in early 1941 was also misleading. Until late 
May 1941 Australian war policy remained geared to inducing the Dutch to join Brooke-
Popham’s Unified Strategic Command in the Far East theatre as decided at the February 
Singapore conference. Under the Singapore conference policy the Australian War 
Cabinet retained the right to unilaterally form high strategic policy in its theatre of 
operations, which included Ambon, and could withdraw or withhold forces from that 
commitment at any time subject only to informing Far East Command before taking 
such action.78 In this context, Australia was never inextricably bound to a determined 
policy of forward observation at Ambon. Strategy for Ambon at this point became one 
of position and line fighting independent of political objectives. There was no longer a 
logical strategic or political object in sending Gull Force to Ambon other than to occupy 
and hold. On this point Sturdee’s ineptitude is more to blame than that of the War 
Cabinet, which was operating without the CGS’s full disclosure regarding his concerns 
48
78 National Archives of Australia, Official History, 1939-45, War: Records of Gavin Long, AWM67, 
3/384, p. 4.over the unprofitability of sending troops to Ambon and the likely outcome of 
overwhelming forces attacking the Island. 
Position and line fighting in isolation of policy here was contrary to Clausewitz’s 
principle that defined military strategy as ‘the employment of the battle to gain the end 
of the War; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in 
accordance with the political object of War’.79 That is, under a democratic system, the 
military must direct its strategy in agreement with the political aims of policy to which 
it must remain subordinate, otherwise position and line fighting alone exists in its purest 
form; that is means without ends. This suggests that under a democratic system, where 
the functions of political leaders and the generals do not reside in the same person, 
position and line fighting serves no purpose whatsoever. 
Sturdee had realised at the beginning of 1941 that the forces he was sending to Rabaul, 
Timor and Ambon would be swallowed up if the Japanese attacked with determined 
force. He compensated by deciding to send one battalion group each to the Islands and 
limit the losses, albeit without fully informing the War Cabinet of that decision or its 
associated implications until he was questioned on the matter by the War Cabinet. If 
Sturdee’s reasoning was based on Clausewitz’s conception that:
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he had misconceived Clausewitz’s intentions. 
This concept rests under Clausewitz’s chapter heading The Effect of the Political Aim on 
the Military Objective, which argues that the agreement to provide mutual support for 
another state in this way is a matter for high politics between those states alone. By not 
informing the War Cabinet of his concerns about the inadequacy of the forces he was 
sending to the Islands and his policy to limit those losses in the Islands, Sturdee was 
acting independent of policy and in contravention to normalised democratic principles, 
where governments determine the aims of policy and where the military serves in 
achieving those political ends.
A better strategy, perhaps, would have been one of limited aims achieved by 
withdrawing closer to Australia and concentrating forces in preparation for the decisive 
moment and then counter attacking in force. According to Clausewitz, without 
possessing superior forces or an inclination to take serious risks, limited aims fall into 
two categories; seizing enemy territory (offensive warfare); and, waiting for more 
favourable conditions to arise (defensive warfare). Clausewitz believed that where the 
political initiative lies with the smaller power the offensive should be taken, although, 
‘if the smaller state is quite certain its enemy will attack, it can and should stand on the 
defensive’ as waiting accrues no disadvantage to the defender.81 Under the above 
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81 Ibid., pp. 726-27.conditions the enemy is required to extend themselves and consequently become weaker 
or poorer. As it happened, when Rabaul, Timor and Ambon fell into Japanese hands 
during early 1942 this is what took place, as Australia was forced to adopt defensive 
warfare principles as described above by Clausewitz anyway. 
Sturdee’s approach to limiting losses in defence of the Islands by dissipating the 23rd 
Brigade in the face of overwhelming odds runs counter to Clausewitz’s principles. The 
object of defensive war is aimed at frustrating the enemies plans, undermining their will 
to fight and exploiting any weaknesses in their military and political objectives while 
concentrating and preserving your own forces and political ends in anticipation of a 
decisive moment followed by offensive action.82 Clausewitz believed here that defence 
was stronger than offence where it was better to wait and hope that conditions might 
become more favourable while preparing for battle.
In light of the achievement of the Singapore conference policy to induce the Dutch to 
fight, the apparent failure of the War Cabinet to review its policy once this was 
achieved, and the disconnect between the War Cabinet and Sturdee when he formed an 
independent policy to provide smaller tasks forces to the Islands without gaining War 
Cabinet’s fully informed approval, it seems clear that the War Cabinet’s processes in 
formulating grand strategy were made dysfunctional. Sturdee’s instinctive reluctance to 
send his troops against probable defeat and his adjustments to reduce the losses was 
probably correct, but his failure to openly disclose what he was doing and his failure to 
involve the War Cabinet in those decisions was ill-considered where he could have been 
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or would not explain to Lind the limitations he had imposed on the Gull and Sparrow 
forces.
Around the same time Sturdee and Lind were working through the concerns of 
inadequate defence for the Islands, Germany launched an all-out assault against Russia 
on 22 June 1941. Germany's attack gave Japan the opportunity to reconsider its policies 
on China as well as its ambitions in the Far East. The German attack forced the Soviet 
Union to move between 18 and 20 of its Siberian divisions to the West to face the 
German offensive and save Moscow. This had the effect of lessening Japan's anxiety 
over Russian intervention in Manchuria and allowed Japanese authorities to accelerate 
long held plans of moving troops into Indochina and other Southeast Asian countries.
Japan's Minister of War, Tojo, believed that this opportunity needed to be exploited 
before the end of 1941 or else the option for a Greater East Asia CO-Prosperity Sphere 
would have to be abandoned. Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the President of the Privy 
Council, Hara, both disagreed and favoured attacking north to exploit the German-
Soviet situation. They thought that if Japan took the southern option it could provoke 
war with America and Britain. These ministers tried to persuade the Japanese Cabinet to 
strike north while the Russians remained preoccupied in the West. Nevertheless, 
emperor Hirohito chose the southern option and set aside war in northern China pending 
the effects of the German-Soviet situation.83 
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As a result the Australian War Cabinet invited their chiefs of the naval and air staffs, as 
well as the DCGS, Sydney Rowell, to outline their views on precautions that the 
Government should consider. Regarding Ambon and Kupang, Rowell explained that 
although war equipment was already arriving on the Islands it was proving difficult to 
find ships to transport the task forces to their allocated destinations. Burnett also 
expressed his concerns about delays in sending RAAF advance parties to Ambon and 
Kupang. The War Cabinet decided to notify the British Government that Australian 
troops were ready for dispatch to the Islands. In the meantime, the War Cabinet asked 
Admiral Colvin to get hold of the Dutch troopships that Berenschot had offered for 
transporting Gull and Sparrow Forces to Ambon and Kupang.85 
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July 1941.That day Menzies cabled Caldecote's replacement, Viscount Cranborne, asking whether 
Britain could persuade the Netherlands government-in-exile to allow the transfer of AIF 
troops, or at the least some advance parties in uniform, to the Islands immediately after 
Japan moved into Indochina. He used this opportunity to remind Cranborne of Britain's 
assurance that they would return RAN ships to Australian waters 'on, or shortly after, 
the outbreak of war with Japan'.86
Cranborne's response came on 7 August:
We have not so far taken any action to approach the Netherlands Government further in this 
matter since we had felt that it would be useless to approach them with a specific proposal 
on the question of reinforcement of Ambon and  Koepang unless we were in a position to 
deal  with a counter request from the  Dutch which they would  no doubt make for some 
assurance of support in the event of their territory in the Far East being attacked.87
Menzies received further advice from Cranborne on 14 June regarding the delay in 
sending Australian troops to Ambon and Kupang. Cranborne wrote:
Further consideration  has  been  given  to question whether  move  of Australian  forces  to 
Koepang and Ambon could take place prior to outbreak of hostilities with Japan. Apart from 
whether Netherlands Government would agree in the absence of definite assurance of British 
support in the event of Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, such a move would 
be  regarded  in  Japan  as  a  challenge  in  present  circumstances.  As  immediate  measure 
therefore it is undesirable. We do not necessarily go so far, however, as to preclude it until 
hostilities break out. A change in the general situation might conceivably occur before this, 
which would provide necessary opening  without present objections. In the meantime we 
fully  agree  that  all  preparations  for  reception  of  Australian  forces  should  be  made 
unobtrusively in advance with the Netherlands authorities.88
With this advice, the Australian government could do little other than agree to this 
policy, because Britain feared overextending its commitments to the NEI. 
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Naval Office was drafting a report at the time relating to requirements for the 
establishment of advanced bases at Ambon and Kupang. Commander Salm of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy attended the meeting as liaison officer to organise transport ships for 
taking Australian supplies and troops to the Islands. The meeting concluded that there 
would be an unsatisfactory delay of at least three weeks in transporting troops and 
equipment to Ambon and Kupang on the outbreak of war. 
Fearing to the potential Japanese threat of entering the war and menacing sea 
communications, the meeting agreed to send advance troops, vehicles and equipment 
when practicable. Notwithstanding the potential of upsetting Japan, the meeting decided 
to transfer more equipment to the Islands immediately in the company of a small 
contingent of technical staff whose job it was to secure the materials and to await the 
arrival of Gull Force.89 This arrangement was later endorsed by the War Cabinet in July 
and maintenance parties of seven men each were sent to Ambon and Kupang with 
instructions to maintain the vehicles, guns, ammunition and stores already on the 
Islands and to receive the rest of the of supplies that were expected to arrive during 
August.
Because the Dutch wanted to avoid provoking Japan they were reluctant to permit AIF 
troops to be moved to the Islands before war began, nevertheless, this did not stop the 
Australian Government from maintaining pressure on Britain in the months ahead to 
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1941-1941, p. 71.have at least two parties of 100 uniformed soldiers each and two smaller groups of 
uniformed RAAF personnel sent to Ambon and Kupang.90 In December 1941 the Dutch 
finally agreed to additional advance parties for the Islands, but it was left too late to act 
before Japan finally launched its attacks.91
Meanwhile, in October 1941, the Labour Party took over Government and John Curtin 
became Prime Minister. Curtin at first continued the war policies of the Menzies 
government because he was a sitting member of the Advisory War Council. Curtin had 
led his party in the formation of a bilateral policy with the Menzies Government vis-à-
vis the War Advisory Council and a change in government did little to affect the 
continuance of the original Darwin-Ambon-Timor policies. Consequently, between 6 
and 12 October, Col Veale92 and other officers from the 7th Military District HQ carried 
out another reconnaissance of Ambon and Kupang.93 
After six days of reconnaissance Lind updated his views to AHQ regarding the current 
situation on the Islands. He informed Sturdee 'my principle impression after reading the 
reports is that the amount of work done since my previous recce in May last is far from 
56
90 Ibid., p. 2.
91 Robertson, J. and McCarthy, J., Australian War Strategy 1939-1945University of Queensland Press, 
1986) p. 173n.
92 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust: Series One - Australia in the War of 1939-1945 p. 69n. Veale replaced 
Scriven after he died in a motor vehicle accident at Kupang on 30 June 1941.
93 National Archives of Australia, [Ambon (1941-1942) - (Gull Force) - Reports:] "Sparrow Force", 
Tactical Report by C.O. 2/40 Infantry Battalion 14/10/1941. Report by Major AJM Wilson O.C., 2/1 
Battery on Fixed Defences, Koepang 14/10/1941. Reconnaissance Report from 6-12/10/1941, Ambon and 
Timor by Major Jw Fletcher B.M. 23rd Infantry Brigade - 7 M.D. Report by Colonel WCD Veale 
C.R.A.E. - Report by Major Williamson C.O. 2/11 Field Coy on Field Engineer Facilities and 
Requirements at Ambon and Timor, Report by Captain Ransom 14/10/1941 on Reconnaissance Battery 
Site and Fortress Engineer Problem, AWM54, 573/6/6, 1941-1941, p. 3.satisfactory'.94 Lind complained that the construction of accommodation for his troops 
was behind schedule at both Ambon and Kupang and strongly recommended that 'no 
part of our forces should be committed in either TIMOR or AMBON until the Dutch 
show by results that they attach as much importance to the well-being and safety of our 
troops as we do'.95 He explained to Sturdee that Australian soldiers were in no position 
to speed up construction schedules at either place because the 'coolie' labour came under 
Dutch control. 
As he had done in May, Lind again asked AHQ to reinforce Gull Force with field or 
mountain artillery. For Ambon, he explained 'it is dangerous to rely on having the 
support of Dutch artillery - it seems already to be allotted to several alternative roles 
which would together be beyond its capacity to fulfil'.96 He added that Timor was in a 
worse situation than Ambon because it had no Dutch artillery at all, apart from the two 
6-inch coastal guns that Australia had supplied to Kupang. Lind also argued 'that to send 
these forces abroad without supplying artillery when they expect to have to fight a well-
equipped enemy would be grossly unfair to the troops'.97
He reiterated that AHQ should supply Bren carriers to both Gull and Sparrow forces. In 
justifying this request, he explained that although both islands were unsuitable for 
cross-country movement of vehicles, the carriers would become vital for rapid 
movement along roads susceptible to small arms fire. He urged AHQ to supply a full 
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97 Ibid., pp. 9-10.complement of Bren carriers in conformity with full war equipment scales to improve 
the mobility of the 2/21st and 2/40th Bns and to safeguard both the troops and the 
airfields they were being asked to protect. He also asked AHQ to appoint a staff officer 
at Melbourne AHQ to liaise with the 23rd Brigade and other AHQ staff officers 
responsible for managing Gull and Sparrow Force operations and material 
requirements. 
Finally, Lind asked AHQ for permission to go to Melbourne to discuss in person the 
issues of equipping Gull and Sparrow Forces, as he thought that the 'many questions 
involved cannot be satisfactorily dealt with on paper'.98 It seems Lind wanted to see 
Sturdee in person to discuss the inadequacy of armaments for his units as well as to find 
AHQ’s true objectives for Ambon.99 Sturdee refused to agree with Lind’s request. He 
also overlooked Lind’s other recommendations in upgrading the number forces and 
artillery for the Gull and Sparrow Force operations.
Adding to the 23rd Brigade's concerns, Lind removed Youl from command of the 2/40th 
Bn on 7 November. Youl had taken command of the battalion in mid 1940 following a 
political push by the then Tasmanian premier Sir Robert Cosgrove to raise an exclusive 
Tasmanian 2nd AIF battalion. Following lengthy representations by Cosgrove to the 
federal government, the CGS informed the premier that Menzies had approved the 
request to raise a Tasmanian battalion. 
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Diaries, 1939-1945 War, AWM52, 8/2/23, 23rd Infantry Brigade, May-June 1942, p. 1.Henning explained that this arrangement had caused Lind problems with the formation 
of the 23rd Brigade:
Under circumstances  where battalions  were  recruited  from within  one  State, as  was  the 
norm, it had been usual procedure for their commanders to be responsible for the selection of 
senior officers. In the case of the 2/40 Battalion this did not happen. The issue, from Lind's 
point of view, was to gain as much control as possible over the development of the 2/40 
Battalion  into  an  efficient  fighting  unit and  as  an  integral  part  of  the  23rd  Brigade. 
Obviously, he would have preferred his whole command to be drawn from Victoria, trained 
in Victoria and staffed with senior officers whom he knew. Once Youl, whom Lind did not 
know, was appointed  as one of his three battalion commanders, against competition from 
another Tasmanian militia officer and some Victorian lieutenant colonels, and once it was 
determined that the 2/40th be trained at Brighton, Lind  was determined to ensure that he 
retained  some influence in the battalion's  development. But then the decision to create a 
completely  Tasmanian unit was  a  further  blow  to Lind's  capacity to oversee  his  whole 
brigade. He lost the opportunity for close communication with three companies of the 2/40th 
that he would have been able to establish at Seymour. Bass Strait was an overwhelming and 
frustrating obstacle to Lind's role and Youl was an unknown quantity.100
Lind resolved the problem by posting Victorian officers of his choice to the 2/40th Bn, 
but it resulted in creating some resentment in Youl and probably the Tasmanian officers 
who had to make way for the newly appointed Victorian officers.101 Although these 
arrangements did not fully suit Lind, Youl or the Tasmanian officers concerned, it is 
unknown whether this setback had any later bearing on Lind's decision to dismiss Youl.
Nevertheless, Lind clearly did not begin making a case against Youl until August 1941, 
when he questioned Youl's military knowledge, methods and application of tactical 
principles. Lind concluded that Youl's attributes as a Lt-Col commanding a battalion 
were not up to standard, especially when that battalion was expected to be in a 'detached 
position far removed from any advice or control by senior officers'.102 Clearly, Lind had 
developed reservations about Youl's ability to work alone and especially in the case 
where Sparrow Force would become isolated far from 23rd Brigade control at Kupang. 
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251/751/1834, 1941-1942, p. 46.To resolve the issue Lind wrote to Gen Gordon Bennett, General Officer Commanding 
(GOC) the 8th Division in Malaya, requesting that Major WW Leggatt MC, now second 
in command of the 2/22nd Bn in Rabaul, replace Youl. Bennett upheld Lind's 
recommendations but the Adjutant-General later advised against the decision on the 
basis that the 23rd Brigade was no longer under Bennett's control; it now came under the 
7th Military District's Northern Territory command. The Adjutant-General advised Lind 
that if he wished to continue with the complaint he must notify Youl of the decision and 
have him initial any adverse report made against him.103 
On 19 September, Lind wrote a negative report against Youl and had him initial the 
document. Unfortunately for Youl in initialling the report he had undermined any future 
appeal that he could make against Lind's accusations, because in effect it demonstrated 
Youl had accepted Lind's assessment. Youl later complained to Brigadier DVJ Blake, 
Commandant of 7th Military District, that he initialled the report but had not 
immediately lodged a protest about the accusations because he was 'so taken aback' by 
the unexpected nature of the charges presented against him. Even so, Youl did complain 
to the Military Board that Lind was prejudiced against his command, rude to him, had 
interfered in the selection of officers for the 2/40th Bn against his will, had made it 
difficult for him to obtain the full value of tactical training and that the circumstances 
surrounding his dismissal were defamatory.104 
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Garth Pratten, in his book Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, 
explained that it was 1943 before the Army realised that battalion commanders needed 
tactical training to supplement their battlefield experience. It was only then that the 
Land Headquarters Tactical School was set up near Brisbane.105 This information, 
however, does not dispel the reality that without proper tactical knowledge Youl 
remained a risk to his command and that Lind had little choice other than to remove him 
from command of Sparrow Force.
Blake accepted that Lind had made his decision based on 'mature consideration'. He 
supported Lind's recommendations to remove Youl and agreed to the recommendation 
to have Leggatt transferred to the 2/40th Bn.106 On 21 October, the 8th Military District 
HQ in Rabaul and the 7th Military District HQ in Darwin were informed that ministerial 
approval had been given to end Youl's command (as well as his secondment to the 
12/50th Bn in Tasmania) and approved Leggatt’s transfer. Youl left the 2/40th Bn on 7 
November and was transferred to the Reserve of Officers List 6th Military District in 
Tasmania. 
After Youl was relieved of command, Lind wrote to Blake of his reasons for the 
decision:
It was with great regret that I recommended the removal from command an officer for whom 
I have, as a man, the greatest possible regard. Lt-Col YOUL has, as I stated earlier, been at 
all times loyal and cooperative and it has only been in the interests of the Unit and the Bde as 
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Despite what Lind may have thought of Youl, his actions ended Youl's standing as an 
officer and his career in the military. Following these events, on 7 November Leggatt 
transferred from the 2/22nd Bn in Rabaul to the 2/40th Bn in Darwin and became a Lt-
Col in command of Sparrow Force. 
Leggatt, like his contemporaries, was also a World War I veteran. Before the War, he 
had accepted a scholarship from the Presbyterian Church of Victoria to study for the 
ministry, but suspended his theological studies in August 1915 to enlist in the 1st AIF. 
After serving in Egypt, he went to the Western Front in France where he became a 
Lieutenant in 1917. On 8 August 1918, while serving as a signal officer with the 60th Bn 
at Villers Bretonneux, he received the Military Cross for maintaining open telegraphic 
lines under heavy enemy shellfire. On 27 September 1918, after transferring to the 59th 
Bn, he received a severe wound to his arm and returned to Australia. He then studied 
law to become a member of the Victorian Bar in 1921. In 1934, he rejoined the AMF 
and in July 1940 became a major in the 2nd AIF.108 After taking command from Youl in 
November 1941 Leggett had less than a month to become familiar with his duties as the 
commander of Sparrow Force before the war with Japan began. 
Meanwhile, the Military Board busied itself making preparations to move Gull and 
Sparrow Forces to the Islands. During November it had become clear to the allies that 
the Japanese were making preparations for war in the 'Southern Area, and some 
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political situation in the Far East, led to some deployment of American and Dutch naval 
forces in the Western Pacific'.109 With concerns increasing over Japanese intentions, the 
Dutch finally opened the way for Australia to send advance parties to the Islands.
The Military Board authorised Lind to send one hundred and seven men each to Ambon 
and Kupang. Within thirteen days of making the decision, however, Sturdee revised the 
commitment back to a thirty-man group for Kupang alone. The expectation was that the 
uniformed party, including their personal arms, equipment and thirty days rations would 
board the Marella and sail for Kupang from Darwin Harbour on 13 December.110 But on 
6 December the Navy Board informed the Dutch that the advance party would be 
delayed until the next day and that it would embark aboard the Zealandia in convoy 
with the Westralia.111
Then on 5 November, the Japanese Imperial Conference met to discuss preparations for 
war against the United States, Britain and the NEI. General Tojo explained to Hirohito 
that his government was ready for war if diplomatic relations with the US broke down 
over sanctions. Hirohito acknowledged this, but asked Tojo to make every effort to 
resolve Japan's differences with the US through diplomatic channels before declaring 
war.112 On 6 November, while awaiting the outcome of the talks, Japan's Imperial 
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112 Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, pp. 208-9.General Headquarters began mobilising its forces and preparing its grand strategy for 
seizing the whole of the Far East and Southwest Pacific Areas. 
The Imperial GHQ ordered the Southern AHQ of General Juichi Terauchi to prepare for 
war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The objectives set for the Southern Army, in 
cooperation with the Imperial Navy, were to assemble its forces in Indochina, South-
China, Formosa (Taiwan), the Southwest Islands and various other South Sea Islands 
and prepare to attack Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines and the NEI. They were 
planning to attack American, British and Dutch strongholds in the Southeast Asian 
region, seize badly needed resources and secure the newly occupied territories. 
Elsewhere, Vice-Admiral Nagumo's naval task force had orders to leave Hitokappu Bay 
in the Kuriles on 26 November to attack the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 
December local time.113
When diplomatic relations between Japan and the US failed to improve, the Imperial 
Conference met again on 1 December to reassess its options for war. Tojo told the 
meeting that he believed the United States had humiliated Japan and Hirohito by 
demanding an unconditional withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, a withdrawal 
from recognising the Nanking Government and a withdrawal from delivering on the 
Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Tojo replied to these demands in addressing the 
Imperial Conference. He said that:
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3-4.This not only belittled the dignity of our Empire and made it impossible for us to harvest the 
fruits of the China Incident, but also threatened the very existence of our Empire. … Under 
the circumstances, our Empire has no alternative but to begin war against the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands in order to resolve the present crisis and assure [Japan's] 
survival.114 
On 4 December, in deciding that peace with America could not be resolved through 
diplomatic means the Imperial Conference, in the presence of the Hirohito, decided it 
was better to risk declaring war on the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands than 
abandoning its gains in China and Indochina. In agreement with Tojo's demands (and 
contrary to the expectations of the Singapore conference’s assumptions) the Japanese 
Government decided that it would declare war on the US, Britain and the NEI on or 
around 8 December 1941 Japanese local time.115 According to that schedule the 
Japanese launched concurrent attacks against the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, 
Borneo, Siam (Thailand) and Malaya on the morning of 8 December. 
Later on the same morning, when the War Cabinet met to discuss Australia's response to 
the war with Japan, Sturdee proposed sending a reinforcement battalion to Port 
Moresby and Rabaul as well as immediately dispatching the previously arranged 2/21st 
and the 2/40th Bns to Ambon and Timor. When Curtin asked whether: 
Men  were  being  wasted  by  “scattering  them”,...  Sturdee  said  that  the  battalion  being 
deployed from Darwin to Timor would be replaced by another being sent from Adelaide. It 
was  necessary to reinforce  Rabaul  in view  of its  importance  to the  United  States  as  an 
airfield on the resupply route to the Philippines.116
Sturdee’s seemingly cryptic response did not directly answer Curtin’s concerns about 
wasting men and the matter was never raised again in later meetings. 
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Chronological Series, A9240, 10 June 1941-19 January 1946, p. 772.If Sturdee was reluctant to send troops to Rabaul, Ambon and Timor here was his 
opportunity to express them to Curtin. He had the opportunity to agree with Curtin's 
concerns that dissipating Australian forces and wasting men in the Island campaigns 
was clearly unprofitable and he could have recommended a review of the Islands policy 
when the War Cabinet met again on 13 December to discuss the Chiefs of Staff 
proposals for the defence of Rabaul and New Caledonia. 
As the United States and Australia had already made plans to establish Rabaul as a 
future fleet base for both United States and British naval forces, the 13 December 
Cabinet meeting wanted to know how the plans were progressing. The Chiefs of Staff 
presented three options on Rabaul to. They were:
(a) to reinforce the existing garrison up to the strength of a brigade group;
(b) to withdraw the existing garrison and abandon Rabaul;
(c) to retain the existing garrison.117
The Chiefs of Staff dismissed option (a) because they had been advised that the 
expansion of Rabaul into a US fleet base was unlikely to happen.118 Their 
recommendation to the War cabinet was to retain Rabaul as an air operation base as 
originally planned and that ‘on this basis we reject course (a), i.e., reinforcement’ of 
Lark Force.119
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119 Ibid., p. 225.In discussing options (b) and (c), the Chiefs of Staff decided it was essential that 
Australia 'maintain an advanced observation line to give the earliest possible indication 
of an enemy move to the South'. Because of the dangers of sea travel to Rabaul the 
Chiefs of Staff argued that there should be no withdrawal from Rabaul to which the War 
Cabinet agreed. The Chiefs of Staff emphasised the importance of this decision by 
drawing attention to the negative psychological effect withdrawal would have on the 
Dutch and presumably British-Dutch cooperation in Malaya.120
It was only now that Sturdee warned the War Cabinet of the dangers inherent in 
maintaining the policy of garrisoning the Islands. Sturdee told the War Cabinet that:
In making this  recommendation we  desire  to emphasise the fact that the scale of attack 
which can be brought against Rabaul from Bases in Japanese mandated islands is beyond the 
capacity of the  small  garrison to meet successfully.  Notwithstanding  this  we  consider it 
essential to maintain a forward  air observation line as long  as  possible and  to make the 
enemy fight for this line rather than abandon it at first threat.121 
It is clear from this statement that Rabaul was doomed to remain and fight an 
overwhelming Japanese invasion force for the sake of forward observation and, by 
implication it seems, so were Timor and Ambon. 
Without raising his concerns about wasting men as he did at the 8 December meeting, 
Curtin willingly accepted the Chiefs of Staffs recommendations. He subsequently wrote 
to President Roosevelt on 13 December 1941 to explain Australia’s position:
As  you  are  no  doubt aware,  we  have  land,  sea  and  air  forces  in  Malaya  and  in  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies  area  …  However  the  changed  naval  situation  has  had  such 
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military resources are insufficient to meet commitments for defence of Pacific Islands  in 
which we are vitally interested. I  am forwarding  separately to the Australian Minister a 
review of the position as it has been put to us by our Service advisers …122
The review also stated that Rabaul could not stand against a large-scale attack by the 
Japanese forces now based in the mandated islands. 
Here, the decision to retain troops at Rabaul in the face of overwhelming odds was 
counter to strategic logic, which is supported in Liddell Hart’s view where:
Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and co-ordination of the 
end and the means. The end must be proportional to the totals means, and the means used in 
gaining each intermediate end which contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the 
value and the needs of that immediate end–whether it be to gain an objective or to fulfil a 
contributory purpose. An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.123 
In other words, strategy is a cost benefit transaction where the means must be in 
proportion to the transaction that is taking place, or affordable, and the ends must be 
beneficial, or profitable. The stated policy for Rabaul was ‘to maintain a forward air 
observation line as long as possible and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than 
abandon it at the first threat’. The available means were Lark Force consisting of 1400 
men together with the 24th Squadron. The expected benefit was gaining intelligence on 
Japanese movements in the Rabaul area of operations. The cost was the abandonment of 
badly needed military resources at Rabaul (and later Ambon and Timor) to an 
unjustifiable operation.
For Australia at this time, where there were few trained and equipped forces to expend 
on unworthy projects, the Islands Strategy amounted to a large investment for limited 
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123 Liddell Hart, The Classic Book on Military Strategy, pp. 322-23.gains in line observation and in position warfare. The costly expenditure of means 
clearly outweighed any limited short-term benefits associated with the line observation 
plan and this was especially the case where the RAN had already provided a coast-
watching network to fulfil line observation throughout the Islands at a much cheaper 
price. If Clausewitz’s maxim that ‘the political aims [of war] are the business of 
government alone’ is correct, then this chapter demonstrates the weakness of Australia’s 
politicians in allowing Sturdee too much scope in driving war policy in the Islands.
The War Cabinet not only allowed Sturdee independently to negotiate with the Dutch on 
the policy of the combined air scheme formed at the Singapore conference, they 
carelessly allowed him to freely revise the scale of forces destined for Rabaul, Timor 
and Ambon. It was within Sturdee’s area of responsibility to inform the government of 
the strategic weakness in the scheme, but he chose not to do that until the last moment. 
Curtin and the War Cabinet thus agreed to Sturdee’s terms that Rabaul, and effectively 
Timor and Ambon, were to be left to their fate against overwhelming Japanese forces, 
without the hope of reinforcement, withdrawal or rescue and all for the sake of a 
desperate ill-considered and ill-prepared air observation policy that could have been 
carried out successfully by the RAAF alone. 
Because the Australian War Cabinet was dysfunctional in properly performing its 
responsibilities to grand strategy it had developed what became redundant policy of line 
observation. In formulating policy for war well-conceived strategies need to closely 
connect threats, objectives, policies, tactics, forces and wider strategies. Unrealistic 
requirements and discontinuities within or between any of those categories cause risks 
69to soar and increase prospects for failure’.124 The Rabaul-Timor-Ambon policy in this 
context represented a strategic mismatch where the discontinuities between War Cabinet 
and the CGS, policy and strategy, realistic objectives and likely success led to its failure. 
The costs benefit ratio in garrisoning the Islands was now bankrupt where the know 
costs of line observation outweighed any known benefits. These decisions would later 
lead to a wastage of human resources where they failed to observe the first principle of 
war - economy of force.
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Books, 2002), p. 65.Chapter Two: Ambon: The Position and Line Holding 
Strategy
The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point. 
Apart from the effort needed  to create military strength, which does  not always  emanate 
from the general, there is no higher and simpler law  of strategy than that of keeping one’s 
forces concentrated. No force should ever be dispatched from the main body unless the need 
is definite and urgent. We hold fast to this principle, and regard it as a reliable guide. In the 
course of our analysis, we shall learn in what circumstances dividing one’s forces may be 
justified. We shall also learn that the principle of concentration will not have the same results 
in every war, but that those will change in accordance with the means and ends.
Incredible though it sounds, it is a fact that armies have been divided and separated countless 
times, without the commander having any clear reason for it, simply because he vaguely felt 
that this was the way things ought to be done.
This folly can be avoided completely, and a great many unsound reasons for dividing one’s 
forces never be proposed, as soon as concentration of force is recognised as the norm, and 
every separation and split as an exception that has to be justified.125 
Carl von Clausewitz
In strategy, Clausewitz believed that defence was stronger than offence and that it was 
better to withdraw and concentrate forces to face a stronger opponent at a time and 
place better suited to the campaign. He learned this principle from his mentor General 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst after Napoleon defeated Prussia at the battle of Jena in 1806 
and after the Russians defeated Napoleon in 1812-13. 
Regarding Jena, the Prussian generals held conflicting theories about how they should 
approach the threat of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. In the mistaken belief that Napoleon 
would stand on the defensive, the Prussian generals and military advisors decided to 
take up the offensive and attack Napoleon’s army at Fraconian Saale or on the Main 
River. At the time, Prussia, dominated by seventy and eighty year old military policy 
advisors, had an inflexible moribund military system that relied heavily on antiquated 
weaponry, large cumbersome methods of supply that were dependent on fixed 
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warfare systems that discouraged initiative. Notwithstanding the state of the military’s 
organisation the Prussian army remained proud, highly disciplined and bold, however in 
Clausewitz’s words, ‘behind the fine facade all was mildewed’.126 The weakness of the 
Prussian army lay not in its soldiers but its leadership and organisation.
The chiefs of the general staff, Generals Phull, Scharnhorst and Colonel Massenbach, 
led their 250,000 troops in developing Prussia’s military strategy and campaigns. This 
group of three dominated a poorly organised divisional chain of command that had no 
corps headquarters. Chambers described this system where:
Orders issued  from general headquarters therefore had  to go into fantastic detail, giving 
ample  scope  for  delay,  miscomprehension  and  confusion  on  the  part  of  subordinate 
commanders, and generals frequently found it necessary to brief their regiments commanders 
in person. Such an army, under such a leadership, bore little comparison to Napoleon’s finely 
geared and ruthlessly efficient war machine.127
Adding to the confusion, as a result of personal ambition, the Chiefs of Staff were often 
at variance with each other and found it difficult to agree on the Prussian Army’s 
strategic military organisation and war strategies.
For example, in 1806 the Prussian military advisors identified three courses action to 
use against Napoleon’s armies; Hohenlohe’s plan to concentrate at Erfurt or Hof and 
outflank the Grande Armée; Brunswick’s plan to attack in force towards Stuttgart and 
threaten Napoleon’s communications with the Rhine and France and attack the French 
in detail; or, as Scharnhorst suggested, wait and fight delaying action along the rivers 
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to 68000 strong Russian army then assembling at Bresc and concentrate their forces for 
a counterattack.128
On learning of the Prussian intention to fight, however, Napoleon cautiously pre-empted 
their plans, gained the initiative and mobilised for an attack while forcing the Prussian 
generals to readjust their plans. Under the influence of the Chiefs of Staffs incompetent 
lack of continuity, ambitious pride and determination to adhere to an agreed strategy, 
their plans fell into disarray. When the two armies finally met at Jena, and after a 
succession of battles, Napoleon succeeded in subjecting the Prussians to humiliating 
defeat. 
Clausewitz learned from the Jena campaign that it would have been better if Prussia had 
followed Scharnhorst’s advice and avoided battle where it was facing Napoleon’s 
superior forces. Clausewitz believed Scharnhorst’s plan to concentrate elsewhere and 
counter attack in force at a time and place more favourable to the Prussians seemed the 
best course of action to follow, even if that meant forfeiting all national territory and 
retreating onto foreign soil.129 
Clausewitz further developed his principle that defence is stronger than offence from 
observing Napoleon’s 1812 Russian campaign. He gained direct experience from 
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129 Sumida, T., Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to on War, (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2008), p. 89.resisting the Grande Armée’s invasion of Russia as advisor to the Russian army’s 
general staff where he witnessed the destruction of Napoleon’s army. The lessons he 
learned were two fold; the extent of disproportionate losses suffered by an attacker 
when advancing; and, the forceful exploitation of those overextended forces through 
aggressive counter attack.130
Clausewitz observed that the Russian army became stronger as it folded back into its 
rear echelons. The retreating army fed itself from supply depots located in the 
provincial towns and the countryside as it withdrew. Their supply train was able to 
subsist on rural produce to feed its draft animals as they shortened their lines of 
communications in retreating towards Moscow. Clausewitz wrote that 
The  retreat from Witebsk to Moscow  was  in fact an uninterrupted  movement, and  from 
Smolensko the point of direction lay always tolerably straight to the rear, the entire retreat 
was a very simple operation, which partook very little manoeuvre and in which no attempt of 
the enemy at manoeuvre was much to be feared. When an army always gives way and retires 
continually in a direct line, it is very difficult for the pursuer to outflank it or press it away 
from its course … every soldier must know from experience that in a retreat this simplicity 
economises the powers of men and horses.131
The baggage trains in retreating to the rear left the roads open for the undivided 
columns to march freely towards Moscow. Apart from casualties of 70,000 suffered in 
the withdrawal, the only difficulties the Russians experienced came from; sourcing 
potable water as the wells dried up over the summer months; and, the pressure put on 
the rear guard’s horses, which remained saddled throughout most of the retreat.
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175-76.For the Grande Armée the reverse was true. Clausewitz observed that in general: 
The  subsistence  of  an  advancing  army  and  pursuing  is  always  a  matter  of  difficulty, 
inasmuch as before the magazines are collected, the army has always moved on a little, and a 
mass of carriages becomes necessary. These difficulties increase as population and culture 
decrease. The advancing army has but two resources for relief. It now and then captures a 
magazine of the enemy, and is not obliged to keep together in large masses  in the same 
degree; can divide itself more, and live better on the inhabitants.132 
For the Grande Armée, however, these generalities failed where Russian troops carried 
out a scorched earth policy in setting fire to its abandoned magazines and towns after 
withdrawing the townspeople. This forced Napoleon’s troops and cavalry to subsist on 
its supply chain and the scant resources they could find as the army advanced, and like 
the Russians, the Grande Armée also suffered for lack of water. In possessing 
knowledge of their own countryside the Russians were able to forage widely for water, 
whereas the Grande Armée, without maps and not having a local population to consult, 
remained more or less fixed to the tail of the retreating Russian army. 
The Russians also destroyed bridges and removed signposts to further delay and 
confuse the French. In the end, measures taken by the Russians against the 
overextended French army weakened Napoleon’s forces and delayed the Grande 
Armée’s progress. It took Napoleon 12 weeks to advance the 115 miles to Moscow and, 
by Clausewitz’s account; his troops were reduced from 280,000 to 90,000. In the final 
reckoning the Russians expended less than fifty per cent of its force in retreat while 
Napoleon expended almost seventy percent of his diminishing force on garrisoning 
occupied territory, privation, weariness, disease and casualties without achieving his 
ends through decisive battle; a wastage ratio of 2.7 to 1 in Russia’s favour balanced on 
Clausewitz’s description of events.133
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The French army reached Moscow already too much weakened for the attainment of the end 
of its enterprise. For the facts that one third  of its force had been wasted before reaching 
Smolensko, and another before Moscow, could not fail to make an impression on the Russian 
officers in command, the Emperor, and the ministry, which put an end to all notion of peace 
and concession.134
The Russian adoption of the Fabian strategy of attrition and avoiding decisive battle to 
wear down the enemy forces bought time for more favourable conditions to develop in 
defeating Napoleon. The weakened state of Grande Armée allowed Tsar Alexander to 
ignore Napoleon’s demands for negotiation on his terms, while the Russian advance 
guard under Kutusov used its time to become stronger and to harass the French lines of 
communications and its battalions. These conditions forced Napoleon to face the reality 
that his weakened army could not remain in Moscow indefinitely and prevailed upon 
him to withdraw first to Kaluga and then in a change of direction from the River Lusha 
to Mojaisk after he was nearly captured at that crossing point.
Chandler described the significance of this turning point after the battle at the River 
Lusha. 
Not only did  the decision remove all pressure on Kutusov [to block Napoleon’s move to 
Kaluga  and  Smolensk] and  throw  away the  hard-won fruits  of Maloyaroslavets,  it also 
wasted a precious week of comparatively fine weather. In the opinion of General Wilson, an 
English observer of the campaign: “Napoleon’s star no longer guided his course, for after the 
(Russian) rear guard  retired, had  any, even the smallest reconnaissance, advanced to the 
brow  of the hill over the ravine–had the slightest demonstration of a continued  offensive 
movement been made–Napoleon would  have obtained a free passage for his  army on the 
Kaluga or Medinj  roads, through a  fertile  and  rich country to the Dnieper; for Kutusov, 
resolved on falling  back behind  the Oka, had  actually issued  orders  to retire in case the 
enemy’s approach to his new position”.135
There is no evidence explaining the ‘uncustomary slowness, irresolution and excessive 
caution’ of Napoleon’s decision. It effectively led, however, to the demoralisation of his 
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the Vistula on its way to Moscow in 1812, Napoleon returned to Poland in 1813 with an 
army of around 85,000; down by a formidable estimate of 560,000 soldiers.136
Notwithstanding that these events happened in an era of horse drawn carts, the action of 
extending the lines of an army beyond its logistical capabilities remained important to 
the strategies of mechanised armies during the Second World War. Despite Napoleon’s 
logistical efforts to meet the challenges of advancing to Moscow, he overextended the 
army and it became weaker the further it reached into Russia. Conversely, the Russian 
army became stronger as it withdrew on its base and Moscow. It was in this context 
Clausewitz formed the principle that defence is stronger than offence. 
Clausewitz’s observations on the Prussian and the Russian campaigns led him to the 
conclusion that a weaker country could frustrate the intentions of an invading army in 
terms of a cost a benefit ratio where the risks remain incommensurate with the gains:
The result of the campaign, which at its commencement could only have been conjectured 
by a man of extended views, clear understanding, and rare greatness of mind, was now so 
near the eye as to be easily embraced by one of ordinary acuteness. Buonaparte had involved 
himself  in  so  difficult  a  transaction,  that things  began  of  themselves  to work  for  the 
Russians, and a good result was inevitable without much exertion on their part.137
Napoleon was ‘a man of clear understanding’ in his awareness that attacking Russia was 
‘a difficult transaction’, for which he planned accordingly:
He knew  he would meet large Russian armies operating  over a vast theater, where the 
roads were at best poor, the food resources practically nonexistent, and the climate prone 
to extremes of heat and cold, but he probably miscalculated the difficulties to be faced.138
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138 Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 753.However, Napoleon had gambled on high stakes in attempting to bring Tsar Alexander 
to heel, but nevertheless failed to obtain that end. His army was superior to the Russian 
army but the war demonstrated to Clausewitz that the extent of disproportionate losses 
suffered by an attacker in advancing and the forceful exploitation of those overextended 
forces through aggressive counter attack supported the notion that a weaker country can 
overcome a stronger aggressor by employing the defensive.
Clausewitz came to the conclusion that:
If then the negative purpose, that is the concentration of all the means into a state of pure 
resistance, affords a superiority in the contest, and if this advantage is sufficient to balance 
whatever superiority in numbers  the adversary may have, then the mere duration  of the 
contest will suffice gradually to bring the loss of force on the part of the adversary to a point 
at which the political object can no longer be an equivalent, a point at which, therefore, he 
must give up the contest. We see then that this  class  of means, the  wearying  out of the 
enemy, includes the great number of cases in which the weaker resists the stronger.139
This is what Clausewitz meant where he stated that ‘the best strategy is always to be 
very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point. Apart from the effort needed 
to create military strength, which does not always emanate from the general, there is no 
higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces concentrated’.
Sturdee was aware of this principle of strategy when it came to concentrating forces in 
war, but he failed to recognise Clausewitz’s principle where it concerned the examples 
of the Prussian and Russian campaigns. At Sydney in 1933, as director of military 
operations and intelligence, he gave a lecture to senior staff officers on the hypothetical 
plan of concentration. The lectures aimed to provide senior officers with knowledge, the 
gathering and testing of information and applying them to the plan of concentration 
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focused on Japan as a potential enemy of Australia where, should the British Empire be 
engaged in a war in Europe, the Japanese would expand its influence throughout the 
Western Pacific.140
The scenario supposed that:
Should Japan desire to impose her will on Australia she would seek to take action that would 
give her a rapid  decision, as she can never be certain how  long the pre-occupation of the 
British Main Fleet would last or whether the U.S.A. might not intervene after a time. Japan 
must therefore seize some area in Australia which is vital to the continuance of our economic 
life, and  the loss  of which would cripple our war effort. Mere  raids  cannot gain a rapid 
decision. Some authorities such as Admiral Richmond hold the view that the Japanese Fleet 
by blockade alone can bring Australia to her knees by stopping our exports and imports and 
our coast shipping and without a single Japanese soldier having been landed.141
In preparing this scenario, Sturdee supposed that Melbourne, Sydney and Newcastle 
were the most important strategic areas to protect because of their economic and 
industrial power. All other cities in Australia were deemed less important in this 
hypothetical war scenario, because it would have required the dissipation of troops from 
the Melbourne-Sydney-Newcastle theatre.
Sturdee had estimated that Japan could provide twenty-three divisions for an attack on 
Australia but that it lacked the shipping requirement to lift more than three divisions at a 
time. This meant that the Japanese transports would have a return journey to Australia 
of two months in bringing a further three divisions and its supplies. Not only that, it was 
supposed that the USA and Britain might intervene in the mean time. His plan was to 
use six Australian militia divisions against any Japanese attack based on the principle of 
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141 Ibid., pp. 2-3.the concentration of force to protect vital areas along the east coast. Although this was 
an exercise to acquaint senior staff officers with the principle of concentration, it 
demonstrated that Sturdee was aware of the principle of concentration, the 
consequences inherent in the dissipation of forces, the danger to Japan in overextending 
itself in a war with Australia and that time was on Australia’s side.142
This exercise provides insight into Sturdee’s strategic thinking. His plan seemed to 
reflect fixed regional lines and position warfare similar to that carried out during the 
First World War. This was a strategy of holding a position along a line and of wearing 
down the enemy’s strength in lives, materials and treasure, which led the European 
nations involved towards bankruptcy. Liddell Hart was highly critical of a strategy 
adhering to ‘the simple idea of a concentrated stroke by a concentrated force’. He 
pointed out that this kind of warfare existed in the eighteenth century where ‘a 
physically concentrated advance, both strategic (to the battle field) and tactical (on the 
battle field) was the rule’ whereas ‘under the new conditions of warfare, the cumulative 
effect of partial success, or even mere threat, at a number of points may be greater than 
the effect of complete success at one point’. Liddell Hart’s doctrine supports the idea of 
‘permeating and dominating areas rather than capturing lines; at the practicable object 
of paralysing the enemy’s action rather than the theoretical object of crushing his forces. 
Fluidity of force may succeed where concentration of force merely entails perilous 
rigidity’.143 
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143 Liddell Hart, The Classic Book on Military Stategy, pp. 332-33.Sturdee’s exercise on the concentration of force indicates a limited area of operations 
within New South Wales and southern Queensland, an offensive in moving all forces to 
the battlefield and on the battlefield to crush the enemies forces, a rigidly based linear 
defence along natural barriers such as rivers and geographical features rather than on 
fluidity of movement and withdrawal, attacking the enemy’s strategy and paralysing 
their movement. This exercise was offensive strategy in defence where he planned to 
move the reserve to the battlefield rather than withdraw into the reserve. Although 
Sturdee left the exercise open to adjustment, its object remained rigidly based on 
offensive linear and position holding type warfare.144
Vernon Ashton Hobart Sturdee KBE CB DSO was born in 1890 to Alfred Sturdee and 
his wife Laura (nee Merrett). Alfred was a doctor who served with the 1st AIF 2nd Field 
Ambulance at Gallipoli. Sturdee’s uncles also had long standing military careers. His 
uncle, Sir Donavan Sturdee GCB KCMG CVO, served in the British Royal Navy (RN) 
and rose through the ranks to become an Admiral of the Fleet. Another uncle, Sir 
Charles Merrett, served for forty years with the military and rose through the ranks to 
become a Lt-Col with the Australian Light Horse, but could not serve with the 1st AIF at 
Gallipoli because of his age. He became better known for his services to agriculture 
through the Royal Agricultural Society of Victoria for which he received his 
knighthood.
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D.S.O., O.B.E. Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, AWM54, 243/6/150, p. 10.Sturdee attended Melbourne Church of England Grammar School (Melbourne Grammar 
School) and subsequently became an apprentice engineer with Jaques Bros. in 
Richmond Victoria. He joined the Corps of Australian Engineers in 1908 and after three 
years service as a sapper in the engineers he became a Lieutenant with the Royal 
Australian Engineers (RAE) in the Permanent Military Forces. In 1912 he was posted to 
Brisbane’s 1st Military District for staff duties. He returned to Melbourne in 1913 and 
married Edith Robins at the St Luke’s Church of England in North Fitzroy.
The army promoted Sturdee to Captain in the 1st AIF on 25 August 1914 and transferred 
him to Egypt that October. He was among the first to disembark to the shores of 
Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, where he served as adjutant with the 1st Division Engineers 
for three months until he was medically evacuated with influenza. In September he 
returned to Gallipoli as Captain in command of the 5th Field Coy 2nd Division of 
Engineers and then the 8th Division of Engineers until Gallipoli was evacuated. 
In June 1916, Sturdee transferred to Armentieres in France acting in command of the 
Royal Engineers. He was recognised for his service at Gallipoli and France during 
1915-1916 and received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). In 1917 Sturdee was 
promoted temporary Lt-Col in command of the 4th Pioneer (Pnr) Bn and for the next 
nine months supervised road maintenance, camp construction, cable laying and the 
digging of communication trenches. In November 1917 he was given command of the 
5th Division RAE and following his promotion to General Officer 2nd grade he served 
with the British GHQ. He returned to Australia with a DSO, two mentions in despatches 
and later received an Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1919.
82After the war Sturdee returned to staff officer duties at AHQ in Melbourne until 1922 
when he was sent to Staff College at Quetta for a year. He spent the following year at 
the Royal Military College Duntroon as an instructor in engineering and survey and 
from 1925 to 1929 served as a staff officer with the 4th Division. In 1929 he was posted 
on exchange to the British War Office in London with the Directorate of Military 
Operations and Intelligence (DMOI). In 1931 he attended the Imperial Defence College 
and then transferred to the Australian High Commission as its military representative.
On returning from London in 1933, Sturdee took up the post of director of military 
operations at AHQ in Melbourne. In 1935, along with his duties at AHQ, he became an 
assistant secretary (military) and temporary Colonel with the Council of Defence until 
1937 when his rank was confirmed at Colonel. Sturdee’s attention was focused on 
raising formations for overseas service and operations planning. In 1938 he became the 
First Director of Staff Duties and received a Commander of the Order of the British 
Empire (CBE) for his services with the staff at AHQ.
When the Second World War began in 1939, Sturdee was promoted to temporary Lt-
Gen and appointed head of Eastern Command as well as commander the 2nd Military 
District. He became responsible for raising, training and equipping the 2nd AIF in New 
South Wales. In July 1940 he accepted a demotion to Major General (Maj-Gen) so that 
he could take command of the 8th Division. One month later he succeeded Sir Brudenell 
White CGS after he was killed in a plane crash.145 Sturdee was reappointed to the rank 
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Hobart (1890–1966).of Lt-Gen and became CGS. Lt-Gen Sydney Rowell recalled Sturdee’s role in that 
office:
To those working with him then, Sturdee displayed those characteristics, which he retained 
all his life. He had a very precise mind and a great sense of the need for priorities–he saw the 
problem very clearly. He was able to give orders that left no-one in doubt as to what was 
wanted and he then left people to get on with the job. When it came to the answer he was 
kindly and constructive in criticism … Almost immediately the Government changed (John 
Curtin became Prime Minister on 7 October 1941). This change of government meant an 
additional worry for the CGS, who had  to accustom himself to a different set of political 
masters who had been in opposition for nine years. And what a dreadful strategic situation 
faced  them! The  first major  issue  was  that of  the relief  of the  9th division in Tobruk. 
Sturdee’s  view  was  sought in  this  matter and  he  said,  with  some justification,  that the 
recommendation of the man on the spot (that is Blamey) should be accepted and that a relief 
should take place. I didn’t go along with this view, but he was the CGS and that was that. 
The further worsening of the situation in view  of Japan’s attitude was a constant worry in 
spite of the most unwarranted  optimism in some political and departmental circles. There 
were two related problems: first; the defence of Malaya and the island chain and, second, the 
improvement in the Home  Defence area. Sturdee  steadfastly re-fused  [sic] to agree to a 
complete concentration of the 8th Division in Malaya, and held a brigade back at Darwin.146
Unfortunately, Sturdee did not afford the same kindly characteristics towards Lind and 
Roach as he did for Blamey. His priorities involved withholding the 23rd Brigade from 
the 8th division in Malaya to service a poorly conceived forward observation line 
strategy, ignoring Roach’s advice as the ‘man on the spot’, refusing relief for the Island 
outposts, withholding crucial information from Lind and Roach about the role of Gull 
Force and sacking Roach for his constructive criticism in pointing out the inadequacies 
of defending Ambon.
As far as Rabaul, Timor and Ambon were concerned, these were never a priority for 
Sturdee after the 12 December war cabinet meeting had decided these tasks forces were 
doomed even before they were embarked for Timor and Ambon. Sturdee was not 
concerned with the concentration of forces on the Islands; his motivation was to 
dissipate his forces based on his definite and urgent policy of ‘demonstrating support for 
the Dutch’, even though this attitude was now of secondary importance to the official 
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resources afforded to the Island garrison, the misconception of the principle of the 
concentration of force by AHQ contributed to the ease in which the Japanese finally 
took Ambon. 
When Gull Force arrived at Ambon on 17 December 1941, the 2/21st Bn and its 
ancillary units it consisted of:
Gull Force Headquarters
The 2/21 Bn.
C Troop of the 18th Australian Tank A Battery
1 Section of the 2/11th Australian Field Company
A Detachment of the 23rd Australian Infantry Brigade Signals Section
An Australian Army Service Corp Section Gull Force
A Detachment 2/12th Australian field Ambulance
The 23rd Australian Dental Unit
The 104th Australian Light Aid Detachment
A Detachment of the Canteens Services
A Detachment of the Intelligence Corps
On 20 January 1941, with the later arrival of one officer and a few other ranks from 
Australia, the number of troops on Ambon came to an approximate total of 1,131 
men.147 
For some inexplicable reason Roach received no orders providing the objectives of Gull 
Force. Despite AHQ Operational Instruction No. 15 being in existence from March 
1941, neither Roach nor Lind received any substantive orders before or after Gull Force 
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Reserve of Officers in 1942 he complained in a memorandum on Ambon and Timor to 
AHQ and the 23rd Brigade diaries that:
No instructions, no information, no orders were received by Comds. 2/21 and 2/40 Bns. - 
before or on embarkation - from A.H.Q. In case of 2/21 Bn. very brief instructions were 
received by signal about 14 days after disembarkation at Ambon while A.H.Q. Op. Instr. No. 
15  of  6  Dec.  1941  implementing  the  move  was  received  by  this  Unit  28  days  after 
disembarkation at its destination. Date of receipt of orders and A.H.Q. Op. Instr. No. 15 of 6 
Dec. 41 implementing the move by 2/40 Bn. is unknown. No copy of orders for these forces 
or of Op. Instr. No. 15 of 6 Dec. 41 were received by H.Q. 23 Aust. Inf. Bde.148
Lind’s concern about AHQ Operation Instruction No. 15 seems odd, however, as Allied 
command Halong sent a message to AHQ Melbourne on 13 January acknowledging the 
receipt of the orders.149 Nevertheless, both Lind and Roach deny ever having received 
them. It is possible, however, that the orders were sent by AHQ but not passed on to 
Roach by the mixed Australian and Dutch Staff HQ at Halong. 
Without a prearranged command structure being set in place before Gull Force’s arrival 
and not having written orders Roach faced a difficult task in establishing a working 
relationship with Col Kapitz, commander of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische 
Leger Ambon (Royal Netherlands-Indies Army or KNIL), to coordinate the defences on 
Ambon. Lt McBride150 later explained that 'relations between the two commanders, 
although cordial, could not have really effective results, because of the attitude of the 
Dutch Force on the method of defence adopted'.151 This statement was borne out when, 
two weeks before the Japanese attacked Ambon, the Australian and Dutch military 
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1942, p. 3.forces divided because of Kapitz’s ostensible belief that Australian troops could not 
work with Indonesian soldiers because of language barriers.
In coming to grips with the situation on Ambon, Roach carried out another 
reconnaissance of the Island to assess the KNIL dispositions. The aggregate strength of 
Dutch NEI forces under Kapitz's command numbered around 2,600.152 The 
organisational structure of Dutch forces was 5 companies of 1,044 mixed European and 
Indonesian troops; one company of 100 European militia troops; 1 home guard with 
650-mixed European and Indonesian troops; 1 MG Coy of 250 mixed European and 
Indonesian troops; a depot battalion of 300 Indonesian Ambonese militia; and, a 
detachment of 60 Indonesian troops from Bula Village on the neighbouring island of 
Ceram. 
The Dutch artillery amounted to 1 battery of (four) 6 in. fixed guns, 3 batteries of 3 in. 
mobile guns, 1 section of 3 in. fixed guns, 2 sections of 2.75 in. mobile guns, 2 sections 
of 1.576 in. mobile Bofors AA guns, 1 section of 1.45 in. mobile AA guns and 3 
sections of.5 in. AAMGs with attached searchlight units. Kapitz also had four Brewster 
Buffalo fighters (two unserviceable) stationed at Laha as well as nine Catalina flying 
boats based at Halong. The American Navy also had Catalina flying boats stationed at 
Halong. The RAAF’s 13 Squadron supplemented the Dutch and Americans flying boats 
with two flights of Hudsons operating out of the Darwin.
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1942 -1942, p. 4.However, supplies required for the ground support of the Hudson squadron at Ambon 
were found wanting. GP-CAPT Scherger RAAF reported to his commander after 
visiting Ambon in early December that as far as Laha was concerned: 
The  supply  service  had  failed;  stocks  of  ammunition  and  fuel  were  quite  inadequate, 
maintenance facilities were negligible, and dispersal for aircraft at Laha … was very poor … 
Equipment issued to Hudson crews was insufficient and there were no spare engines for their 
aircraft, although spares and equipment had been ordered in September.153
Exacerbating this situation was the fact that 13 Squadron had begun using fuel supplies 
and losing planes during photographic reconnaissance and bombing attacks on Japanese 
forces at Tobi Island from as early as 10 December.154 
Kapitz's total maritime forces on Ambon amounted to two armed harbourmaster 
motorboats, which were given the desperate task of guarding the entrance to Ambon 
Bay against warships. Kapitz covered the other potential landing sites at Baguala Bay, 
Seri Bay and Waai Bay with booms made of logs and sea mines.155 He also knew that 
his forces could not simultaneously man the whole island at the potential beach landing 
points with the troops he then had available. In fact, all his units were under strength 
and each had inadequate numbers of officers and NCOs available to command the 
KNIL troops. Nevertheless, Kapitz had established solid defensive positions at the most 
probable landing sites long before the Japanese arrived.
Working from a centralised base at Paso, Kapitz planned his system of defence in three 
basic phases: first, to hold Paso as the main base, distribute selected units into prepared 
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pp. 5, 7.positions close to obvious landing sites and staff the defences at Laha airfield; second, 
to withdraw inland on Paso after fighting delaying actions against the Japanese 
landings; and finally, to fall back into positions held by the general reserve in the 
hinterland and holdup the Japanese advance from reaching Paso. He called this his 
'Reedefront' (ready front) plan. It was a flexible plan in nature which allowed him to 
respond to known Japanese landing points when they arrived while also providing the 
freedom to manoeuvre troops as required.156
Kapitz located his main force at Paso where the isthmus between the Hitu and Laitimor 
peninsulas created a bottleneck to large military forces, as he expected the main 
Japanese landings would arrive at Baguala Bay. He had also prepared Latuhalat and Eri 
as the defensive positions for the southwestern coastal sector on the Laitimor Peninsular 
in case the Japanese tried a beachhead landing at the entrance to Ambon Bay. A Bren 
gun carrier and one platoon were later allocated to Latuhalat for fighting delaying 
actions back to Eri. Kapitz gave orders to hold the Eri positions to the utmost, or at least 
until subjected to encirclement, and then to withdraw to Amahusu and defend it at all 
costs. Amahusu was a crucial defensive point linked to the defences on Mount Nona 
and Mount Seri where Kapitz had hoped to guard his southern flanks.157
In the southeastern sector of Laitimor Peninsular Kapitz prepared the coastal defence 
positions at Sojadiatas and Waru to support the main group above the potential landing 
site at Rutung. Kapitz decided to assign one company to occupy these villages. At the 
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157 Ibid., p. 5-6.start, one platoon occupied the prepared positions at Sojadiatas and Waru and two 
platoons occupied the forward positions at Rutung to engage any Japanese landings as 
well as to fight delaying actions back through the mountain positions to Ambon Town. 
Other platoons defended the access routes through Leahari and Ema back to Sojadiatas. 
Kapitz decided that these defensive positions would cover the principle approaches to 
Ambon Town, and the rear of Paso, from the southeast coast. Kapitz considered these 
arrangements sound based on his belief that the narrow jungle tracks made it too 
difficult for other than small forces like his own to penetrate across the mountains.158 
(See disposition map in Appendix 1)
In the Hitu peninsula sectors, Kapitz chose to defend the potential landing sites at 
Hitulama on the north coast as well as Waai and Tolehu on the east coast. The role of 
the troops at Hitulama was to protect the northern approaches to Laha and Paso by 
repelling Japanese landings on the beaches and, failing that, to fight delaying actions 
back through prepared positions from Mount Helat to Paso. The positions at Waai and 
Tolehu also had the same role of resisting any Japanese landings and withdrawing back 
to Paso. However, their task was two-part; a fighting withdrawal from Waai to the 
Tolehu positions, or, if the Japanese took Hitulama making the Waai-Tolehu positions 
untenable, a withdrawal back to Paso.159 As Roach had not received AHQ Operation 
Instruction No. 15 explaining the command structure on Ambon and the fact that Kapitz 
claimed general command for the defence of Ambon, Roach worked within the limits of 
the above plan.
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pp. 6-7.When Roach inspected Kapitz's plan he found that, although the KNIL forces were 
adequate in quality, the prepared defences, pillboxes and defended posts were 
disproportionate to men, machine guns and equipment available to make the plan 
practicable. He noted that Kapitz could not effectively occupy all the posts along the 
coast because of a lack of personnel and equipment. Roach thought it would be too 
time-consuming and impracticable to withdraw troops from superfluous posts with their 
equipment to strengthen the many other posts if called for.160 Adding to Roach’s concern 
was 'that Dutch strength and dispositions were always difficult to obtain' from Kapitz.161 
For example, Roach's incomplete information of Kapitz's resources at the time was 
demonstrated by his lack of knowledge about two 6-inch coastal guns that where 
located in bunkers on the hills behind Paso facing Baguala Bay.162
On 4 January 1942, Roach had A, B, and D Companies plus their support units 
encamped at Tantui and C Coy encamped at Laha. Initially 'Roach, with his Indian 
Army experience in mind, wanted to put his troops among the KNIL's Indonesian 
companies and planned his dispositions accordingly, with one company at Laha, one to 
go to Paso and one held in mobile reserve'.163 Roach wanted to withhold at least one 
company from Kapitz's plan to use as a mobile counter attacking force when the time 
came and he kept A, B and D Companies plus their support units at Tantui.
After the first series of Japanese air raids over Ambon on 7 January, Capt Gabriel 
reported that the:
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behaved  in  exemplary  manner,  particularly  at  LAHA  where  the  attack  was  primarily 
directed.164
As the weeks progressed, however, the Japanese carried out more air raids that forced 
Roach to amend his plans and spread his companies away from Tantui to avoid the 
bombing. Roach kept one platoon of B Coy, B Echelon, the RAP and Gull Force 
Infantry Bn HQ at Tantui; D Coy moved to Amahusu; one pioneer platoon moved to the 
Mount Nona observation post; and, A Coy moved to Paso. Roach also moved the stores 
to Kudamati and had them and the ammunition dumps camouflaged to protect them 
from air raids.165
Following the move the 2/11th Field Coy, working in liaison with a Dutch engineer 
officer, began preparations for the demolition of hangers, bridges, wharves, fuel storage 
and other major assets deemed useful to the Japanese. C Coy remained at Laha airfield 
together with small detachments from the 2/11th Field Coy, 2/12th Ambulance, Signals 
and AASC, as well as 4 Bren Carriers and 3 Mortars.166 Over the following weeks 
Japanese planes maintained their attacks against Laha airfield. The objective of the raids 
was to render the airfield unserviceable and to destroy any Allied planes remaining on 
the runway abutments. In one raid, thirty bombers under fighter escorts dropped 114 
heavy bombs along the runway, but Australian and Dutch troops were able to repair the 
damage by the following day. After this raid ended the soldiers at Laha were evacuated 
from their huts and dispersed to the hilly ground to the north of the airfield where they 
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men soon contracted malaria.167
On 10 January 1942, Kapitz called Roach to Territorial Command HQ at Halong to 
discuss the combined forces dispositions. As Roach was ill, Major Macrae took his 
place at the meeting. Kapitz told Macrae that his company commanders had complained 
that they could not work with Australian troops. Kapitz based this claim on existing 
language difficulties between the Dutch/Indonesian troops and the Australian troops. He 
offered Macrae two alternatives; either the Australians take over the sector between 
Hitulama and Paso or take over the sector containing Mount Nona-the Coal Wharf-
Laha. Macrae told Kapitz that, subject to Roach's approval, the Australians would take 
the second option because it took in Laha airfield, which was apparently the Australian 
force's principle reason for being at Ambon. Roach confirmed the decision and issued 
orders to put the new plan in train and repositioned his troops the next day. By 15 
January, the division of responsibilities and the new dispositions of the Dutch and 
Australian troops had begun to shift, with the Dutch holding Paso and covering 
potential coastal landing sites while the Australians covered Laha as well as the 
southwest sector of the Laitimor Peninsular.168
In early January, Kapitz discovered that the Japanese had assembled a large convoy at 
Manado with the probable aim of attacking Ambon and he withdrew his KNIL units 
back from Laha to concentrate his forces at Paso. This move effectively separated the 
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From that time forward the Australian and Dutch forces acted independently of one 
another. The effect of the decision was the separation of the Allied forces, leaving 
Roach's companies divided by Ambon Bay at Laha and the southwest sector of Laitimor 
Peninsular, which covered Kudamati, Amahusu and Eri while Kapitz's forces remained 
concentrated at Paso. The consequences of this move were a hindrance to the 
concentration of force in cooperation with the Australians at any given time or place 
while providing the potential for all three isolated forces to be wedged and attacked in 
detail by the Japanese landing forces.169
In responding to Kapitz's new order of battle Roach removed A and D Companies plus 
one platoon of B Coy from Paso and Tantui to Eri and Amahusu. B Coy (less one 
platoon) was sent to join C Coy at Laha. Roach organised A and D Companies to act in 
mobile reserve with all their company trucks loaded and ready to move. Under these 
arrangements Roach decided that if the Japanese landed in small scale at either 
Latuhalat or Ambon Bay, D Coy could reinforce A Coy with one or two platoons and 
counter attack. 
If large-scale landings happened at Latuhalat or Ambon Bay, A Coy was to withdraw to 
the Amahusu line and, in proximity to D Coy, occupy the Ambon Road facing back 
from Amahusu Village and Gull Force Bn HQ. If landings took place elsewhere, Roach 
wanted to hold Amahusu, the Benteng Barracks and the heights of Mount Nona. 
Because the Mount Nona position protected the left flank, Roach positioned a pioneer 
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weapons in case Japanese paratroops landed on the position.170
From 10 until 15 January Roach had his troops moving water, stores, ammunition and 
other supplies up the trenches and along the ridges of the Amahusu Line leading to the 
top of Mount Nona. These troops became busy occupying and revetting the existing 
Dutch trenches that ran from the sea on a gradient of one-in-six up the mountainside for 
2560 metres. The Dutch had already constructed at least thirteen concrete pillboxes 
along this line and the trenches and wire defences were already in place. Nevertheless, 
D Coy soldiers had to carry all their supplies along this steep route on foot. Roach 
respectively located his Bn HQ and the regimental aid post (RAP) at a school and 
church belonging to the Amahusu village.171
A Coy concurrently spent its time occupying the Eri Line farther to the West. This line 
climbed along the edge of a precipitous gorge leading up from the sea to the Tjenke 
plateau, which rests above Eri. Similar to the Amahusu line, the Eri line also consisted 
of concrete pillboxes, trenches and defensive works, only here the pillboxes were found 
to be too conspicuous for use. A Coy was required to build new and more suitably 
camouflaged medium machine gun posts in their stead. 
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19.The Eri line was steeper and longer than the Amahusu line and men on foot had to 
supply these lines also. Although the Tjenke plateau was vulnerable along its left flank, 
Kapitz planned to supply a company of KNIL troops to bolster the Australians by 
occupying the gap. At Eri, Roach allocated two platoons from A Coy to occupy selected 
positions along the beach.172 Even though the Dutch administration had supplied 
Ambonese labour as carriers for both A and D companies, the soldiers became 
exhausted over the next two weeks after repeatedly climbing the steep ridges and 
carrying supplies to their positions under the tropical sun.
Meanwhile, back in December and after examining the Dutch dispositions on Ambon, 
Roach became concerned about the weakness of the Island’s defences and began 
corresponding with AHQ in Melbourne asking for reinforcements. On 17 and again on 
23 December, Roach sent a number of cables to Lt-Col Scott, General Staff Officer 
Grade 1 (GSO 1), asking for additional artillery guns, machine guns and a further field 
troop. On 24 December Roach cabled AHQ again to warn them that Ambon could hold 
out for one or two days only 'against a determined attack from more than one direction 
simultaneously'. Roach wrote that:
To be of any appreciable value we consider imperative have following additional forthwith. 
2 troops field artillery preferable carriage 2 troops anti-tanks 6 mortars 4 medium machine 
guns all with personnel 2 rifle companies fully equipped. Requisite ammunition food for all 
on liberal scale also bush nets and medical (supplies?) few anti-aircraft guns would be useful 
as  ([sic]it is  unreasonable anticipate?  Bofors  not arrived.  Carriers  not arrived. Owing  to 
enemy strategy now  employed  indications are this position will be  precarious  even with 
above additional if adequate support services other services not provided. Would appreciate 
indication proposed policy.173 
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MP742/1, R/2/1803, 1942 -1947, p. 108.This cable makes it clear that Roach had little idea what AHQ's policy for Ambon was 
even though he understood the dangerous position that he and his troops were placed in 
without further reinforcement and especially without naval and substantial air support 
coming from Australia or elsewhere. 
Roach reported that our ‘position [here] is not as strong as it sounds on paper. This has 
caused me considerable concern, particularly as I am in complete ignorance at present 
of the policy so far as holding this position is concerned’.174 He went on to ask 'whether 
it is worth losing the whole force for a few days resistance to the enemy'.175 Scott did not 
accept Roach’s concern and noted to the side of this sentence 'well worth it - what's the 
force there for'. As far as the food supplies were concerned, Roach reported to AHQ on 
24 December that rations needed topping up by 33% above the original stores landed at 
Ambon. He pointed out that frozen mutton, potatoes and onions had not arrived, that 
rations stocks were less than had been intended and that this had exacerbated the 
situation at Ambon because army rations were being shared with RAAF personnel. 
Somewhat desperately he added that 'we have acquired an ex enemy lugger in the hope 
that we may be able to supplement our supplies' with fish.176
Two days later Roach received a terse reply from Rowell showing concern that 
ammunition and food reserves at Ambon were needed when enough supplies, in his 
opinion, had already been shipped to Ambon. He told Roach that Bren carriers had been 
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176 Ibid., p. 66.shipped to Ambon and would arrive in the first week of January. As for the 
reinforcements Roach had requested, Rowell informed him that there were no additional 
units available.177 Concerning AHQ policy in the defence of Ambon, Rowell simply 
recorded 'your job in cooperation with local Dutch forces is to put up the best defence 
possible with the resources you have at your disposal'.178 Roach replied, 'Additional 
requested would make immeasurable difference this strategically important centre as 
feel confident enemy will waver before Australian fire and bayonets. Almost eager 
administer salutary punishment'.179
Concerning Rowell's cable the Dutch KPM transport vessel SS Bantam and the anti 
submarine escort sloop HMAS Swan arrived at Ambon on 10 January with ten Bren 
carriers, an ambulance, two 15-hundredweight vans, two motorcycles, 180 days of 
ration stores, mortar bombs and additional ammunition for Gull Force. As expected, no 
substantial reinforcements arrived with the Bantam. When HMAS Swan embarked for 
Darwin, it evacuated Dutch women and children, severe medical cases and three 
soldiers facing court-martial.180
In responding to Rowell's cable Roach wrote of his true concerns to Scott at AHQ. 
William John Rendell Scott was an interesting character. He began his career as an 
insurance broker before enlisting in the 1st AIF during the First World War. Scott served 
with the 19th and 20th Bns in France and received a DSO for his service at Flers during 
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Scott was interesting because in the period between the First and Second World Wars he 
had become a leader in an ultra conservative organisation called the 'White Army', a 
Japanese foreign office collaborator, a member of the Australia-Japan Society, a spy for 
military intelligence and an advocate for Japanese foreign policy, which included his 
support for Japan's policy on the occupation of Manchuria. 
Scott was an anti-unionist reactionary, was fervently anti-socialist and helped organise 
returned soldiers from the First World War into the ‘White Army’ to act as strongmen in 
threatening socialist meetings and even governments of the time. By 1931, Scott was 
the Chief of Staff of a 30,000 strong organisation. The White Army was a subversive 
secret army sworn to uphold civil government, but ironically played a role in the 
dismissal of Premier Jack Lang by intimidating governor Phillip Game with the 
prospect of facing 'violent action' if Lang remained in government. Although the White 
Army disbanded in August 1932, diehard Scott continued to hold meetings in his 
brokerage office with a group of the White Army's past leaders. In 1932 Scott helped 
Eric Campbell form a new ultra conservative group called the 'New Guard'.181
During this time Scott began taking an interest in Japanese business and trade. Between 
1932 and 1935 he wrote articles and letters to the Sydney Morning Herald for the 
Japanese consulate’s propaganda machine in supporting Japanese industry and foreign 
policy and especially pertaining to Manchuria where he acted on an official invitation 
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Press, 1965), pp. 30-34.from the Japanese to explore the prospects for wool production in Manchuria. On 
returning to Australia, Scott remained active in the Australian militia and became a 
military intelligence officer running a civilian spy network linked to the New South 
Wales police force. In 1939, his role turned to spying on Sydney's Japanese community 
and resolving differences between military and civil intelligence agencies. Although 
somewhat successful in his role in intelligence, Scott's colleagues viewed him as an 
arrogant highhanded intriguer.
In June 1940, Scott joined the general staff in Melbourne to direct the Australian 
Independent Company guerrilla warfare school at Wilson's promontory. After returning 
to GHQ in May 1941, he became GSO1 operations and liaison officer to Gull Force. 
Ultimately, Scott's eclectic mixture of peculiar affiliations did not hamper his rise to the 
rank of Lt-Col at AHQ.182 Roach was probably ignorant of the above history when he 
naively placed his personal trust in Scott’s hands. He wrote two letters to Scott on 1 
January 1942, one secret and personal and the other official, asking for Scott's support 
in gaining a satisfactory response from AHQ on the issue of supplying adequate 
materials and reinforcements needed for the defence of Ambon.
In the secret and personal letter Roach spoke his mind to Scott complaining:
I find it difficult to overcome a feeling of disgust, and more than a little concern at the way 
in which we have seemingly been “dumped” at this  outpost position,  in the  first place 
without any instructions whatever … and in the second place with (so far) a flat refusal to 
consider any increase in fire power and  the number of tps., whilst the co-operation and 
assistance from the other two arms of the Service must be of very limited value indeed … 
After all, I am for the time being the “man on the spot”, and even from the earliest and very 
brief recce I made, I said that more fire power than that at present allowed me is necessary to 
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Hobart (1890–1966).successfully hold this position. After a more thorough recce., I find this even more necessary 
than I at first thought. It seems to me (and it seems to other experienced Offrs. here) that 
unless such fighter and augmented bomber support can be given, together with some naval 
assistance, then the garrison here must inevitably suffer the same fate as HONG KONG, the 
only difference being that with a determined attack on a large scale from several directions 
simultaneously, we may be able to hold out for two, or perhaps three days.183 
Roach vented his frustration regarding the Gull Force situation and demonstrated he 
was not alone in his assessment that Ambon required additional support. He told Scott 
that he had spoken to the heads of other services on Ambon and they had confirmed 
Roach's appreciation that more air and naval support would be required to hold the 
Island.184
Roach went on to criticise AHQ's strategy for the defence of Ambon:
It is beyond my comprehension to understand - and I am not alone in this - why this policy 
of a dissipation of strength, which is not adequately supported, is allowed to continue. There 
have already been salutory [sic] lessons in this regard in this war, and although I thoroughly 
appreciate the enormous importance of time, and delaying action, I cannot be convinced that 
the throwing  away of a Force like this, and that of Leggett's [on Timor], for the sake of 
anything up to three days delay to the enemy, is worth the sacrifice of so many valuable 
lives, and valuable material. Perhaps the same thing obtains with Carr [at Rabaul], but I do 
not know enough about the circumstances there, to discuss it.185
It is understandable that Roach could not comprehend AHQ's approach when he had not 
been told that the war cabinet and the service chiefs had already decided to abandon the 
Islands under their grand strategy of line observation on 12 December 1941. It seems 
little wonder that after Carr's Lark Force fell to the Japanese at Rabaul on 23 January 
1942, Rowell was reported to comment that 'it's not the first time a few thousand men 
have been thrown away and it won't be the last', after all this what was expected by 
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could ignore Roach's appeal regarding the sacrifice of his men and materials at Ambon 
while they pursued a policy of limiting additional losses in resources to the Japanese.
Unaware of the above policy, Roach went on to reason that AHQ's strategy was either to 
hold the Islands in the North to protect Australia, or not. He argued that, if the policy 
was to hold the Islands, then adequate means were needed to do that. On the other hand, 
if AHQ intended to abandon the Islands, then the commanders needed to know so that 
they could arrange to hold the Islands up to a point and then evacuate to concentrate 
elsewhere. Roach, probably assuming AHQ was seriously committed to defending 
Ambon, wrote that 'the policy of sitting down and waiting to be encircled, which 
unfortunately has happened on more than one occasion, is doomed to failure'.187
The premise of Roach's argument was that, without knowing the objective of AHQ's 
policy, many lives could be lost while the commanders on the Islands were unaware of 
the actual situation. Underscoring his concern, Roach asked Scott whether it was the 
intention of AHQ 'to continue the policy of allowing small Forces, inadequately 
equipped for their task, to be spread over a vast area, so that they can be defeated in 
detail?' He put it to Scott that it would be better to 'cut the loss' and concentrate all 
American, Dutch and Australian forces farther to the South in preparation for a later and 
more decisive action. In his appeal to Scott, Roach asked that he provide a copy of the 
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catastrophes'.188 
In his official letter to Scott, Roach claimed he was ignorant of his battalion's role at 
Ambon. He formally complained that:
All I knew about our detachment from Bde. was that my Brigadier, just prior to my leaving, 
said, 'Very sorry you are to leave my Command, but you now come under AHQ direct and 
will have nothing further to do with this Bde. Neither will you have anything further to do 
with 7 MD [Military District] except that they form the advance portion of your L of C [lines 
of communications]. You will be empowered to appoint two additional Offrs., one as GSO 3, 
and the other as “I” Offr. for your Force HQ”. - and this is all I know.189
He pointed out to Scott that a request had been made through official channels for 
operational orders, but he had received nothing other than an obtuse message that stated 
'Co-operation with the Local D[utch] was to put up best defence possible with the 
resources at my disposal'.190 In reading the content of these letters, it appears Roach had 
come to the conclusion that Rowell's message of putting up the 'best defence possible' 
meant that Gull Force would be sacrificed, albeit for hitherto unknown reasons.
Despite the secret and personal nature of the personal letter, Scott betrayed Roach's trust 
and passed it and all other cables from him to Rowell, but not to the Minister concerned 
as requested by Roach. The motivation for Scott's duplicity soon became apparent. Scott 
wrote to Rowell on 11 January angling for command of Gull Force. As Scott put it, 'I 
should be proud indeed to be allowed to move by the quickest means available to 
Ambon and take over from the C.O. Gull Force'.191
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191 Ibid., p. 42.He expressed his ill informed opinion that the political implications involved in putting 
up a strong resistance to the Japanese at Ambon, regardless of the outcome, would help 
clinch Dutch cooperation, demonstrate to the USA that Australia was prepared to fight 
and heighten morale in Australia, Malaya and elsewhere. Here Scott demonstrated he 
was unaware that the true policy for the Islands was one of line observation. The only 
qualification Scott offered to Rowell for assuming command at Ambon was his 
professed promise that 'I have no particular belief in my ability but I have a definite 
belief in my ability to inspire confidence in men and to lead them'.192
After the war Scott justified his moves against Roach when he wrote:
On 11th Jan a  lengthy,  and  what might be described  as an hysterical  cipher cable, was 
received at AHQ Melbourne from the C.O. (Lt-Col Roach) of Gull Force, Ambon. Previous 
cables  and letters  from this  officer to AHQ had  been couched  in similar terms, those of 
defeatism and entire lack of morale. As GSO 1 Operations, AHQ, I wrote a minute to the 
DMO calling attention to the cable of 11th Jan and previous correspondence in similar terms, 
at the  same  time  recommending  Lt-Col  Roach's  recall  and  the  appointment of  a  new 
commanding officer. I offered my own services if this was thought desirable.193
It seems Scott had either overreacted or at least exaggerated Roach's concerns regarding 
the conditions on Ambon to serve his own interests in obtaining command for himself.
Scott may have chosen this moment to make Rowell and Sturdee aware of his perceived 
concerns about Roach's abilities to maintain the morale of his troops while 
simultaneously angling to take over command of Gull Force. He had based his 
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1939-45, p. 4.Am very disturbed at complete absence of response in view of latest positions … can we rely 
immediately adequate support … if not the result must be inevitable as predicted. We are all 
completely in the dark and failing any information from your end prospects are gloomy. At 
present time (safety?) apparently is 12 hours.194
Followed by:
Japanese  now  established  Manado and  Kema  359 miles  from Ambon bases. Anticipate 
concentrated bombing from flying boats based Lake Tondana as preliminary to invasion of 
Ambon. With present equipment Ambon could not resist for 1 day forces equal to those 
which took Manado Kenadri [sic] Kema. Again urgently request immediate reinforcements 
by fighters and dive bombers … Enemy has definite sea control as well as air superiority and 
therefore situation far worse than instances such as Greece. Intelligence report allies supply 
line through Torres Strait and Darwin will be cut within 1 week of capture of Ambon.195
Roach's last cable  that day was  to  request a  conference  at Darwin  with Leggett to 
discuss the present situation. 
In support of these concerns Capt Tanner, an intelligence officer at Ambon, also sent 
two cables to AHQ on 13 January giving his assessment of the situation. He wrote that 'I 
have read this secret and personal communication addressed to you by C.O. “Gull” 
Force and I entirely agree with his description of the position as it affects “Gull” Force'. 
He went on that he was 'aware of the joint views of the respective commanders of all 
forces including NEI concerning trim of local position'.196 Tanner recommended that 
AHQ evacuate Ambon, adding that any delay would result in disaster.197 He followed up 
later with another cable stating the 'present strength of combined forces here can only 
offer short resistence [sic] to expected attack. Can I advise that reinforcements if 
necessary will be provided or that evacuation will be attempted'.198 These letters 
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MP742/1, R/2/1803, p. 36.demonstrated that although very concerned, Roach was not panicking. Rather it shows 
that he was responsibly, albeit frustratedly, trying to convince an unresponsive AHQ of 
the true position on Ambon and that he had the support of his fellow officers.
Rowell's reply was blunt, threatening and unproductive, but it provided a glimpse into 
Gull Force's true objective despite a definite lack of detail:
We are completely aware of the enemy situation as represented in your series of messages. 
These  should  cease  at once and  your attention be  given to carrying  out my instructions 
contained last paragraph my MC 4060 26 Dec. Your situation is being closely watched. Your 
staunch defence will have important effect especially in regard to future Australia Dutch co-
operation.199
This was the first time that AHQ had informed Roach of any policy regarding the 
defence of Ambon, although it was only partially true where Rowell attached it to Dutch 
cooperation, because AHQ knew that Gull Force was doomed to carryout a redundant 
policy of line observation with no ends and that it had kept that information from 
Roach. Rather than fully inform Roach of the true situation, Rowell threatened to 
remove him from command if he continued to cable AHQ asking for reinforcements; 
Roach stopped doing so. Nevertheless, Scott had undermined Roach's credibility and 
Sturdee took up on his offer to replace Roach. In Scott Sturdee had found a willing 
marionette that would serve AHQ policies without officially complaining about the 
inadequacies of the Ambon operation. 
Nevertheless, Roach’s cables had affected Sturdee. He began writing letters that 
ostensively addressed Roaches concerns, but he retained in files unsent. In filing these 
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Colonel J W R Scott, January 1942 [Reference Copy], AWM54, 573/6/10B, p. 32.letters, it suggests that Sturdee was either prevaricating or otherwise seeking to protect 
himself from any future enquiry into his conduct in controlling the Ambon operations, 
as they contradicted his policy of not throwing away resources to a lost cause in the 
Islands strategy. For example, on 13 January, Sturdee wrote a letter to Darwin HQ to 
arrange for Lt-Col Veale to inspect Gull Force and the Ambon defences. Sturdee 
explained to Lind that Roach was becoming alarmist and was asking for reinforcements 
that AHQ was unable to fulfil. 
The main basis for Sturdee's concern was Scott’s misconceived assessment of Roach's 
influence on the morale of Gull Force and its possible effect on relations between 
Australian and Dutch forces. Veale was to report whether, with the present resources, 
the defence of Ambon was adequate; whether Roach had undermined the state of morale 
of the Australian and the Dutch forces; and, whether Roach was continuing to 
undermine the morale of the forces on Ambon.200 Sturdee stressed the importance of 
Gull Force remaining at Ambon to bolster Australian-Dutch relations. Apparently, the 
nature of the letter demonstrated Sturdee's responsiveness to Roach's concerns, but it 
was never delivered.
In a second unsent letter, Sturdee wrote to the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, 
explaining that the AIF unit commanders at Ambon and Timor had both stressed the 
need for additional field artillery. Sturdee wrote:
Although it was known from previous reconnaissances [sic] that field artillery has a limited 
scope owing to the nature of the terrain, it is now felt that these battalions should have some 
close artillery support against the types of landings being made by the Japanese. A definite 
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200 Ibid., p. 33.role exists for 18 pounder guns, firstly for beach defence against military landing craft, and 
secondly against armoured fighting vehicles after they have come ashore.201 
Sturdee explained to Forde that the AIF had no available artillery units to send to Timor 
and Ambon and requested permission to enlist an AMF independent field artillery troop 
into the 2nd AIF for despatch to the Islands in two separate sections. The success of his 
proposal rested on persuading AMF troops, which were bound to the mainland defence 
of Australia only, to take-up overseas service by enlisting in the 2nd AIF at short notice 
to reinforce Gull Force. Sturdee must have known, however, that the Japanese were 
close to attacking the Island and time was against such a plan.
In a final example, Sturdee wrote to Forde of his 'regret' for having to dismiss Roach 
from Gull Force command. He explained:
Since his arrival in AMBON Lieutenant-Colonel Roach has given evidence, in a series of 
letters and signals, of a rapid deterioration of morale. It has become increasingly clear from 
his messages that not only is he, personally, unfitted to lead the defence of this island with 
the necessary resolution, but that the morale of all forces in the area is rapidly being lowered 
as a result of Lieutenant-Colonel Roach's lack of spirit.202
This assertion over morale would later prove untrue when Scott arrived at Ambon. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that Sturdee believed this was the case, or at least believed 
it was good cause to remove Roach from command. 
Sturdee demonstrated that he thought he could mislead Forde by claiming:
The force provided, in co-operation with N.E.I. forces, is considered sufficient to retain the 
island against attempted occupation on a light scale. To provide sufficient forces to withstand 
a major attack is entirely beyond  our means. Great value should accrue, however, if the 
enemy is denied the island except by the employment of overwhelming forces.203
108
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., p. 15.
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aware of the enemy situation', which indicated Sturdee knew an overwhelming Japanese 
force was on the way to Ambon and that, should they attack, it was beyond the means of 
Gull Force to hold the Island. Sturdee seems to have also forgotten that Forde attended 
the 12 December war cabinet meeting where it was decided to abandon Rabaul and 
presumably Timor and Ambon to similar fates. 
Notwithstanding the above, Sturdee's real intentions in the letter became apparent where 
he attempted to undermine Roach's expressed concerns about the inadequate numbers of 
Australian forces and equipment at Ambon. Sturdee tried to ameliorate his position by 
convincing Forde that, as Ambon now came under Sir Archibald Wavell as C-in-C 
American-British-Dutch-Australia Command (ABDACOM), 'resources in support of 
the defence of Ambon, if it is attacked, are likely to be considerable'. This was a 
nonsensical suggestion, as the reinforcement of the relatively insignificant outpost at 
Ambon 2,294 km away from Bandung in Java was unlikely to have been high on 
Wavell's agenda at a time when Singapore was gravely threatened. On this point, the 
facts overruled Sturdee's suggestion.
For example, Wavell's responsibilities covered the defence of Singapore, India, Burma, 
the Philippines, the NEI and northern Australia. His task was to protect the 5,632 
kilometre long “Malay Barrier”, which stretched from Thailand to the southern coast of 
New Guinea and including northern Australia. The problem Wavell faced was that 
ABDACOM formed too late to develop any effective defence along such broad lines 
with the too few military forces available to him at the time. As it was, ABDACOM 
109lacked unity of purpose with conflicting political demands regarding Britain's interests 
in saving Singapore, MacArthur's aims in defending the Philippines, Dutch needs in 
defending the NEI and Australian calls for the defence of Australia.204
Wavell’s instructions stated that he could not exercise authority over any forces except 
through his government and the commanders appointed by their respective 
governments.205 For example, the Dutch and American commanders concerned with the 
forward Allied bases at Sabang, Balikpapan, Kendari and Ambon had asked Wavell that 
he reinforce the isolated outposts, but Wavell replied that the risk of dissipating further 
forces was too risky.206 Even if Wavell wanted to or could have sent reinforcements to 
Ambon, it was an unlikely prospect owing to time constraints and the above military 
and political demands on ABDACOM. In other words, Sturdee was stretching his 
imagination (especially when he should have been aware of the restrictions placed on 
ABDACOM) if he truly thought Wavell would, or could, send military resources to the 
relatively unimportant island of Ambon. 
It seems Sturdee was concerned that Forde should come by Roach's complaints by some 
means other than AHQ. He ended his withheld letter by feigning concern for Roach's 
position where he wrote:
Although, for Lieutenant-Colonel Roach's sake it is most desirable that this matter should 
remain confidential, in view of his latest appeals which request reference to yourself, I feel it 
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The truth is Sturdee could not have cared less about Roach. He wrote after the War that: 
He was a squealer from the moment he got to Darwin …  From the time that he arrived at 
Ambon he never let up. His final message was demanding that ships be sent to Ambon to 
take the force out … Not only did he send a message to me but he repeated it to Wavell at 
ABDACOM HQ (a channel he was not authorized to use) indicating to me that he had lost 
his punch. As it turned out I should have left him there to go into the [Japanese] bag and 
saved a good man like Scott for further useful service.208
In drafting the letter, Sturdee was probably attempting to forestall any attempt by Roach 
to inform Forde on his opinion regarding the state of affairs surrounding Ambon outside 
the chain of command. Although Sturdee never sent the letters, they provide an insight 
into his then motivations and state of mind. In filing withheld dispatches coeval with the 
day, it seems the letters were possibly a contrivance used by Sturdee to influence history 
in his handling of the Ambon operations over the long term, as they could not possibly 
serve any other useful purpose locked away in a filing cabinet. 
Notwithstanding the above, Sturdee cabled Wavell on 14 January that he had lost 
confidence in Roach and that Scott would travel to Ambon and replace him on 16 or 17 
January. Sturdee reported his opinion that Roach did not have the 'spirit to conduct a 
resolute defence if [Ambon was] attacked'. He told Wavell that he was replacing Roach 
in command of Australian forces at Ambon on the basis that morale of all troops on 
Ambon had probably deteriorated beyond which the new commander could 'improve 
rapidly’.209 Under the circumstances, Wavell concurred with Sturdee and replied ‘in any 
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MP742/1, R/2/1803,  p.86.case I am opposed to handing out important objectives to enemy without making them 
fight for it. Quite appreciate feelings of lonely garrison but am sure Australians will put 
up stout fight whatever happens. No doubt it is wise to change commander’.210 Wavell 
later wrote that he 'was unable to see how with our very limited resources we could 
afford to reinforce' Ambon, Kendari, Celebes, Kupang in Timor, Samarinda in North 
Borneo and Sebang in North Sumatra that 'had only weak garrisons [that would be] 
unable to resist a Japanese attack in force’. In agreement with Roach’s conclusions, 
Wavell felt that it would have been better if the outposts had been withdrawn and 
concentrated further back.211
After Wavell had concurred with Sturdee’s proposal to dismiss Roach, Scott was 
inducted into the 2nd AIF and appointed in command of Gull Force on 14 January. 
Arrangements were made for Scott to travel the next day to Darwin and then on to 
Ambon. He took with him Operation Orders 29 and 30 to give to Roach when he 
arrived at Ambon. Rowell addressed operation Order 29 to Roach, which read: 
It is apparent from messages received at Army Headquarters since your arrival at AMBON 
and  from letters written by you  to Lt.-Col. W.J.R. Scott, that you have not the necessary 
confidence in your ability to conduct a resolute defence of AMBON in co-operation with the 
local Dutch forces. Your task was explicitly laid down in A.H.Q. Message … of 26 Dec.41, 
in which it was also made clear that reinforcing units you requested were not available … 
You have since persisted in repeating requests for these units and have given the impression 
that you have accepted defeat as inevitable … Under these circumstance, it has been decided 
to relieve you at once of your command which you will hand over to Lt.-Col. Scott.212
Considering Scott’s analysis of Roach’s letters, Sturdee and Rowell were right to act 
against any real or imagined influence Roach might have had on Gull Force morale, as 
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concerns could not be assessed independently and proved unsound. 
Sturdee issued Operation Order 29 after communicating to Wavell and Forde that Roach 
was not fit to command Gull Force because of his alarmist influence on the morale of 
the forces at Ambon. Resulting from Sturdee and Rowell’s misperceptions, AHQ gained 
both Wavell and Forde's official approval to replace Roach. Operation Order 30 
officially appointed Scott commander of Gull Force and instructed him to seek out 
Tanner and to take any action he saw fit in either removing him with Roach or allowing 
him to remain at Ambon. This order was derived from Tanner's assessment that Ambon 
could not hold out and that AHQ should evacuate Gull Force. Scott was authorised to 
replace Tanner with an intelligence officer of his choice. AHQ also ordered Scott to 
arrange Roach's, and possibly Tanner's, return to Melbourne for disposal, but as it was 
Tanner remained at Ambon. Scott also received the same orders that Roach had received 
from Rowell; 'you will make all preparations for the best possible defence of AMBON 
in cooperation with local N.E.I. Force, and with the means at your disposal'.213
On the morning of 16 January, the day that Scott was to arrive at Ambon, a Japanese air 
raid attacked Laha killing two Australian riflemen and two signallers. The Dutch sent up 
their two remaining operational aircraft, which were soon shot down by Japanese 
fighters. The Japanese damaged the airfield, a number of fuel dumps and six Lockheed 
aircraft in the bombing. These bombings imposed on the remaining American air 
personal to evacuate Ambon and abandoned their damaged Catalina flying boats. 
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flying boats and took them to Laha to use in antiaircraft defence.214
Scott arrived on Ambon that night at 2100 hours to face even greater difficulties than 
Roach had done when he had arrived at Ambon. Time was against him as he was 
unacquainted with his subordinate commanders, the dispositions of the Dutch and 
Australian forces, the geography of the Island and faced the imminent arrival of the 
Japanese. He later described his first encounter with his new command:
There  had  been  a  heavy  air  raid  over  Ambon  during  the  afternoon  and  as  the  Force 
Headquarters were in tents no lights were allowed and I was introduced to Lt-Col Roach and 
a number of officers in the dark at approximately 2230hrs. During the interval between the 
afternoon of 13 Jan and the night of arrival 16 Jan, I had had little sleep or food and was 
somewhat fatigued.  I  was  given  some  tinned  cherries  to  eat in  the  dark,  and  in  this 
atmosphere and  not knowing  who the officers were with Lt-Col Roach, I handed him his 
papers of recall. I gave him the option of returning to Darwin at 5 AM the following morning 
in the returning RAAF plane or waiting the chance of another plane to Darwin later. Lt-Col 
Roach decided to leave by plane at 5 AM next morning, or less than 7 hours after my arrival 
and those 7 hours darkness. I had no opportunity of any discussion or handover and in the 
morning I found myself in command of a force of officers and men who were all entirely 
unknown to me.215
It is difficult to understand, however, how Scott imagined it would be any different. He 
had no grounds to complain about Roach's quick return to Darwin when Roach had 
orders to 'afford Lt-Col Scott all necessary facilities to ensure that he is properly 
informed as to the local situation' if requested and it was in his power to retain Roach on 
Ambon to receive a full briefing on Gull Force’s dispositions before allowing him to 
return to Darwin.216 
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Allied land forces commander at ABDACOM Bandung, General Ter Pooten, making a 
mockery of Scott's unsubstantiated fears over poor morale at Ambon that had led to 
Roach's unjustified dismissal. The cables contradicted Scott's initial claims about 
morale at Ambon and demonstrated his misconceived appraisal of Roach's real concerns 
about the situation on the Island. Scott had passed on his concerns to Rowell that Roach 
was being alarmist and that he had undermined the morale of troops at Ambon. Rowell 
had to take Scott's tenuous concerns seriously and put into train Roach's removal from 
command of Gull Force. This made it clear that Scott had been mistaken in his 
assessment of Roach, especially where he was now forced to contradict his earlier 
assertions.
Scott wrote to AHQ that he was impressed by Kapitz and entirely satisfied with the 
morale of the Australian and Dutch troops at Ambon. Wavell concurred that he was also 
satisfied with the morale of troops at Ambon. He wrote 'IMPRESSED WITH 
COLONEL KAPITZ COMMANDING N.E.I. TROOPS. HIS MORAL ALSO HIS 
TROOPS MORAL COULD NOT BE HIGHER’. Ter Pooten confirmed the morale on 
Ambon and relayed Kapitz's report to AHQ that the morale of the NEI troops at Ambon 
was high. He wrote 'THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ANY DETERIORATION 
MORAL N.E.I. TROOPS'.217 Both Scott and ABDACOM signed off “no worries”. 
Unfortunately for Roach this information was delivered too late to save his reputation at 
AHQ and he was returned to Melbourne to be retired to the reserve officers' list. 
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Newbury, officer commanding (OC) HQ Coy, his adjutant Capt Hooke and intelligence 
officer Gabriel, visited the Amahusu Line. Capt Newnham, officer in charge (OIC) of D 
Coy, explained to Scott Roach's plans for the dispositions and roles of the company and 
attached troops on the Amahusu line. Newnham explained that if small landings 
occurred at either Latuhalat or Ambon Bay to the West, D Coy was to move forward 
one or two platoons in support of major Westley's A Coy near Eri Bay. If large-scale 
landings happened at Latuhalat or Eri Bay, A Coy would withdraw to Bn HQ in 
Amahusu village and face back along the road to Eri.218
Scott questioned this plan where it only allowed for a landing at Eri or Latuhalat. 
Newnham explained to Scott that Roach had addressed this problem by allocating D 
Coy in the role of mobile in reserve at Amahusu, where transport trucks were loaded 
and ready for the company to move in support of A Coy at Eri or to move to Benteng 
Hill artillery barracks to face any attack from the East.219 Roach's intention had been to 
commit as few of his forces as possible and use them for counter attack purposes only, 
but the continuing Japanese air raids had forced the dispersal of his units from Tantui.220 
When Scott questioned the vulnerability of the left flank on Mount Nona, Newnham 
explained that Roach had prepared the 5th pl Pioneers (pl Prn/s) under Jenkins command 
with automatic weapons at Mount Nona to cover the Amahusu Line from the top of the 
mountain.
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reconnaissance and movement through the mountains. Newnham also told Scott that 
training in night occupations of trenches had not yet been arranged. Scott was anxious 
that a Japanese attack could come at any time and ordered Newnham to carry out an 
exercise that night to see how long it took for the company to occupy their positions. He 
did this on the basis that they must by ready to move into positions by day or night. 
When Scott’s inspection party returned to D Coy HQ, he explained to his officers that 
'this plan for withdrawal does not appeal to me and you can assume that there will be no 
movement of [A Coy] and that positions will be held, also that the occupation of the 
“Amahusu Line” would be [Newnham's] role'.221 This directive effectively fixed D Coy 
in their positions rising above Amahusu to Mount Nona and A Coy in their positions 
rising above Eri to the Tjenke plateau. Scott countermanded Roach's plans for D Coy's 
movement to Benteng Hill leaving that approach open to the Japanese if they landed 
unexpectedly to the East and in Gull Force's rear. 
Apart from fixing A and D companies in their trenches, Scott followed Kapitz’s original 
plan on the occupation of positions across the Laitimor Peninsular. In Macrae's words, 
'Col Scott immediately inspected all positions including Laha and decided to make no 
alterations in dispositions. He issued an operational order stating that all positions 
would be held'.222 Because Ambon was on alert in case of imminent Japanese attack, it 
would have been dangerous for Scott to attempt a reshuffle of troops and acquaint them 
117
221 National Archives of Australia, Official History, 1939-45, War: Records of Gavin Long, AWM67, 
3/384, p. 9.
222 National Archives of Australia, Report on Ambon and Hainan Part 2, AWM54, 573/6/1B, Appendix B, 
p. 6.with new and unfamiliar dispositions, wherever they may be, when an attack was 
expected at any time. On the other hand, Scott’s decision had fixed the companies in 
isolation from C and B Coy (less one platoon) at Laha and from the KNIL positions at 
Paso.
The problem of fixing his defensive positions at Laha, Amahusu and Eri was that the 
Japanese had the advantage in choosing where and how to conduct the attack. 
Clausewitz noted that under conditions favouring the enemy ‘a position is turned in 
relation to its front, and this is either to attack it from the flank, or even the rear, or to 
cut its lines of communication’.223 Scott’s positions were vulnerable to these tactics. For 
example, Laha was isolated, weak in numbers, its lines of communications with the 
main body of the battalion were extremely vulnerable and there was a possibility that 
the Japanese could outflank Laha by infiltrating through the jungle.
Amahusu and Eri were similar in geographical terms where the companies in these 
positions could be turned from the heights of Mount Nona. If the Japanese attacked 
from the rear the supply dumps at Kudamati would be cut off from Amahusu and Eri, 
there was no space to manoeuvre except back into the sea and the nature of the 
mountainous terrain across the peninsular made it too difficult to simultaneously 
employ A and D Coy forces in combination. Scott’s fixed dispositions cancelled out the 
full movement and concentration of force at any place other than where they stood 
while his crowded positions became open to the potential of envelopment from the rear. 
Under these difficult circumstances the place of battle was practically predetermined.
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223 von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Peter Paret p. 486.Up to 28 January, Scott occupied A and D Coy in carting additional stores, water and 
ammunition up the trenches, setting up food dumps, and revetting the trench systems 
above Amahusu and Eri. On 23 January, Scott issued operation orders designating the 
roles and dispositions for all units of Gull Force. He instructed each company 
commander to store 18 days of water and rations at positions all along the lines. While 
this work continued the engineers setup water points and laid explosives and antitank 
mines. These tasks had wearied the men of Gull Force as they continued carrying 
supplies up the lines.224 
Meanwhile, Air Commodore Wilson, commanding the newly formed north-western 
Command Area, became increasingly unhappy with the RAAF situation at Ambon and 
pushed for the withdrawal 13 Squadron from Laha back to Darwin. He asked Burnett to 
authorise the withdrawal, but was told to seek permission from ABDACOM at 
Bandung, as Ambon had now been put under its command. Wing Commander Dallas 
Scott and Squadron Leader Ryland flew to Bandung to report to General Brett. Scott 
told Brett that 'if adequate strength in fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) 
could not be provided, all but small parties to maintain refuelling and rearming facilities 
should be withdrawn from Laha and Namlea to Darwin'.225 Because there were no 
reinforcements available, Brett concurred with Scott's argument and authorised the 
withdrawal of 13 Squadron from Ambon and Namlea to Darwin. When Brett gave his 
permission 13 Squadron began its preparations to abandon Ambon.
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225 Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942: Series Two (Navy) Australia in the War of 
1939-1945, p. 373.At 1500 hours, two days before the RAAF evacuation, 13 Squadron sighted Japanese 
warships off the Celebes north coast. One reconnaissance flight reported 22 ships in 
convoy, including 13 transports, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers and 5 destroyers, 
heading on a southeasterly course past Manado.226 Considering these reports, and the 
supposition that the convoy was heading to Ambon, the last of the RAAF Hudsons and 
most of the squadron's ground crews evacuated Ambon on 28 January.227 Two days later, 
Jinkins' 5th pl Pnr/s at Mount Nona observed the Japanese fleet as it approached. At 
1700 hours, Jinkins reported that 17 warships and 11 transport ships were heading to the 
Southwest of the Ambon. Later he reported to Bn HQ that the ships were standing 
offshore at around 21 kilometres to the south of the Island, but that they did not appear 
to be moving.228
Jinkins recorded the incident as follows:
I saw  17 ships  of war  and  11  transports  out to the  southeast,  proceeding  south-west.  I 
communicated with Area Command  H.Q. by phone and told them what I had seen. These 
vessels appeared to be standing off some 12 or 15 miles and did not appear to be attempting 
to come in. … The following  morning, 31st January, we observed these ships about 0700 
hours. The ships of war dispersed and all the transports [were] standing in to the shore off 
HOEKOERILLA. They were transporting what we believed  to be troops ashore in motor 
landing craft. … At dawn on the 1st February a further 8 Naval vessels, mainly destroyers, 
and 3 small merchant craft arrived and commenced landing operations at the same place. A 
Naval  Force  consisting  of some heavy cruisers  and  destroyers  kept up a constant patrol 
during the 31st January and 1st February to the South and West of the island and across the 
harbour mouth.229
Jinkins could not see exactly where the landings took place because of the mountains 
that rested between his position and the beaches, but his report was nevertheless 
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229 Ibid.accurate. At 0300 hours 31 January, Kapitz also alerted Scott that the Japanese had 
started landings at Hukurila.230
Gull Force now faced an overwhelming Japanese task force of more than 25,000 men 
supported by transport ships, battle ships, aircraft carriers and aircraft. The Curtin 
government’s inexperienced, or at least misled, war cabinet in accepting Sturdee’s 
antiquated First World War strategy had placed Roach and then Scott in an unenviable, 
unprofitable and unobtainable position of holding Ambon against an overwhelming 
force without a hope of achieving any substantive ends. If Clausewitz’s observations 
‘that armies have been divided and separated countless times, without the commander 
having any clear reason for it, simply because he vaguely felt that this was the way 
things ought to be done’ is correct, then the forward observation line policy for Ambon 
seems to fit that adage. Sturdee had dissipated the 23rd Brigade, and especially Gull and 
Sparrow forces, on the spurious basis that the right thing to do was to demonstrate 
Australian support to the NEI, to hold the line on observation and to make the Japanese 
fight for their gains. 
Based on a cost benefit ratio, Sturdee’s rigid strategy of dissipating, fixing and isolating 
his insufficient task forces on far-flung islands without a plan for supply, reinforcement 
or withdrawal makes little sense. The basic principle of formulating strategy is to meet a 
profitable end in proportion to the expected costs. The 23rd Brigade’s task forces had no 
prospect of decisively disrupting the Japanese plans and the costs would be great in 
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Australian mandated territories and mainland was now in need of these resources. 
In the realm of Realpolitik, there was no longer any justification for demonstrating 
support for the Dutch after Van Kleffens had broadcast to the world that the NEI would 
fight in support of Malaya and when the RAN had prepared a cost effective line 
observation network of coast watchers. Unlike Hong Kong, where the British sacrificed 
their island to overwhelming Japanese forces in December 1941, Ambon and Timor 
were not Australian sovereign territory. Where no other justification existed in the 
garrisoning of the Dutch Islands it seems Sturdee had exceeded his level of competence 
in planning, commanding and following through on an antiquated strategy of holding a 
forward line that led to achieving no higher purpose other than simply making the 
Japanese fight for Ambon at the cost of Gull Force and especially after he was apprised 
of the danger in following that path by his subordinates.
Roach, Tanner and Lind each in turn had recognised that the better policy for Ambon, 
and many of the other isolated outposts, was to withdraw the garrisons and concentrate 
them further back. Whether knowingly or unwittingly, these officers had evoked 
Clausewitz’s principle that defence is stronger than offence and that the concentration of 
forces is more powerful than their dissipation. Japan had created a situation for itself 
similar to that which Napoleon faced in attacking far into Russia. The Japanese policy 
was one of establishing a greater co-prosperity sphere throughout Southeast Asia and 
Southwest Pacific regions and to achieve this it was required to weaken itself by 
122extending its front and dissipating its finite resources in the hope of consolidating its 
objectives before the allies could counter attack.
Furthermore, Wavell, while at a conference at Singapore on 28 January 1942, 
recognised that Ambon was not considered a crucial position to hold when he advised 
on the best course of action to take in defending important objectives in the face of the 
Japanese: 
All I can do in the immediate future (said  Wavell) is  to check enemy by such offensive 
action by sea and  air as limited resources allow  and  to secure most important objectives 
which I conceive to be Singapore, air bases in central and southern Sumatra, naval base at 
Surabaya, aerodrome at Koepang. Picture looks  gloomy but enemy is at full strength, is 
suffering  severe losses, and  cannot replace his  losses in aircraft as  we  can.  Things  will 
improve eventually as we keep on fighting but may be worse first.231
When the War Advisory Council read Wavell’s report it found that Ambon was not on 
the list of those objectives and they questioned the Chiefs of Staff whether it would be 
better to withdraw Gull Force. The War Advisory Council minutes note that:
A discussion took place as to the possibility of holding Ambon in the event of a Japanese 
attack in force. It was noted that General Wavell had expressed the view that all that could be 
done in the immediate future was to secure the most important objectives which included the 
aerodrome at Koepang but not Ambon. The view  was expressed by the Chiefs of Staff that 
withdrawal  from Ambon  would  be  a  very  difficult  operation  and  in  any  event it was 
important to hold Ambon as long as possible in order to deny it to the enemy.232
While it is agreed that it would have been a difficult operation to carry out by this time, 
history nevertheless demonstrates that Ambon should not have been considered a 
strategic point needing to be defended at all costs. The irony is that it was Wavell who 
had highlighted the lack of objective value of Ambon to the War Advisory Council 
where Sturdee had not, especially as Sturdee was aware of what Gull Force was up 
against. It seems clear from this example that if the government had known what 
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Minute 724, 30 January, 1942, p. 440.Sturdee was holding back, there was a possibility that Gull Force would have been 
retained for a more advantageous objective. Nevertheless, it was only after Singapore 
fell that Sturdee overcame his rigid approach to position warfare and grasped 
Clausewitz’s idea of defensive warfare, a point that is discussed further in Chapter Five 
below.
124Chapter Three -The Japanese Grand Strategy, Strategy and 
Tactics on Ambon
[Strategy] is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war. Though strategy in itself is 
concerned only with engagements, the theory of strategy must also consider its chiefs means 
of execution, the fighting force. It must consider these in their own right and in their relation 
to other factors, for they shape the engagement and it is in turn on them that the effect of the 
engagement first makes itself felt. Strategic theory must therefore study the engagement in 
terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determines 
its course.
Strategy  is  the use  of the  engagement for the  purpose of  the  war.  The  strategist must 
therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance 
with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine 
the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns 
and, within these, decide on the individual engagements. Since most of these matters have to 
be based on assumptions that may not prove to be correct, while other, more detailed orders 
cannot be determined in advance at all, it follows that the strategist must go on campaign 
himself. Detailed  orders  can then be given on the  spot,  allowing  the general  plan to be 
adjusted  to  modifications  that are  continuously  required.  The  strategist,  in  short,  must 
maintain control throughout.233
Carl von Clausewitz
The Japanese grand strategy of the Second World War was to obtain secure access to 
resources independently of those supplied by the western nations. The Americans and 
British had imposed embargoes on trade with Japan because of their occupation of 
China. It had been a long held dream of the Japanese navy to colonise the Far East and 
South West Pacific areas under an economic greater East Asia co-prosperity complex. 
From June 1941 forward Japan began serious negotiations with the USA to lift the 
embargoes. However on 6 November, in case the ongoing diplomatic negotiations with 
the United States should fail, the Japanese Imperial GHQ ordered its southern army area 
commander, General Juichi Terauchi, to prepare his forces for the seizure of strategic 
areas in the Far East and Southwest Pacific areas. In cooperation with the navy, 
Terauchi was required to assemble his armed forces in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos), South China, Formosa (Taiwan), the southwest islands of the Pacific and 
South Seas. 
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233 von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Peter Paret, p. 207.The overall operational objectives for the Southern Army were, in cooperation with the 
2nd Fleet, the seizure of Hong Kong, Malaya, British Borneo, the Philippines, North 
Sumatra, Java and Burma. The imperative was to seize resource rich areas before the 
incumbent sovereign forces could destroy them. The Japanese justification for these 
measures was the economic self-defence of Japan. Japanese politicians took this 
initiative to circumvent American embargoes on trade through war and to establish a 
Greater East Asia CO-prosperity Sphere throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific from 
which it could independently obtain those resources.234
The Japanese 16th Army was given the task of securing Dutch oilfield infrastructure and 
oil reserves in the NEI before March 1942 even if this entailed some sacrifice. To 
achieve these objectives Imperial GHQ deemed it necessary to first neutralise the NEI, 
Philippines and Malayan areas.235 The planned attack on Java was scheduled along five 
lines of advance:
1. The Sakaguchi Mixed Brigade will first invade Davao on Mindanao, then, after handing 
over to the Honma Army, will occupy the oil regions of Tarakan and Balikpapan on Borneo. 
After handing those over to the navy, the brigade will occupy Bandjermasin city in southern 
Borneo, then advance on to Java.
2. The Eastern Detachment (the Ito Detachment) will sortie from Hong Kong in mid-January 
and, in cooperation with the navy, invade Ambon from the seas to the east of the Celebes, 
then move on to invade Timor.
3.  The  Sano  Division  (38th  Division  -  missing  the  Ito  Detachment  and  the  Shoji 
Detachment) will sail from Camrahn Bay on 11 February and invade the area of Palembang, 
centre of many oilfields, in southern Sumatra.
4. The Tsuchihashi Division (48th Division) will invade Surabaya in eastern Java.
5. The army commander will lead army headquarters and direct army units, as well as the 
2nd Division and the Shoji Regiment, and attack the area of the capital Batavia (present-day 
Jakarta) in western Java.236
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Mar. 1942, ed. United States Department of Army Office of Military History, (Washington, DC: Library 
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236 National Archives of Australia, Ambon Offensive Operation - History of Imperial Japanese Army Unit 
on Ambon, Second World War, MSS1912, 2007, p. 1.The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) troop transport escorts for these tasks were 1 
cruiser and 32 destroyers. Terauchi continued to prepare the Imperial Japanese Army's 
(IJA) task forces throughout November 1941 and moved them to their respective 
stepping off points ready for the attack. 
The 14th Army's 16th and 48th Divisions, the 65th Independent Brigade and the 5th Air 
Division assembled at stations in Formosa, Amamioshima and Palau ready to attack the 
Philippines. The 15th Army's 33rd and 55th Divisions (less one Infantry regiment) 
assembled in Indochina for the attack on Thailand and Burma. The 25th Army's 5th and 
18th Imperial Guard and the 3rd Air Division assembled in Indochina, Hainan Island and 
Japan for the attack on Malaya. The 16th Army's 2nd, 38th, 48th Divisions and the 56th 
Regimental Group assembled in South China and Palau for the attack on the NEI. 
All troop transports and IJN escorts for the Southern Army came under the command of 
Vice Admiral Kondo's Combined Southern Naval Force. It contained the 2nd Division 
(two 14 inch battleships) of the 3rd Battle Squadron, the 4th Carrier Squadron (2 light 
fleet carriers), the 4th, 5th, 7th and 16th Cruiser Squadrons (eleven 8-inch and 3 light 
cruisers), the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Destroyer Flotillas (4 light cruisers and 52 destroyers), 
the 4th, 5th, and 6th Submarine Flotillas (eight submarines). These forces were organised 
to attack Malaya on 8 December at 1245 hours local time, Singora in Thailand at 0230 
hours local time and Hong Kong 0800 hours local time.237
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of Military History, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1963), p. 1; Kirby, 
W., Addis, C. T., Meiklejohn, J. F. et al., History of the Second World War: The War against Japan, ed. 
J.R.M. Butler, vol. 1, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), pp. 96, 492.At 1245 hours on 8 December, General Yamashita's forces landed at Kota Bharu in 
Malaya and at Singora in Thailand. At 0800 hours local time, after receiving news that 
the attack on Malaya had begun, the Japanese 16th Army started its assault on Hong 
Kong. On 26 December, and after 17 days of fighting, Hong Kong surrendered. 
Following the campaign on Hong Kong, the 16th Army reorganised for the attack on 
Java. The 38th Division, under Maj-Gen Takeo Ito, formed up the Eastern Detachment 
division and organised its move to Manado to take Ambon and Timor. Ito took personal 
command of the 228th Infantry Regiment together with its elements of engineers, 
mountain artillery, medical, transport and other supporting units that he had assembled 
for the attacks. The Kure 1st Special Naval Landing Force (1st Kure SNLF), which was 
chosen to support the Ambon offensive at Hitulama, remained under the command of 
Rear Admiral Kouichiro Hatakeyama.238
Organisation of the 38th Division Detachment 
Major General Takeo Ito, Commander of the 38th Infantry Division
Group Headquarters (38th Division)      Engineer Company (less 1 platoon)
228th Infantry Regiment        1 Independent Engineer   Company
Light Tank Unit          1 Transport platoon
1 Signal Unit element        Water Supply and Purification Unit
Half of a Field Hospital        1 Anchorage Headquarters Element
Anti-Tank Gun Unit         1 Imperial Guards element
March Casualty Collection Unit      Howitzer Battery Unit
1 Division Veterinary Hospital element    1st Mountain Artillery
2 Anti-Aircraft Batteries
A total of: 5300 personnel, 400 horses and 110 vehicles
The Eastern Detachment's objectives were 'to cut the lines of communications between 
Australia and Java, isolate the latter, and facilitate … [the] invasion of Java [by seizing] 
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1942 -1947, p. 2.air and naval bases there and to form a defensive line against an anticipated enemy 
counteroffensive from the Darwin area'.239
In the opening phases of these operations the IJN air forces stood-by until Davao, Jolo 
and other islands in the Mindanao area were secured. After Borneo and the Celebes fell, 
the IJN’s air force from that area moved further eastward to extend its air power over 
the Davao and Jolo precincts in preparation for moves against Kendari in the Celebes 
and then Ambon. A two-carrier division of the 1st Air Fleet, returning from operations at 
Pearl Harbor, had the task of supporting the land-based operations against Ambon. Its 
objectives were to provide air superiority over the region and to support the capture of 
Kendari, Ambon, Timor and eventually Java.240
On 12 January Ito’s Eastern Detachment embarked from Hong Kong aboard the 
transport ships Miike Maru, Africa Maru, Ryoyo Maru, Zenyo Maru and the Yamaura 
Maru for Davao under escort of a full destroyer flotilla. The Imperial General 
Headquarters ordered Rear Admiral Tanaka Raizo and his 3rd Fleet to also support the 
naval operations at Manado, Kendari, Ambon and Timor. Drawing from these naval 
resources for Ambon, Raizo organised the flagship Jintsu, the 11th Seaplane Tender 
Division's Chitose, the 2nd Destroyer Squadron (including the 8th Destroyer Division 
minus one section (2 ships) and the 15th and 16th Destroyer Divisions (8 ships)),241 the 
21st Minesweeper Division (nos. W7, W9, and W12) and two ships of the 1st Sub-chaser 
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Organisation List of the Ito Detachment
1. Eastern Detachment
  Miike Maru
      Eastern Detachment commander, Maj Gen Ito
      Senior adjutant, Lt Col Matsumoto
      Attached staff officer, Maj Tosaka
      Reserve and direct command units
      7th Company, Light Armoured Car
      38th Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion (main strength), Maj Asano
      Engineer Company (minus elements)
      Supply and transport, medical units (part strength)
      2nd Field Hospital (half strength)
  Africa Maru
      Left Flank commander, Col Doi
      4th Company, direct command company (main strength)
      Left front-line Battalion
      3rd Battalion (minus 10th Company), Maj Nishiyama
      Rapid-fire Gun platoon
  Zen’yo Maru
      Left front-line battalion
      1st Battalion (minus the 4th Company), Maj Hayakawa
      Infantry Artillery Unit main (main strength, minus some elements)
      Engineer Unit, Wireless Squad, others
  Yamaura Maru
      Right Attack Unit
      2nd Battalion (minus 7th Company), Major Kimura
      Mountain Artillery Unit (one platoon)
      Engineer Unit, Wireless Squad, others
  Ryoyo Maru
      Naval landing party cooperating
      10th Company (Machine Gun platoon, Engineer squad attached), 
      Lt Wakabayashi
2. Naval Marines
  Kure 1st Special Naval Landing Party, Naval Cdr Iemoto Yoshiyuki (attached)
3. Escort Fleet
  2nd Torpedo Squadron, Rear Adm Tanaka Raizo
  (Flagship) light cruiser Jintsu, one submarine chaser
  8th Destroyer Squadron, 4 destroyers
  15th Destroyer Squadron, 4 destroyers
  21st Minesweeper Flotilla, 5 minesweepers
  Support Group
  2nd Air Flotilla (2 vessels)
  Aircraft Carriers (Soryu, Hiryu)243
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243 National Archives of Australia, Ambon Offensive Operation - History of Imperial Japanese Army Unit 
on Ambon, Second World War, pp. 2-3.In implementing the first phase of operations, Imperial GHQ allocated the 16th Army's 
Sakaguchi Mixed Brigade and the Miura Detachment to take Davao on the Philippine 
Island of Mindanao. At dawn on 8 December, as a prelude to the invasion, the Japanese 
carrier-based aircraft stationed at Palau raided Mindanao, attacked the US seaplane 
support tender base at Davao and destroyed all the American PBYs anchored in the 
bay.244 In the second phase of their operations, the Eastern Detachment made landfall at 
Davao to reorganise itself in preparation for the attack on Ambon. The Eastern 
Detachment arrived at Davao Bay on 18 January and witnessed the Miura and 
Sakaguchi Detachments assault the town. 
At 0400 hours on 19 January, the Miura and Sakaguchi detachments respectively landed 
their forces to the north and south of Davao. The following day, these combined forces 
routed the Philippine army and took Davao. After Davao fell, Ito rearranged the ship 
loadings, formulated tactical plans and carried out sea-borne rehearsals for the attack on 
Ambon Island.245 In planning the attack over the next ten days, Ito collected information 
from current, albeit cloud obscured, naval aircraft survey photographs of Ambon. He 
determined that Ambon Town and the airfield at Laha were his most important 
objectives. Although Ito was unable to completely establish Allied strengths and 
dispositions, he nevertheless correctly estimated that the main opposing forces were 
concentrated on the southwest end of Laitimor Peninsular, in the central east position at 
Paso and at Laha on the Hitu Peninsular.
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and Timor, 1942, AWM54, 573/6/16, p. 3.Ito estimated that the Australian and KNIL forces could not cover all potential coastal 
landing sites at any one time, as they were committed to defending their fixed positions 
at Laha, Amahusu and Paso.246 Taking the initiative, Ito planned to carry out 
simultaneous seaborne landings on the beaches at Hitulama and at Hutumuri/Rutung at 
precisely 0100 hours on the morning of 31 January 1942. The 1st Kure SNLF and the 
10th Coy Wakabayashi Unit 3rd Bn (Det.) would land at Hitulama and attack south 
towards the Laha airfield on Ambon Bay while the 228th Regiment would land in the 
bay of Hutumuri and Rutung to execute a three-pronged attack towards Paso, Ambon 
and the main Australian defences located at Amahusu and Eri.247 The objective of this 
operation was to isolate the Dutch forces at Paso from the Australian forces at Amahusu 
and Laha. 
Considering British intelligence reports of September 1941, which were supplied to the 
23rd Brigade248 to illustrate how the Japanese carried out their seaborne landing tactics in 
China, clearly Ito chose landing sites on Ambon that were vulnerable to attack from the 
sea and open to rapid lodgement with adequate bridgeheads from which to break out. 
These Japanese seaborne operations worked on the principle of launching the landing 
craft on a moonless night with the rising tide, embarking troops and grouping the 
landing craft for a predawn surprise attack. The coordination of these operations 
required landing craft to approach the beaches on a wide front while allowing a major 
landing force to concentrate on any strongly defended positions. The Japanese tacticians 
calculated that the success of these seaborne landings were dependent on surprise, the 
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248 Ibid.concentration of force as well as the use of pincer formations to outflank and weaken 
any opposition on the beaches.249
The Australian intelligence branch reported these tactics to the 23rd Brigade with the 
advice that:
This method of procedure has a greater chance of success than a landing at one single point. 
However it does necessitate the putting into action of a first echelon of considerable size. In 
any case it obliges the defense to scatter its forces to various points at each of which they are 
faced by strong opposition, and are, at the same time, uncertain where to launch an effective 
counter attack.250
The key to Ito's plan was that his force was a division in size; he had sufficient transport 
ships and special landing craft, strong air and naval support and highly experienced 
well-trained troops to carry out the Ambon landing operations. Unlike Sturdee’s 
unprofitable approach of holding Ambon for as long as possible to demonstrate a 
commitment to the Dutch and to delay the Japanese for a few days only, Ito was 
committed to seizing Ambon and holding it; to assure that success he had rehearsed his 
units at Davao and made them familiar with their respective tasks and schedules well 
before approaching Ambon.251
Before the Eastern Detachment sailed for Davao from Hong Kong, Japanese aircraft 
stationed at Palau began to raid and soften up Ambon from the air. On 7 January 1942, 
Japanese aircraft attacked Laha airfield for the first time dropping up to 50 
antipersonnel bombs over the airfield, albeit without causing any casualties among the 
Australian or Dutch defenders. On 16 January Japanese fighters shot down the two 
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251 Ibid., pp. 61-62.remaining serviceable MLKNIL’s fighters, destroyed some Hudson aircraft parked 
along the runway as well as killing four Australian soldiers.252 After the bombing raids, 
Kapitz, except for the AAA crews that he left behind, withdrew his infantry company 
from Laha to reinforce Paso. This left the AIF's B Coy (less one pl) and C Coy, two 
Bren carriers, 3 mortars, a detachment of the 2/12th field ambulance, a detachment from 
the service corps, a signal detachment and Dutch Bofors and the AAA to defend the 
airfield. 
Over the ensuing weeks, Japanese twin-engine bombers and Zero fighters continued to 
raid Ambon on an almost daily basis to destroy any planes left sitting on the ground, the 
seaplanes at Halong and to harass the Allied positions. On 16 January, following the 
previous air raids at Halong on 15 January, in which two of the nine US navy’s Patrol 
Wing 10 (PW10) Catalina PBYs were damaged, the remaining American and Dutch 
flying boats and their crews evacuated Ambon.253 On 28 January all remaining RAAF 
aircraft and their crews at Ambon also evacuated the area and withdrew to Darwin 
leaving the remaining Australian and Dutch land forces to continue without any air 
support.
On 27 January, following the bombing of Ambon by the 23rd Air Flotilla, the Kanoya 
Air Unit, the Toko Air Group Detachment, the 3rd Air Group and the Eastern 
Detachment flotilla departed from Davao for Ambon.254 At 1700 hours on the afternoon 
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what turned out to be a poorly organised ploy at deceiving the allies.255 Between 0030 
and 0100 hours on 31 January, the southern force transport ships, lead by the Yamaura 
Maru, then the Africa Maru, the Zenyo Maru and finally the Miike Maru, returned to 
Ambon Island and entered the bay fronting the villages of Rutung and Hutumuri. After 
anchoring in the bay, the marine engineers lowered landing craft into the water and the 
Eastern Detachment troops began descending rope ladders into the boats. Once 
underway the landing parties faced no opposition and, according to both Japanese and 
Dutch sources, no casualties occurred during the landings.256
At 0130 hours, the assault elements of the three battalions simultaneously landed along 
the bay:257 the 1st Bn commander, Major Hayakawa, disembarked his troops from the 
Zenyo Maru and landed on the left beach near Rutung; the 3rd Bn commander Col Doi 
disembarked his troops from the Africa Maru and landed on the centre beach between 
Rutung and Hutumuri; and the 2nd Bn commander, Major Kimura, disembarked his 
troops from the Yamaura Maru and landed on the right beach adjacent to Hutumuri. 
The second and third waves followed the initial landings in 30-minute intervals. Once 
ashore all landing parties were required to carry their own ammunition and food 
supplies until rations could be obtained from supply ships at Ambon Town after it was 
captured.258 At 0250 hours, the main landings less the mountain artillery were 
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and Timor, 1942, AWM54, 573/6/16, p. 4.completed. In the third landings artillery guns, transport horses, an ammunition platoon 
and hospital units arrived on the beach. On 1 February the Ryoyo Maru, which had 
delivered the 10th Coy Wakabayashi Unit 3rd Bn (Det.) and a machine gun platoon to 
Hitulama, arrived in the bay to offload the 1st Mountain Battery.259
From the Rutung/Hutumuri beachhead, Ito ordered the 228th Regiment's 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
(less the 10th Coy) battalions to move off to their respective objectives. The 1st Bn 
marched Southwest towards Ema to cross the Island through Sojadiatas to Ambon 
Town, where it was to cut off the southwest sector of the Laitimor Peninsular and the 
Australians. The 2nd Bn marched Northeast along the coast towards the Dutch positions 
at Paso. Their aims were first to isolate and then attack the Dutch positions at Paso 
before taking the seaplane base at Halong. The 3rd Bn marched across the centre of the 
Laitimor Peninsular towards Ambon Town to converge with the 1st Bn, to take the town 
and to isolate the Australians at Amahusu.260 Ito’s plan was to drive a wedge between the 
Australian and Dutch forces on the Laitimor Peninsular and attack them in detail. 
Concurrent with the southern landings, the northern force consisting of the 10th Coy 3rd 
Bn (Det.), a machine gun platoon and the 1st Kure SNLF respectively disembarked at 
0130 hours from the Ryoyo Maru and Jintsu at Hitulama. According to Japanese sources 
the northern landings met with little resistance from the Dutch defenders other than 
about 20 mortar rounds being fired from the hills above Hitulama. The Japanese forces 
136
259 National Archives of Australia, Personal Records Colonel W.J.R. Scott, War of 1939-45, AWM67, 
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and Timor, 1942, AWM54, 573/6/16, p. 2.took the beachhead without much effort and marched off towards their objective at Laha 
airfield.261
Operations at Hitulama and Laha - Kure 1st Special Naval Landing Force 
and 10th Company (3rd Battalion detached) Northern Assault Unit (Laha 
Airfield) 
31 January – 3 February1942
The transports ships Jintsu, with provisional naval commander Iemoto Yoshiyuki's and 
his 1st Kure SNLF made up of 579 officers and men,262 and the Ryoyo Maru, 
transporting Lt Wakabayashi's 10th Coy, anchored off the beaches at Hitulama on the 
north coast of Ambon at 0130 hours. The 1st pl 4th Coy KNIL together with the 1st M23 
MG pl KNIL and two sections of mortars engaged the Japanese after they landed on the 
beaches. The KNIL tentatively attacked the Japanese landing parties at Hitulama with 
mortar and machine gun fire, but the Japanese were able to ignore the ineffective Dutch 
fire until after their northern assault units had been consolidated on the beachhead at 
0320 hours. At 0630 hours Wakabayashi's 10th Coy leading the breakout to the high 
ground at Mount Helat, contacted the KNIL units and overran their defensive positions 
after two hours.263 The Japanese reported that the KNIL units had dropped their 
equipment and rapidly withdrew into the hinterland.264
The KNIL infantry units withdrew into the jungle to the west of Mount Helat after 
sending the mortar platoon back down the road to Paso by way of Dorianpatah. The 1st 
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61.Kure SNLF and 10th Coy, with three armoured vehicles and troops riding bicycles along 
the road, headed for Dorianpatah to the South where they soon overran and captured the 
retreating mortar platoon. Because the 1st pl KNIL had failed to demolish the bridges 
along the Hitulama/Dorianpatah Road as ordered, the Japanese were able to make a 
rapid advance.265 On reaching Dorianpatah at 1200 hours, the 1st Kure SNLF and the 
10th Coy secured the village and turned towards their objective at Laha. On reaching 
Suakodo at 1530 hours that afternoon, a 1st Kure SNLF advance party went forward to 
Laha where they met with heavy resistance from Australian forces on the west bank of 
the Lawa River at Tawiri village. When the 1st Kure SNLF advance party engaged the 
Australians it took heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw back to Suakodo where 
it regrouped over night and prepared for a more concentrated attack on Tawiri the next 
morning.266
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mThe following morning, the 10th Coy sent out a reconnaissance party into the hills to the 
rear of Laha airfield to find a way around the Australian defences. On receiving a 
favourable report from the reconnaissance party, Wakabayashi directed the 10th Coy to 
march north and come around to outflank the airfield. Wakabayashi’s company 
infiltrated the jungle and spent all night and the next day manoeuvring to the north and 
to the rear of the airfield. After reaching Mount Kadera the 10th Coy turned South 
towards Laha where they claimed to have engaged and destroyed a machine gun post. 
At 1330 hours on 2 February, the 10th Coy reached a position to within walking distance 
of the airfield but they were forced to call a halt and rest for the night.267 Despite the 
effort involved in the outflanking manoeuvre the 10th Coy had little effect on the 
outcome of the Laha battle because they had arrived too late to threaten the Laha 
positions or to engage in the fighting.
On the afternoon of 31 February, the 1st Kure SNLF began its attack at Tawiri in an area 
to the front of Lt Seabrook's 11th pl B Coy, but owing to the narrow one kilometre front 
and its barbed wire entanglements, the nature of the terrain along the Tawiri River and 
the combined resistance of the 11th pl B Coy and the 15th pl C Coy the Japanese advance 
was quickly stalled.268 The Australian’s C Coy pls came forward in support of the 11th 
and 15th pls at 1600 hours and the battle continued in stalemate. Meanwhile, to the rear 
of the action Lt McBride's 12th pl B Coy and Lt Calder's 14th pl C Coy remained in 
reserve formation along the beach near Laha village and to the rear of the fighting.269
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269 Ibid., p. 116.At around 2300 hours on 1 February, McBride's platoon was moved to the northeast 
approaches of the airfield to block an expected attack from the 1st Kure SNLF in that 
area. At 0100 hours the next morning, and after infiltrating between the Australian 
positions, elements of the 1st Kure SNLF contacted McBride's platoon with bayonets, 
automatic weapons and mortar fire. During the hand-to-hand fighting that ensued, 
McBride and some men of the 12th pl were wounded and had to withdraw back to C 
Coy’s advanced dressing station (ADS) at the western end of the airfield.
According to McBride:
The enemy were located, because of their habit of talking and calling out in a high tone to 
each other. They were armed with rifles, tommy [sic] guns and light machine-guns. This 
fighting took place in an area covered by tall grass and the number of enemy force could not 
be correctly arrived at. The enemy failed to make use of the natural cover afforded them and 
seemed to be poorly trained in night fighting.270
Because of their careless tactics in moving forward, the infiltrating Japanese troops 
were unable to penetrate the Australian lines any further that night. After C Coy HQ 
received the news about the breach, the headquarters units, reinforcements from the 13th 
pl C Coy and the remaining members of the 11th pl counterattacked to close the gap and 
impose further heavy casualties on the infiltrating Japanese force.271 The next day the 
battle at Tawiri continued into deadlock until 1430 hours when all shooting suddenly 
ceased. Although Japanese planes flew overhead they also suddenly refrained from 
attacking the airfield.272
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and Ambon [Two Copies] Volume 3, AWM54, 229/1/7 PART 5, pp. 166-17The reason for the cease-fire may have been owing to the capture of Major Newbury’s 
surrender party. It seems that sometime on the afternoon of 2 February, Newbury led a 
party of about ten men under a flag of truce through the Japanese lines. They were taken 
to Japanese HQ at Suakodo for interrogation where Newbury explained that he was 
heading a surrender mission on behalf of the Australians. Because the 1st Kure SNLF 
had been almost wiped out in the fighting, Capt Hatakeyama was reluctant to allow 
Newbury to return to his lines to affect the surrender in case he took advantage of the 1st 
Kure SNLF’s weakened state and recommenced the battle.273 The Japanese detained 
Newbury and his attendants in the Suakodo school under a Japanese piquet. When Capt 
Hatakeyama returned from the fighting at Laha to talk with the Australian, it is likely 
that he called a halt to the fighting in case Newbury was in fact representing a surrender 
party and perhaps to preserve what remained of his company.
On the morning of 3 February, Capt Hatakeyama’s party went forward to investigate 
Newbury’s claims and they approached the Australian lines under a white flag. The 
group's interpreter, Ikeuchi, called out for the Australians to surrender but there was no 
reply. Capt Hatakeyama then took Ikeuchi and three other soldiers to the airstrip to see 
if they could find the Australians. On passing through the lines it became clear to 
Hatakeyama that the Australians had abandoned their defences. Capt Hatakeyama's 
party eventually found the Australians, Dutch and some Ambonese troops gathered at 
the Laha jetty under a white flag where a surrender was effected. According to Takada, 
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Australians, 2 or 3 Dutchmen and 2 or 3 Ambonese troops.274
On the morning of the surrender McBride, still at the undetected ADS, ordered a small 
party to reconnoitre the airfield. The party reported back to McBride that Japanese 
troops were walking around freely, no Australian troops were visible, the Japanese flag 
was flying over the aerodrome and that it was clear the Japanese were in control of 
Laha. On hearing the report, McBride made the decision to attempt an escape from 
Ambon. Apart from Capt White of the 2/12th Field Ambulance and his medical orderlies 
who volunteered to remain behind with the seriously wounded, McBride gathered 
around 20 of the sick and walking wounded and followed a creek leading to the north of 
the Island. After arriving at Lima on the north coast, McBride learned from the villages 
that wing commander Scott and ten other RAAF personnel had some time earlier 
attempted an escape by sea, but that a Japanese patrol boat had captured them. After 
hiding on the north coast of Hitu Peninsular for next nine days, McBride’s party was 
forced to split-up because of a lack of sufficient food supplies. McBride and his party of 
8 men eventually requisitioned a native perahu (small boat) and escaped to Kurumba 
Island from where they sailed it back to Australia.275
Meanwhile, sometime between 3 and 6 February, Rear Admiral (R-Adm.) Hatakayama 
gave the order to execute all Australian and Dutch POWs on the Hitu Peninsular. Patsy 
Adam-Smith wrote that R-Adm. Hatakayama had the POWs at Suakodo executed 
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275 National Archives of Australia, Report on the Japanese Invasion of Ambon, MP729/7, 35/421/67, p. 
3-4.because they were a drag on his movement.276 This is unlikely, as the murders did not 
take place until 6 February, three days following the surrender. Beaumont also noted 
that some individuals believed the Australians were executed for being unruly and prone 
to escape or otherwise killed for revenge.277 A later war crimes investigation concluded 
that R-Adm Hatakayama had executed the POWs for decimating his 1st Kure SNLF 
force during the Lawa River battle. This is supported by the fact that Hatakayama had 
also executed Dutch KNIL prisoners in revenge for the 130 1st Kure SNLF soldiers that 
were killed in the fighting at Kema and Manado. It is believed R-Adm. Hatakayama 
ordered Capt Hatakayama to carry out the executions at Tawiri and Suakodo and that 
Capt Hatakayama had passed the order on to Lt Nakagawa.278 
Forty Japanese volunteers from the 1st Kure SNLF’s Yamashita and Yosiwara platoons 
carried out the first massacre under the command of Nakagawa at Suakodo on 6 
February. Between 1300 and 1500 hours Major Newbury and forty-five others were 
marched into the hills behind Suakodo and either bayoneted to death or beheaded by 
their Japanese executioners. On the same day Wing Commander Scott and another 59 
mixed RAAF personnel and Dutch POWs were executed near the Lawa River at Tawiri, 
probably under the command of Capt Hatakayama and WO Sasaki Kakitare, 
commander of the 1st Kure Machine Gun Coy. The third massacre of two Australian 
POWs occurred on 7 or 8 February after a patrol to the Allang village where they were 
acting as guides to Sub-Lt Fukuda. The names of the perpetrators who carried out these 
executions remain unknown. 
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be either eye witness to cognisant of, or connected with Laha Massacres 1945, AWM54, 573/6/2, p. 208.The fourth lot of killings took place to the southwest of Tawiri village at approximately 
1200 hours on 15 February, where the Japanese executed another 135 Australian POWs. 
It is believed the survivors of the No. 9 Minesweeper, which had struck a mine and sank 
in Ambon Bay, had carried out these executions. The final murders of around 60 to 70 
Australian POWs was carried out between 1100 and 1300 hours on 20 February at a site 
also located near Tawiri village.279
The war crimes commission charged Naval-Lt Ken-ichi Nakagawa for assisting in the 
murders. In evidence given at the war crimes trials in Japan after the war, Nakagawa 
described what had happened at one of the massacre sites:
We dug  holes  in a place in a coconut forest at Tauli [sic];  this  new  place  is  a  different 
position from that of the previous murder, being 140 or 150 metres away from it, and was 
about two hundred metres off the headquarters of the Laha detachment. I divided ninety men 
into nine groups: two groups for bloody killing, three groups for watching the prisoners of 
war on their way to the killing place, two groups for sending prisoners of war out of the 
barracks; one group for guard on the spot of the killings, the last one for emergency. The 
prisoners of war were on foot from the Detachment building to the spot of the killing. The 
same way of the killing was adopted as in the previous case; to have them kneel down with 
bandage over their eyes and to kill them with sword or bayonet. The poor victims numbered 
about 220 in all including a few Australian officers.280
Despite the SNLF’s commission of these atrocities, the Japanese military overlooked 
this brutality and awarded the SNLF a commendation for the Battle of Laha.
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280 Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War: From Gallipoli to Korea, p. 415.The 1st Kure SNLF received its commendation on 9 December 1942, which stated: 
Blasting stubborn resistance put up by the enemy, a special landing unit carried out a landing 
in the face of the enemy on Hitoelama Beach on the Island of Amboina on 31/1/42. Cutting 
through thick jungles and over bad roads, the unit then attacked Laha, whereby they repeated 
their daring assaults against a numerically superior enemy entrenched in a stronghold. There 
the unit finally crushed  the enemy and  finally captured  an airfield on February 3rd. The 
military services rendered in the above operations are distinguished. Wherefore a citation is 
hereby granted.281
Although the citation’s declarations about the capture of Laha were overstated (for 
example, 600 Australian troops, five tanks and two large armoured cars)282 it provided 
an insight into the respect the Japanese had gained for the Australian defenders. In a 
sense the citation also recognised the bravery of the Australian troops for their stoic 
resistance against the 1st Kure SNLF attacks at Laha (The 2/21st  Bn was also later 
recognised in the Australian Army Battle Honours for their efforts at Laha).283 
Understandably, the massacres at Laha were never mentioned in the Japanese citation. 
Admiral Yamamoto, however, later wrote of the Australian defence at Ambon stating 
that ‘… the desperate resistance of the Australians after the breakthrough of the 
Japanese death band was not to be despised’.284
Operations Paso - 2nd Battalion Right Assault Unit (minus the 7th Company)
31 January - 1 February 1942
At the same time as the 3rd and 1st Bn landings, the 2nd Bn under the command of Major 
Kimura, beached its forces to the east of Hutumuri village at 0130 hours on 31 
February. Ito had organised the 2nd Bn as the Right Assault Unit responsible for taking 
Paso and Halong. The 2nd Bn formation was the 5th, 6th & 8th companies (minus the 7th 
Coy) in complete tactical order. The 5th Coy acted as the advance guard as the battalion 
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284 Ibid.set off towards its objectives at Paso in the North. Almost immediately after leaving the 
beachhead the lead platoon came into contact with and dispersed a KNIL home guard 
observation post. Following this incident, a Japanese platoon commander seized some 
local Ambonese and forced them to guide the 2nd Bn safely through the jungle trails to 
Baguala bay and Paso.285 
Here Kapitz had located the Dutch positions to the southwest of Paso, facing Northeast 
to the village itself and east towards Baguala Bay. The defences were organised into 
five sectors. The 1st Reserve Coy occupied sector A to the north of the Wai Jori River 
next to Baguala Bay. The 3rd Coy occupied sector B to the southwest near the Paso-
Halong Road and shared its boundaries with sector A to the East and with sector C to 
the South. The 1st Coy occupied sector C to the north of the Wai Jori River below sector 
B. Two platoons and a machine gun section occupied sector D between the Wai Jori 
River and Batugong village and three groups of European militia occupied sector E to 
the northwest of sector B on the Paso-Halong Road. In support of these companies were 
two six inch naval guns dug into concrete bunkers under the ridges of Hill 130 to cover 
the littoral approaches to Paso and two 7cm infantry guns and one 7.5 cm gun in sector 
B, one 7.5 cm gun in sector E, four Stokes Brant mortars in sector A and two artillery 
sections of two 7 cm guns (one section each stationed at the Halong and Lateri villages 
in support of the Paso lines).286 
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dAt 0600 hours on 31 February, the Japanese 5th Coy’s vanguard approached the high 
ground to the south of the Wai Jori River. The company was ambushed here by two 
platoons of the KNIL’s 1st Coy and by a machine gun section positioned to the Japanese 
right near Batugong village in sector D, where many Japanese where killed. Lt Adachi 
ordered his 1st pl to take the position, but the Dutch held on with heavy automatic fire. 
Unable to carry the attack forward, the 1st pl discharged smoke grenades and moved off 
to dead ground to reorganise its attack. Concurrently, Adachi’s 3rd pl attacked to the left 
of the 1st pl and it managed to brake through the barbed-wire entanglements to occupy 
the position. This attack dislodged the Dutch from position A1 in sector A.287 By 0700 
hours the Japanese had gained control their right flank, which allowed the 5th Coy to 
probe further into the undergrowth towards the Dutch front-lines in sectors A and B.
Meanwhile, on the Japanese left front the KNIL’s 1st Coy seven man machine gun 
section abandoned its post in position C1 to withdraw into position C2 where they left a 
further gap in the Dutch lines for the Japanese to exploit.288 The Japanese 6th Coy then 
attacked forwards towards the southern end of the Dutch first and second lines to 
exploit their flanks. The Japanese 6th Coy’s 1st and 2nd pls approached these flanks by 
advancing along the southern side of the Wai Jori River. During this move they received 
spasmodic fire from the KNIL 1st Coy in sector C, but the shooting was ineffective 
because the men of the 1st Coy had trouble finding their targets as the Japanese platoons 
advanced along the riverbank under the cover of the thick jungle. 
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288 Ibid., pp. 9-10.At 0830 hours, Major Tieland, Commanding Officer of the KNIL companies at Paso, 
came forward to take control of the fighting. At 0900 hours the Japanese 5th Coy began 
to attack the first line of the KNIL’s 3rd Coy in sector B. Despite the heavy fighting, the 
3rd Coy managed to hold off the Japanese with machine gun fire from position B1 and 
with artillery fire from position B2. At midday, and owing to heavy resistance in this 
sector, the Japanese were forced to abandon their frontal attacks and to withdrew back 
on the Wai Jori River.289
While the Dutch 3rd Coy held the positions at B1 and B2, the reserve platoon from 
position B4 tried unsuccessfully to counter attack the Japanese in sector A at position 
A4. The result of this effort came to a standstill in the face of heavy automatic fire. The 
reserve platoon had lost the initiative because the Japanese were able to hold off the 
attack from their newly posts at position C1 and because Capt Uckerman’s 1st Reserve 
Coy in sector A had failed to support the counter attack despite being ordered to do so. 
Following this action the KNIL’s B Coy reserve was forced to withdraw to their original 
positions in sector B.290
Meanwhile, Kimura ordered Major Tsuruta's 6th Coy’s 1st and 2nd pls and a machine gun 
unit to attack towards the rear of the Dutch positions. They attacked up a ridge-line of 
Hill 130 towards the KNIL pillboxes and barracks area, however, although the Dutch 
troops were forced to withdraw a short distance they successfully maintained their 
positions on the hill by firing at close range down into the advancing Japanese platoons. 
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290 Ibid., pp.75-6.Here the 6th Coy took heavy casualties and were momentarily stalled. Tsuruta was then 
forced to change the angle of attack and he ordered Lt Ota's 3rd pl 6th Coy to attack 
further around to the rear of the Dutch positions and create a diversion.291
The 3rd pl used the thick jungle along the banks of the Wai Jori River for cover and 
attacked to the rear of the KNIL barracks under the support of sniper fire and grenade-
launchers. At this time the Japanese 2nd Bn artillery arrived at the Wai Jori from 
Hutumuri and began pounding the ridge-line on Hill 130 to destroy the Dutch pillboxes 
and to dislodge the infantry. The 3rd pl continued its attack against the Dutch rear into 
the evening. Eventually, engineers from the 8th Coy came forward to reinforce the 2nd pl 
and they attacked up the slopes to overrun a section of the Dutch second-line.
While Kimura’s troops attacked the ridge-line, Kapitz ordered a counter attack to retake 
sector C. The company commanders, however, found that they were unable to attack 
across the low terrain of the first line because it was being fired on from the hills above. 
Kapitz then ordered the commanders from sectors B, C3, and E to fill a gap between B1 
and C3 with an ambush party. This order was also rejected after it was found that small 
detachments on the right wing of position B1 had abandoned their posts and left those 
flanks exposed. Running out of options Kapitz ordered the 3rd Coy to alter its defences 
and form two strong posts in position B2. Kapitz and Tieland then inexplicably 
abandoned their HQ position and, with their staff officers in tow, withdrew to Nuntetu 
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291 Ibid., p. 11.without notifying their company commanders.292 Notwithstanding the disappearance of 
Kapitz, the 1st Coy troops occupied their designated positions in B2 at 1745 hours.
Within fifteen minutes of moving to position B2, Lts van Ravenswaaji Claasen and de 
Jong drove by on a motorcycle sidecar trying to contact the Japanese to negotiate a 
Dutch surrender. On seeing the lieutenants driving across his front with a white flag and 
attempting to reach the Japanese, Capt Uckerman ordered a cease-fire. The Japanese 
also stopped firing, but Claasen and de Jong were unable to reach the Japanese and they 
returned to Tulehu to report to Kapitz. On the way back de Jong told the other Dutch 
commanders that it was over.293 
After waiting for an hour and without receiving instructions from Kapitz, the company 
commanders ordered their troops to lay down their arms and assemble on the Paso-
Halong Road for rest and food. At 2000 hours Tieland returned to Paso and ordered the 
troops to take up their arms again as Kapitz had not yet been able to arrange a 
surrender.294 After deliberating over these instructions with his officers Tieland agreed to 
suspend the order and took Uckerman and Capt Schouten back to talk with Kapitz who 
was now at the Lateri battery. 
Following a discussion with his officers Kapitz stood by his order for troops to remain 
armed and ready. Kapitz justified his stand on the following grounds:
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294 Ibid.1.  He...  [said  he] was  deceived  by the reports  of the  proceedings,  given to him by his 
officers and it appeared to him, that the situation was much less serious, than he thought it 
to be at the time, that he decided to show  the white flag. He considered that his sub-
commandants had been intimidated by the very bold acting  of a handful of “snipers”, 
penetrated  into our lines; this consideration deducted from the fact, that (according to 
him) only a few casualties had been suffered. He felt ashamed and not able to account for 
giving up fighting so soon.
2. According to [Kapitz] showing of the white flag did not imply “surrender”, but only the 
indication of the desire to open negotiations, to which the enemy apparently was  not 
inclined., shown by the fact, that the officers, bearing the white flag, had been driving 
several times to and fro, not succeeding in contacting the enemy. When however, Capt. 
Schouten  hereupon had  brought forward  the  seriousness  of  some fighting-actions,  of 
which  he  had  knowledge  at  that  moment,  because  some  units  of  his  troops  had 
participated in these actions, the Territorial Commander [Kapitz] altered his order in so 
far, that fighting would not be taken up again, but that a waiting and prepared for action 
attitude  should  be assumed  in the last occupied  positions  in  B  Sector, not to be left 
defenceless against possible ruthlessness of the Asiatic enemy. Against the thus worded 
order both coy commanders declared to have no objections.295
Considering this quote it seems Kapitz wanted to have some negotiating power when it 
came to surrendering his troops to the Japanese. Nevertheless, the discussions were in 
vain because after Tieland, Uckerman and Schouten returned to Paso at 2130 hours to 
pass on Kapitz’s orders they found that the Japanese had already captured their troops 
while they were away meeting with Kapitz. All three of the officers were then taken 
prisoner. Finally, at 0300 hours on 1 February, as the Japanese advanced through the 
Lateri battery towards their objective at Halong they captured Kapitz.296
Kimura's 5th Coy secured Paso and Halong the next morning. He then assembled the 6th, 
7th, 8th and the 2nd Machine Gun companies at the Halong pier to await naval water 
transport to Laha. He had decided to send the battalion to Laha in support of the Kure 
1st SNLF and the 10th Coy as they struggled in their attack on the airfield, but owing to 
sea mines in the bay it was deemed too dangerous to ferry the troops across to the 
airfield. Kimura finally ordered his units to march to Laha but they arrived too late to 
take part in the battle, as the Australians had already surrendered. On 6 February, the 
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296 Ibid., p. 78.10th Coy and Kumura’s battalion both returned to Ambon and without having 
participated in the Laha massacres.297
Operations Rutung, Leahari, Hukurila, Ema and Sojadiatas - 1st Battalion 
Left Assault Unit
31 January – 1 February 1942
Maj. Hayakawa's 1st Bn (minus the 4th Coy) advance guard and the 1st Coy (Omasu 
Unit) departed Rutung at 0250 hours for Ambon via the villages of Leahari, Hukurila, 
Ema and Sojadiatas. Their objectives were first Ambon and then the Australian forces 
entrenched at Amahusu. Including the 1st Coy, the force consisted of its Bn HQ, the 2nd 
Coy (Kanbe Unit) and the 3rd Coy (Kosaki Unit), a MG Coy, a mountain artillery unit 
and other assorted units. 
The lead platoon moved to Hukurila where it entered a narrow track in single file during 
its advance to Ema, but the horses were unable to follow because the track was too 
narrow. This made it difficult for the artillery troops who depended on horse transport to 
carry their guns. In the end they had to dismount their guns and to carry them through 
the jungle by hand. When they reached Leahari the artillery unit was engaged by a 
KNIL platoon, which they drove off. Because this incident held up the artillery unit it 
fell behind the main force and was later unable to support its the main force in its attack 
on the village of Sojadiatas and Mount Serimau.298
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298 Ibid., p. 7.After reaching Ema, the 1st pl met with steep ravines and cliffs sloping down from the 
western face of Mount Serimau. As the 1st Coy advanced towards Sojadiatas it was 
apparently attacked by the Australian observation post on Mount Nona, by concealed 
KNIL positions on Mount Serimau and by two Dutch artillery guns sited near Mount 
Nona. Nakamoto's men found it difficult to continue through to Sojadiatas because the 
firing, the cramped hill trail, high cliffs and gorges restricted the platoon's movement. 
During this phase of the assault, the 1st pl 1st Coy lost half of its troops under the 
withering Allied crossfire fire. The weight of this assault temporarily stalled the 1st 
Coy's advance. Hayakawa eventually deployed the 2nd Coy to the left flank to reinforce 
the 1st Coy and was only then able to recommence the advance towards Sojadiatas.299
As the 1st Coy began to move forward, Lt Omasu sent an officer patrol under 2nd Lt 
Agriga Yu to reconnoitre the western slopes of Mount Serimau near Sojadiatas. At 1640 
hours Agriga was killed by KNIL machine gun fire as his patrol approached the village. 
Omasu then ordered WO Yamada to lead the 2nd pl in a night attack on the Ambonese 
militia positions at Sojadiatas, however, this assault also went awry when the KNIL 
fired flares, laid down a blanket of light arms and machine gun fire and continuously 
counterattacked and the 2nd pl's progress. Finally, Omasu ordered the 1st Coy to move 
behind the KNIL positions and carryout a night attack to the rear of Sojadiatas from 
Mount Serimau. Omasu's tactics succeeded and he managed to take the Dutch positions 
at Mount Serimau and to overrun the Sojadiatas stronghold sometime in the early hours 
of 1 February.300
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300 Ibid., pp. 8, 17.At 0800 hours on 1 February, Hayakawa's 1st Coy 1st Bn vanguard moved down from 
Sojadiatas towards the southeast sector of Ambon Town. After fending off further minor 
attacks along the Sojadiatas Road the 1st Coy reached the outskirts of Ambon Town that 
afternoon. Hayakawa then ordered the 1st Bn to form up for a night attack on Mt Nona. 
Omasu's 1st Coy (with machine guns attached) took the right front line, Kanbe's 2nd Coy 
the left front line and Kosaki's 3rd Coy remained in reserve. After moving along a 
ridgeline plateau towards the Australian rear at Mount Nona, the 1st Coy contacted and 
drove off a small Australian reconnaissance party that had been moving down from the 
mountain towards Kudamati.301 
The attack on the Australian 5th Pioneer pl’s positions on Mount Nona began later that 
night at 2200 hours. Fuma's 2nd pl came to within 80 metres of the defences at Mount 
Nona before the Australians finally engaged them. Fuma attempted to infiltrate the 
camp with his troops but they were quickly discovered and he lost the initiative. The 
Australians counterattacked Fuma's party and drove them back to where they were 
unable to make any further ground. To breach the Mount Nona defences, Omasu 
ordered the 3rd pl to attack the summit, however, the Australians threw down hand 
grenades into the 3rd pl until it too was driven back. As the above engagements were 
taking place, Kosaki moved his 3rd Coy in to attack the pioneer platoon’s rear in the 
Southwest while Kanbe had his 2nd Coy attack forward to put further pressure on the 
Australian flanks, however, these manoeuvres also failed to make ground.302
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until 0130 hours on 2 February when they were finally forced to evacuate Mount Nona. 
According to the Japanese account of the battle the fighting had continued until 0300 
hours ending only after the 1st Bn took Mount Nona by force. This account by the 1st 
Bn, however, was clearly an exaggeration where it was claimed that 'the position was 
quickly cleared, with the result that two artillery guns were captured, 50 enemy troops 
were killed, and 15 officers and other ranks taken prisoner'.303
Lt Jinkins' 5th pl Pnr/s later reported that they had left the mountain at 0130 hours 
leaving one dead and taking with them three wounded, five sick, twelve still fit together 
with another unscathed section that had not taken part in the engagements.304 It is 
possible, however, that the officers of the 1st Bn exaggerated the facts to hide from their 
superiors their inability to defeat a relatively small Australian platoon. Nevertheless, on 
the morning of 2 February, the 1st Bn now controlled the high ground above the 
Amahusu and directly threatened D Coy’s left flank on the slopes below.
Operations Rutung, Ambon and Amahusu Line - 3rd Battalion Central 
Assault Unit (minus the 10th Company)
31 January – 3 February 1942
Col Doi's 3rd Bn landed to the east of Rutung at 0100 hours on 31 January. The 3rd Bn 
set out at 0530 hours to follow the centre line Northwest across the Laitimor Peninsular 
to Ambon. The 11th Coy's commander, Capt Fukada, ordered his troops to advance up a 
steep narrow jungle track behind the village to advance across the Island to Ambon 
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and Ambon [Two Copies] Volume 3, AWM54, 229/1/7 PART 5, p. 56.Town. The order of advance was the 11th Coy with Lt Kosuda's infantry and machine 
gun platoons in the lead, the command squad in the centre with Lts Abe’s and Kawano's 
1st and 3rd pls respectively. The remaining 9th and 12th Companies brought up the rear of 
the 3rd Bn with its horse transport and mountain artillery in train.
At dawn and within 30 minutes of leaving the beaches, Kosuda's vanguard arrived at a 
small U-shaped plateau resting 255 meters above Rutung village. Here the lead platoon 
met with a skilfully camouflaged network of KNIL pillboxes set back into the jungle 
overlooking an open killing ground that was protected by anti-grenade nets, barbed wire 
entanglements and antipersonnel mines.305 On entering the plateau Kosuda's advance 
guard immediately met with a hail of machine gun fire from the KNIL’s pillbox 
network. From the Japanese perspective:
The enemy, with the advantage of the terrain on this U-shaped formation, had constructed a 
network of permanent pillboxes on the summit and slopes. They had secured themselves in 
this position for some time, and with much training, were now prepared for the attack. When 
they recognised an attack from our forces, a hail of machine-gun fire rained down from each 
of the pillboxes. In an instant, the battlefield became a scene of carnage. Bullets came down 
like rain. The company were completely bogged down within the enemy's field of fire. The 
casualties within the advance guard platoon continued to mount, and calls for medics were 
clearly heard.306
In response to the ambush Capt Fukada ordered Kosuda's 2nd pl to attack along the main 
track, Abe's 1st pl to attack along the right front and Kawano's 3rd pl to attack along the 
left front.307 
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307 Ibid., pp. 5, 20.Abe gave the order and his platoon rushed forward across the land-mine field and 
barbwire entanglements towards the pillbox positions on the right. At the same time, 
Major Nishiyama ordered another platoon from his 12th Coy to assist Abe’s platoon in 
attacking the right of the forward line. Capt Kobayashi passed the order to Lt Kawase's 
1st pl 12th Coy to fire on the pillboxes with machine gun fire, teargas and rifle fire. 
Kosuda's 2nd pl 11th Coy, which was trapped behind barbed wire entanglements taking 
heavy casualties from machine gun fire, rose together with Abe, Kawano and Kawase's 
platoons, attacked forward and somehow managed to dislodge the Dutch pillbox 
positions. Despite the initial success of clearing the pillboxes, the Japanese platoons 
continued to receive fire from the KNIL's main barracks position some thirty metres 
further up Hill 255.308
The KNIL platoon held the 3rd Bn at bay for a further one and a half hours until it 
became clear to them that they were becoming vulnerable to encirclement. The KNIL 
platoon assembled to the rear of Hill 255 at 0735 hours and withdrew to Karang 
Panjang village where they joined forces with Kapitz’s Staff HQ and the Boela 
detachment, which was moving up from Ambon Town to Rutung to help block the 1st 
Bn advance. Nevertheless, after contacting the Japanese advance parties the Boela 
detachment were also forced to withdraw back to Karang Panjang and regroup.309
After hearing that the Japanese were on their way to Karang Panjang, Kapitz transferred 
his Staff HQ to the headquarters position overlooking Paso at Hill 130. The remaining 
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p. 11.KNIL units were able to hold Karang Panjang against the 3rd Bn until 1230 hours when 
they too were ordered to return to Paso. On their way to Paso the Boela detachment 
came into continual contact with other Japanese units and believing that Paso had been 
lost, and except for two infantry sections under the command of a sergeant, they 
deserted en masse. On nearing Paso the two remaining sections learned that the 
Japanese 2nd Bn had already captured Paso and they in turn fled through the jungle to 
the coast from where they escaped Ambon to Australia.310
The 3rd Bn advanced through Karang Panjang and arrived on the outskirts of Ambon 
Town at 1500 hours. Doi positioned the mountain artillery on the heights of Batumerah 
to provide support for the 3rd Bn advance on Ambon Town and to shell the Benteng 
artillery barracks farther to the West. On reaching Ambon Town, Nishiyama organised 
the 9th and 11th Companies together with the 4th Coy 1st Bn (Det.), which was supporting 
the left flank, to form up and clear the town. Under the cover of the mountain artillery 
guns the Japanese forces entered Ambon Town at 1700 hours and quickly forced all 
remaining resistance from the town. That evening the Japanese had occupied Ambon 
Town to as far west as the Sanatorium, which was perched above Ambon Town across 
from the Australian positions above Kudamati village.311
On the morning of 1 February, the 9th Coy was split-up for the attack on the Australian 
B Echelon lines at Kudamati. Lt Kawake’s 1st pl remained in reserve in the City while 
Lt Koseki's 2nd pl and Lt Muto's 3rd pl together with the 11th and 4th Companies moved 
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on Ambon, Second World War, MSS1912, 2007, p. 6.southwest along the coastline of Ambon Bay towards the Dutch artillery barracks at 
Benteng. In the morning, using captured Australian ambulances as transport, Japanese 
mortar units surreptitiously occupied the sanatorium. Under the cover of mountain guns 
and mortar fire the 4th Coy attacked up through the Kudamati cemetery towards the 
Australian positions, but were held back by heavy machine gun, small arms and rifle-
grenade fire. Because of the fierce resistance put up by the Dutch and Australian 
soldiers at Kudamati the Japanese decided to block the position and bypass B Echelon 
for Benteng.
At 1000 hours, the 4th Coy redirected its attack onto the Benteng barracks farther to the 
West along the Ambon-Amahusu Road. The Japanese attacked through two lines of 
entanglements at Benteng and infiltrated the KNIL's rearward positions to capture the 
two 6 inch coastal gun emplacements. The guns had been employed in firing at the 1st 
Kure SNLF at Tawiri, but the KNIL artillery officers set fire to the guns at 0900 hours 
before withdrawing to Karang Panjang when it became clear that Benteng was 
threatened. Nevertheless, the barracks remained protected by KNIL infantry who 
remained in their mortar and machine gun positions to stall the 4th Coy’s advance.312
While the 4th Coy was attacking Benteng, Nishiyama's 9th Coy 3rd Bn attempted to 
advance along the coast road to contact the Australian lines at Amahusu, but they were 
also stalled by KNIL mortar and machine gun fire coming from the Benteng barracks 
positions.
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162At 1300 hours, after four hours of attempting to bypass the barracks, Nishiyama decided 
to wait until after dark and carry out a full battalion attack on the position. An unknown 
Japanese officer present at the battle later wrote: 
How  to pursue the operations  against the Dutch and Australians still dispersed within the 
narrow peninsular could invite higher than acceptable casualties - like the proverb states,... [a 
cornered rat will bite the cat]. Based on a determination to rest the main strength of his force 
for later operations, the commander blockaded the peninsular with a portion of his force and 
rested the majority of the forces personnel and had them prepare for future operations. The 
4th Company, which had secured the slopes of Hill 514 [at Benteng Barracks on Hill 317], 
was appointed to blockade the peninsular.313
Nishiyama also decided that a daylight attack against the Australians was too dangerous 
to contemplate and withdrew his troops to a rest area to recuperate in preparation for a 
night attack.314 This attack ended at 2000 hours and after three hours of fighting when 
Nishiyama’s battalion finally dislodged the KNIL, who then broke up their heavy 
weapons to withdraw back through to the Australian lines at Amahusu. The success of 
this action allowed the 3rd Bn to launch an attack on the Amahusu line.315
At 2000 hours Nishiyama ordered all the companies to advance on the Amahusu 
positions where he succeeded in taking the Amahusu line after the Australians withdrew. 
A Japanese officer later explained that ‘By around 2300 hours, the enemy positions had 
been breached. The enemy stoutly defended their existing camp, but could not resist the 
fierce onslaught and hand to hand combat, retreating to the tip of the peninsular after 
breaking up their heavy weapons’.316 In agreement with the Japanese story, Scott had 
given the order to withdraw D Coy from the line as early as 2030 hours that night. Scott 
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Campaigns, 1942-43, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 2007), p. 6.had left rearguard platoons at Amahusu to cover the withdrawal and they arrived back at 
Eri early in the early morning hours of 2 February. 
When the 3rd Bn entered the Australian lines the next morning they found the trenches 
were protected by two lines of barbed wire that faced back to Eri rather than towards the 
Japanese main line of attack. The 4th Coy was ordered to halt its advance at Amahusu 
and await negotiations for an Australian surrender. Nishiyama decided to preserve the 
3rd Bn and blockaded the Australian forces at Eri and on 3 February Scott, with no room 
for manoeuvre and suffering from inadequate food and water supplies for his troops, 
surrendered his forces to the Japanese and they were marched back to their old camp at 
Tantui as POWs. 
164Chapter Four - The Australian Story
Pure defence ... would be completely contrary to the idea of war, since it would mean that 
only  one  side  was  waging  it. Therefore,  defence  in  war  can  only  be  relative,  and  the 
characteristic feature of waiting should be applied only to the basic concept, not all of its 
components. A partial engagement is defensive if we await the advance, the charge of the 
enemy. A battle is defensive if we await the attack – await, that is, the appearance of the 
enemy in front of our lines and within range. A campaign is defensive if we wait for our 
theatre of operations to be invaded. In each of these cases the characteristic of waiting and 
parrying is germane to the general idea without being in conflict with the concept of war; for 
we may find it advantageous to await the charge against our bayonets and the attack on our 
position and  theatre of operations. But if we  are really waging  war, we must return the 
enemy’s  blows;  and  these offensive  acts  in a defensive war come  under the heading  of 
‘defence’ – in other words, our offensive takes place within our own positions or theatre of 
operations. Thus,  a  defensive  campaign can  be  fought with offensive  battles,  and  in a 
defensive  battle, we  can employ our divisions  offensively. Even in  a  defensive  position 
awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive. So the defensive form of war is 
not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.317
Carl Von Clausewitz
The principles of war help to guide the strategist in considering the valid national 
interests above all others. The Principle of Security is directed at preserving power, 
reducing the threat of attack by foreign nations, protecting the people, husbanding 
resources and the economy as well as conserving the armed forces for their role in 
physically protecting the national interests. The minimum aim of war therefore is the 
continuation of the nation. In this context strategists also need to consider the Principle 
of Purpose, which is aimed at formulating a decisive war strategy in balance with its 
attainable political objectives and the military’s complementary capabilities in directing 
those defensive or offensive operations.318 Clearly, under the prevailing circumstances of 
1941, where the Japanese had the initiative in how, when and where it would attack, 
Malaya, Singapore, the NEI, the Philippines and Australia were countries placed on the 
defensive in waiting for their theatres of operations to be invaded.
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318 Collins, Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives, pp. 83, 85.Notwithstanding Clausewitz’s recommendation that ‘the defensive form of war is not a 
simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows’, the imperative lay in the 
principle that any offensive action in defence must be in proportion to the means 
available and that they be achievable. The implication is that the Chiefs of Staff of any 
nation must know or at least tacitly understand these fundamental principles in advising 
a government on the practise of defensive military strategy. In the case of the Islands 
strategy, the Australian Chiefs of Staff failed to utilise these principles, or at least the 
will to advise the government, on the inefficacy of isolating and expending its troops in 
unsustainable far flung outposts. The policy of simply fighting for the sake of fighting 
or fighting because it seems the right thing to do is the antithesis to rational strategic 
thinking. Nevertheless, it was under these circumstances that the Australian government 
and the Chiefs of Staffs had placed Gull Force.
The objectives Sturdee gave to Scott for Ambon were simple; to demonstrate Australian 
support to the NEI with the available resources under his command. The practicalities 
of carrying out this policy entailed the protection Laha airfield, the occupation of the 
fixed trenches at Amahusu and Eri and delaying the Japanese for as long as possible at 
Ambon on their southward advance.319 By now Australia’s military intelligence and 
AHQ were aware that the Japanese 38th Detachment’s division was currently at Manado 
and that Ambon was likely to be their next target. The series of air raids from 7 January 
1942 onward at Laha and Halong seemed to confirm that assumption.
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line with Kapitz's plan and he relocated his forces from Tantui to the Amahusu and the 
Eri lines, albeit while holding D Coy resting in mobile reserve. On taking over and 
contrary to Roach's plan to maintain his troops on a mobile basis, Scott determined to 
tactically fix his lines of defence where they remained and began occupying positions 
that the Dutch had already prepared at Amahusu and Eri. This was to prove a 
problematic decision for Scott, as the position on Mount Nona held by a platoon only, 
was vulnerable to turning by a decisive attack from the rear. If this happened, the whole 
Amahusu line would have to counter attack or face a risky withdrawal into Eri. Scott's 
awkward situation derived from placing too much faith in Kapitz, suspending Roach’s 
mobile defence plan and fixing his defences at Amahusu and Eri based Kapitz’s 
assessment that the Japanese would most likely land at Latuhalat or on Ambon Bay.
Scott's misapprehension on this point resulted from a conference on 16 January at 
Halong, where Kapitz had assured Scott that the Japanese were most likely to effect 
landings at Eri Bay, at Paso or at both. Kapitz dismissed any assumption that the 
Japanese would land at Hukurila to the southeast because of the forbidding mountainous 
terrain and narrow jungle tracks between the south coast and Ambon Town. According 
to his assessment, Kudamati would be a safe area at the rear of any expected attack from 
the West. It was on this advice that Scott positioned Gull Force’s stores and ammunition 
dumps at Kudamati. It was not until 30 January that Kapitz's assumption proved 
incorrect after Jinkins reported from Mount Nona that the Japanese fleet was 
approaching towards the southeast of the Island off the coast at Hukurila.320
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trenches and pillboxes at Amahusu and Eri while B Echelon occupied the rear positions  
and stores dumps at Kudamati.321 The positioning of B Echelon at Kudamati 
demonstrated Scott had accepted Kapitz’s assumption that the Japanese would most 
likely attempt a landing at Latuhalat or Eri. The above dispositions and the decision to 
hold these positions demonstrated that Scott had made no contingency for an attack 
from the rear. In practice, the Australian fixed positions would remain static shields 
lacking the flexibility to repel anything other than the predicted Japanese landings at 
Latuhalat or Eri.
The Japanese Attacks at Kudamati and Mount Nona
On 31 January, after receiving reports of Japanese landings to the Southeast, the 
quartermaster and officer in charge of B Echelon, Capt Miskin, ordered the motor 
transports, the 104th LAD, elements of the 2/11th Field Coy, the bulk of the AASC as 
well as a section of the 2/12th Field Ambulance to move from their location at Galala to 
Kudamati. The 2/12th Field Ambulance Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) took up 
separate positions to B Echelon and waited along the Ambon Amahusu Road to the west 
of Kudamati.322
Following Jinkins' report at 0900 hours on 31 January that the Japanese were landing at 
Hukurila, and after Kapitz confirmed to Scott that the Japanese were landing in the 
Southeast, Kapitz asked Scott to send a company to reinforce B Echelon at Kudamati. 
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the Australian D Coy:
“We can't do that”, … [Scott] said “that's what I think too”. My reasons were - the Japanese 
addiction  to feint landings;  the  difficulty  of extracting  a  Coy  on an extended  front  in 
precipitous country with its attached heavy weapons; the exhaustion factor, the probability 
that we would inflict heavier damage by remaining in one strong position; the close watch 
kept by enemy recce planes making any secret daylight move impossible and his ability to 
make new landings at will; supplies and water for seven days were in these positions, also 
adequate ammunition. In the wisdom vouchsafed after the events I would have moved A Coy 
from Eri rather than D Coy from AMAHOESOE as the ERI position was an excresence [sic] 
as things turned out and the ground was not essential to the enemy.323
Scott's decision to fix his positions at Amahusu and Eri had now affected the security of 
his B Echelon forces and his supplies at Kudamati to his rear, which was now his front, 
but he made gave no orders to readjust to the situation other than turn D Coy to face the 
new direction of attack. 
If Scott had maintained his companies in mobile reserve, as Roach had planned, he may 
have been able to respond to Kapitz's request to reinforce B Echelon with D Coy and 
without many of the encumbrances Macrae had envisaged. As Macrae explained later, 
the option of reinforcing B Echelon was lost and both A and D Companies remained in 
position. With Scott's refusal to act on the request, Kapitz ordered Bouman's 2nd Coy 
KNIL from its positions at Eri back to Kudamati. 
Considering the evidence it seems Kapitz was anticipating that A Coy would move back 
to Kudamati from Eri and not D Coy from Amahusu. Because of this confusion Kapitz 
became obliged to instead move Bouman's 2nd Coy to Kudamati in support of B 
Echelon.324 At the time the 2nd Coy KNIL reached Kudamati the Japanese were thought 
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324 Ibid., pp. 84-85.already to have entered Ambon cutting off all communications between the Australians 
and the Dutch. This report was later proved wrong as according to the Japanese reports 
the attack against Ambon Town did not begin until 1700 hours that afternoon.325
The reason that communications had ceased between the Australians and the Dutch was 
that Kapitz had moved his headquarters to Karang Panjang to the east of Ambon Town 
to avoid the Japanese troops that were now approaching from Sojadiatas in the South. 
This move may have contributed to the breakdown in communications between the 
Australian and Dutch commanders as he did not tell Scott he was moving. Lt Russell 
later confirmed to Scott that Kaptiz had abandoned the staff offices in Ambon Town 
before 1100 hours leaving maps lying around and the phones intact. Russell reported 
that he had destroyed the phone lines and maps before returning to Bn HQ.326 
Unfortunately it seems, Russell may have inadvertently destroyed a main telephone 
junction, as it was from this time forward that all communications had ceased.
Meanwhile, at 0800 hours and before Bouman moved the 2nd Coy KNIL to Kudamati, 
Scott ordered Capt Turner, second in command of A Coy, to take over as officer 
commanding B Echelon from Miskin. On inspecting of the position Turner decided his 
force was too weak to cover both the Ambon-Eri Road and Mount Nona. He therefore 
organised B Echelon into positions on the hill overlooking Kudamati to prevent the 
Japanese from approaching the heights of Mount Nona. He placed the transport 
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326 National Archives of Australia, Report on Ambon and Hainan Part 1, AWM54, 576/6/1A, p. 22.personnel on the southwest front facing Ambon Town; the 2/11th Engineers held the 
north front and the recruit reinforcements detachment, the 104th LAD, the AASC 
detachment and Quartermaster details occupied the northeast position.327 
When Bouman arrived, Turner had the 2nd Coy KNIL occupy the ground in front of the 
Australian positions facing Ambon to 'the southernmost extended and dangerous part of 
the hill range' facing Ambon Town.328 Unsatisfied with the position Bouman moved the 
company along the southeast front to form an arc behind the cover of a nearby ravine. 
Three of the 2nd Coy’s machine gun sections were dispersed among the Australian lines 
at Turner's request because B Echelon had had one light machine gun only with which 
to defend its positions. While Bouman's 2nd Coy occupied its positions, the 3rd pl 2nd 
Coy arrived at Kudamati, but unfortunately the Australian troops policing the road 
failed to intercept one of the sections and it continued towards Ambon Town to be, 
presumably, captured or killed by the Japanese. 
Bouman's 2nd Coy went into position under the supervision of Lieutenant Prins. 
Bouman’s preparations in moving ammunition up to the lines were complete by 1600 
hours, even though the Dutch troops had become movement exhausted in the move 
from Eri to Kudamati. Because there had been a lack of transport to bring Bouman’s 2nd 
Coy food supplies and backpacks forward, the Australian troops issued rations of 
corned beef and biscuits to feed some of the KNIL troops. The 2nd Company kitchen 
had arrived at 1630 hours, but it was unable to finish feeding most of the troops because 
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328 Ibid., pp. 24, 85.the cooks were required to suspend their work after dark to avoid the detection of their 
cooking fires by Japanese air patrols. 
Kudamati Battle Map
At 1700 hours Lieutenant Van der Wijder arrived at the Kudamati with 30 soldiers to 
report that the Japanese had taken Karang Panjang and were now approaching Ambon 
Town.329 B Echelon first met with enemy troops when the Japanese occupied the 
Sanatorium 2 kilometres east of the Kudamati position. B Echelon attempted to fire on 
the Japanese soldiers but with little effect owing to the limited range of their weapons.
Early the next morning an Australian reconnaissance patrol consisting of transport 
personnel went forward to reconnoitre Kudamati village only to find that the Japanese 
3rd Bn had already moved into the area. When the Japanese troops approached the patrol 
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329 Ibid., pp. 85-86.in the village, Private Thomas Doolan chose to remain behind to single handedly 
engage the enemy while the rest of the patrol returned to their positions above 
Kudamati. Armed with six grenades, a rifle and pistol Doolan hid in the undergrowth 
and held off the Japanese until he was killed.330
After taking the village more Japanese Army vehicles and two captured Australian CCS 
ambulances moved up to the Sanatorium and disembarked troops and mortars from the 
vehicles. Soon after the vehicles arrived the Australian CCS personnel, who had been 
located on the Ambon-Amahusu Road, were marched into the Sanatorium as prisoners 
of war. B Echelon tried to engage the Japanese at the Sanatorium a second time but the 
hospital grounds remained outside the effective range of their fire.331
Between 0700 and 0800 hours on the morning of 1 February the Japanese 4th Coy 3rd Bn 
advanced Southwest from Ambon Town and up through Cemetery Hill to attack the 
Kudamati positions, but were driven back by B Echelon. At 1000 hours the Japanese 
regrouped to carry out a flanking movement in the same area in the hope of driving a 
wedge between the Kudamati positions and the Benteng Barracks, which was situated 
farther to the West along the Ambon-Amahusu Road. At around 1130 hours, the 
Japanese 3rd pl 3rd Bn attacked the side of the Kudamati positions, overran and occupied 
a crucial corner of the Australian positions.332 
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on Ambon, Second World War, MSS1912, 2007, p. 6.Turner ordered WO2 Ryan to intercept the enemy action but it was discovered that most 
of his command had disappeared, either by leaving their posts or being killed by 
artillery and mortar fire. Turner then asked Bouman to take up the position on 'Coconut 
Ridge' to prevent the Japanese from making further gains. Bouman, like Ryan, had lost 
most of his force to mountain artillery and mortar fire as well as to his men leaving their 
posts. Bouman nevertheless acted on the order to cover the ridge with the few men he 
had available and stopped the Japanese from advancing further up into the Kudamati 
positions. Having secured a corner of Kudamati the main force of the Japanese 3rd Bn 
redirected the artillery fire onto the Benteng Barracks, then isolated and bypassed B 
Echelon at Kudamati, overran the 6-inch guns at the Benteng artillery barracks from the 
rear and captured the position.
Unknown to the Japanese at the time the Dutch had already destroyed the guns at 0900 
hours that morning. This was important because the guns had deterred the war ships 
from entering the bay. After taking Benteng, the Japanese 9th Coy 3rd Bn moved forward 
from the artillery barracks to contact the Australian lines at Amahusu. After taking 
heavy mortar fire from the Australian lines the 9th Coy halted its advance and was 
forced to wait until it could carry forward a night attack. Later that night, at 2000 hours, 
the 9th Coy made further gains towards the Australian lines.333
Meanwhile, after the Japanese attacked Kudamati on the morning of 1 February, Jinkins 
sent a reconnaissance patrol to the northeast plateau from Mount Nona to find out what 
was happening to B Echelon. The patrol reported back that they heard LMG fire coming 
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333 Ibid.from the direction of Kudamati where B Escalon was positioned. Jinkins also received a 
report from Corporal Porter by field telephone at Kudamati informing him that B 
Echelon were evacuating their position and withdrawing up the slopes to Mount Nona. 
Unsure of the circumstances at Kudamati, Jinkins sent forward two more patrols that 
afternoon to reach B Echelon and facilitate their withdrawal. 
During the reconnaissance, the patrols at first saw no Japanese near the B Echelon area 
even though heavy mortar fire was falling on the position. Elements of the Japanese 1st 
Bn, however, later engaged one of the patrols two kilometres to the front of the Mount 
Nona observation post on the plateau running to the East from the mountain.334 The 
Australian patrol scattered and three men of the section became pinned down by 
Japanese fire. Nevertheless, Jinkins sent forward another section forward to extricate the 
men and they all returned safely to Mount Nona.335
Ultimately, the Japanese advance on Amahusu had left B Echelon surrounded and 
isolated. Lt Rudder of the AASC later wrote of the final stages of the engagement at 
Kudamati: 
The Japanese did not come near us again, but went around the hill to our left. We were 100 
strong, and we could not move, owing to the vigilance of the air craft above, and  also by 
reason of the fact that we were not strong enough numerically to tackle the Japanese … In 
the meantime, we were kept busy by mountain gun fire and mortar fire on our positions. We 
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Battle for Ambon, B6121/3, 115A, p. 31.stayed in those positions until late that day when we were completely exhausted, and until 
we could not hear any firing at all.336
After the Benteng Barracks fell, Ambon Bay became vulnerable to Japanese destroyers 
and cruisers that were patrolling the entrance of the Bay. From then on and until the 
surrender, the Japanese continued to harass the Kudamati positions during the daylight 
hours with artillery fire from Batumerah and this action helped pin down B Echelon in 
their positions. 
At 1200 hours, B Echelon observed 300 Japanese troops of the 1st and 2nd Companies 1st 
Bn (with the 3rd Coy in reserve) moving Southwest up the northeastern slopes to Mount 
Nona.337 At 1800 hours, Jinkins reported to Scott at Bn HQ that the Japanese were 
moving up to attack his position. As a result of this report, it appears that Jinkins' 
platoon became accidentally responsible for a friendly fire incident involving Lt 
Anderson's 18th pl B Coy. Scott had ordered Anderson's platoon up to reinforce Jinkins 
on Mount Nona. Anderson tried to enlist the support of some Javanese soldiers but they 
had refused to accompany him. Taking his twenty-strong platoon (less one section), 
Anderson led the patrol through the 17th pl positions across the flying ridge to the top of 
Mount Nona.338
When Anderson's platoon arrived at Mount Nona events became hectic as depicted by 
Jinkins' account:
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and Ambon [Two Copies] Volume 3, AWM54, 229/1/7 PART 5, pp. 55, 96.The  Japanese,  about 40 or 50  strong, attacked  at approximately 1945 [around  the  time 
Anderson was expected] and had approached to within 30 yards before being challenged. 
When challenged they called out “Ambonese”. We immediately opened fire, where upon the 
Japs  withdrew  to dead  ground. The  Japs  immediately re-formed  and, uttering  what was 
apparently a war cry, rushed our positions. The rush was stopped by tommy-gun [sic] fire 
and hand grenades. The enemy then with-drew [sic] to about 100 yards and went to ground. 
Rifle grenade fire then drove them back a further 100 yards.339
Following this contact with the 'Japanese', Jinkins called out to warn Anderson's platoon 
that the Japanese were close to their line of approach. Anderson replied that he was 
wounded. 
By contrast Private Alexander Chew's sworn statement later given at a Court of Inquiry 
in Australia in May that year provided a different account of what he thought happened. 
Chew told the court that: 
I heard someone yell out “Ambon”, and after that I found it was Mr Anderson. I did not see 
any more of 17 platoon, except when Mr Jinkins and a couple of other chaps went down and 
brought Mr Anderson in. Until that time, the Japanese had not attacked our post on the hill. I 
was in the same post as Mr Jinkins.340
What is interesting about these conflicting reports is that Jinkins and Chew were 
together and they both heard someone call out 'Ambonese' or 'Ambon'. The testimonies 
diverge where Jinkins heard what he believed to be the Japanese calling out whereas 
Chew said he heard Anderson. It appears that Jinkins' platoon may have overreacted and 
unintentionally engaged Anderson's platoon with grenades, rifle and Tommy gun fire 
before wounding him.
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340 Ibid., p. 111.Pte Keith Ashton also supported this version of the event in evidence given at the 
inquiry where he explained:
I went up on to Mount Nona with Lieutenant Anderson and No.18 platoon. When we went 
up on mount Nona there was not much fighting. It was a moonlight night. Mount Nona is the 
highest peak on Amboina. Lieut. Anderson was leading and I was not far behind him. … We 
got on top of the Mount. and heard a lot of squealing and screaming. Lieut. Anderson said to 
us “Boys I do not think these can be Japanese screaming and squealing like this. They must 
be Javanese or Ambonese troops who are with us gone panicky.” We did not know whether 
they were Javanese, or Ambonese, or whether they were Japanese, so we got out towards 
them, and Lieut. Anderson said “Australians here, Ambon.” He was talking to them as best 
he could. Of course, I did not understand much of their language, like he did. Anyhow they 
tossed a hand grenade over and  hit him in the legs, and he went over. He said “Carry on, 
boys; I am done.” That was all he said.341 
Cpl Land took over the patrol and the 18th pl withdrew some distance to return fire on 
the 'Japanese', or possibly, the 5th pl.
Furthermore, the Japanese evidence supports the assumption that it was a friendly fire 
incident where the 1st Bn Commander claimed he did not contact the Australians at 
Mount Nona until 2200 hours that night, two hours after the Anderson incident.342 
Jinkins' evidence also confirms that the Japanese attacked his position on both flanks at 
2200 hours, He explained: 
These operations  lasted  until 2300 hours  when the enemy apparently withdrew. This was 
possibly caused  by JAP heavy Mortars which opened up on our position at approx. 2200 
hours and which probably caused some casualties to their own forces. Mortar fire ceased at 
approx 2330 hours.343
Following this incident, Jinkins moved his platoon 360 metres to the West and 
abandoned the observation post. The timing of the incident, the fact that Anderson had 
called out 'Ambon', (which was heard by both Jinkins, Chew and corroborated by 
Ashton), that Anderson was speaking Malay, the events surrounding the exchange of 
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AWM54, 573/6/12, p. 2.fire and that the Japanese were not yet in the area all point to a 'friendly fire' incident 
occurring between Anderson’s and Jinkins' platoon. This point was not lost on the Court 
of Inquiry recorders. The official summary edited out sections of Private Chew's 
testimony and deemed him an unreliable witness. Because Chew was an Australian born 
Chinese this may have been a factor in influencing their decision. Nevertheless, Chew 
later proved reliable enough to become a Warrant Officer (WO.) in Australia's elite 
clandestine organisation Z Special Force.344
Notwithstanding the confusion, the importance of the Anderson incident was that it 
created a turning point in the battle for the Amahusu Line. Had Anderson's platoon been 
able to join Jinkins in the battle for Mount Nona it may have allowed D Coy to further 
hold-up the Japanese advance. Mount Nona was the highest point on the D Coy line and 
was critically important to holding the flanks of the Amahusu line’. Under the 
circumstances the 5th pl Pnr/s were forced to face Hayakawa's 1st Bn assault on Mount 
Nona alone and once Mount Nona was taken the Amahusu Line was lost also.
On the morning of 2 February, Jinkins attempted to and failed to contact D Coy at 
Amahusu because it had already withdrawn to Eri during the night. Unsure of the 
current circumstances the 5th pl Pnr/s hid on the slopes of Mount Nona while runners 
were sent to Bn HQ to obtain further orders. While awaiting their return, some 
volunteers carried Anderson and two malaria cases through the Japanese lines to 
Benteng barracks to get medical treatment. When the reconnaissance party failed to 
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Distance: The Loss of the Legendary USS Harder, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 76.return from Bn HQ, Jinkins moved his platoon down the mountain towards Eri by way 
of Amahusu to rejoin the companies. On the way down Jinkins met some Ambonese 
who told him that the Australians were pinned down on the extreme southwest end of 
the Island. On hearing this Jinkins decided to hide near Amahusu with his platoon until 
they could find an opportunity to escape from Ambon.345 
While the 5th pl waited, Pte Lewis decided to walk back to the RAP to get his wounds 
dressed. Jinkins explained:
On the way to the RAP he met a Dutch officer who had a letter from the Dutch Commander 
to say that he had  given in three days earlier. There was also a note on the letter by the 
Japanese to say they had ceased hostilities until 12 o'clock next day, to allow the Australian 
Commander to give in also. This  letter was  not given to the Australian Commander, the 
Dutch officer returning to the Amahusu line where he was held as a prisoner of war without 
delivering the message. Pte. Lewis came into bush at Amahusu Village and informed me of 
this letter.346
Considering this information Jinkins discovered that the Australian units were still 
intact and positioned around Eri and he decided to leave Amahusu for Eri the next 
morning. On the morning of 3 February, Jinkins changed his mind and contacted the 
Japanese to obtain another letter from Kapitz to give to Scott.
Jinkins put a white handkerchief around his sleeve and walked to the Japanese line. He 
was taken to Benteng Barracks and then on to the resident's house in Ambon to meet 
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It was explained to me [by the Japanese] that fighting would cease until 1800 hours that day 
… then I was taken back to the AMAHUSU Line by car, and there told by the Japanese that 
the C.O. had until 1800 hours to decide. Otherwise we would be pushed off the end of the 
Island. I set out for ERI, and found that my batman had contacted the C.O. to tell him what I 
had  done. I met the C.O., and ascertained  that he had already contacted the  Japanese at 
Amahusu through our M.O. [Medical Officer]. The C.O. informed me that he was marching 
the Battalion into the Japanese.347 
The Dispositions of Gull Force on the Laitimor Peninsular and the Japanese 
Attack at Amahusu (See Ambon Dispositions Map in Appendix One)
Roach had located the Bn HQ in a school building at Amahusu and the RAP was set up 
in a church in this area 50 meters to the west of the Bn HQ. Newnham established his D 
Coy headquarters in caves along the shoreline below the entrenchments that ran up the 
side of Mount Nona. The 16th pl D Coy and 4B pl were allocated to protect Newnham's 
headquarters at the caves HQ. 
The 10th pl D Coy secured the lower section of the Amahusu line leading up to Mount 
Nona and the 17th pl D Coy took up positions in the entrenchments further up in an area 
called the 'Flying Ridge'. Jinkins’ 5th pl Pnr/s occupied Mount Nona above the flying 
ridge to act as flank protection armed and were with some light automatic weapons. At 
the eight-kilometre point between Amahusu and Eri Newnham positioned the 18th pl B 
Coy Det. and a detachment of engineers to defend the littoral approaches along the 
shores of Ambon Bay. D Coy had at its disposal an antitank section, 2 carriers with 
machine guns, 2 mortars and a detachment from the 2/11th Field Coy. 
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347 Ibid.Maj. Westley’s A Coy occupied the positions along the Eri Line. Complimenting A Coy 
were one section of an antitank troop, four carriers (two with machine guns mounted), 2 
mortars and a detachment of the 2/11th Field Coy. Lt Chaplin's 10th pl A Coy together 
with two carriers stationed at Batuanjut. Capt Bouman's 2nd Coy KNIL less one platoon 
was located above Eri to reinforce A Coy's left flank. One rifle section, the 2/11th 
engineer detachment and an armoured carrier occupied a position at Latuhalat to cover 
the southern beaches from Japanese marine landings. Their task was to resist any 
landings, to destroy the bridge at Latuhalat and withdraw to Eri if required.
At 1400 hours on 30 January, after receiving reports of the Japanese landings, Scott 
ordered the companies to rest as much as they could before the battle started. The Dutch 
began exploding their stores dumps in the town, the petrol dumps at the coal wharf as 
well as other infrastructure while at the same time evacuating their troops from Laha. 
These actions dampened the morale of the Australians and ‘tended to cause a feeling of 
temporary depression in the t[roo]ps’. Newnham told his platoon commanders to pass 
on the message that ‘this was a precautionary measure and not much significance was to 
be attached to it’.348
At 0200 hours, Scott informed Newnham the Japanese had landed at Leahari, Hitulama, 
and Paso and that some troop transports had been seen sailing in the direction of Seri 
Bay. At 0400 hours Newnham ordered D Coy to stand-to in anticipation of the 
approaching Japanese attack. D Coy stood-to until around 1100 hours, but no enemy 
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Newnham, CF, Capt, AWM67, 3/285, p. 11.contact occurred that night. After discovering that the Japanese had landed to the 
Australian rear and to the south of the Island Newnham moved his headquarters out of 
the caves along the shoreline to higher ground that provided better all round observation 
to the East.349
At 1400 hours on 31 January Scott received a report that Japanese troops had entered 
Ambon Town. Macrae went forward to Batumerah with a patrol of transport personal to 
verify the report. The patrol saw no Japanese troops but did hear LMG fire coming from 
the Dutch Recruit Coy, which had intercepted the Japanese 1st Bn on the Sojadiatas 
Road leading down to Ambon Town.350 After Macrae reported the situation to Scott it 
was decided to move the Bn HQ back to the Eri line. Scott set up the new headquarters 
near Eri at around 2000 hours that evening while leaving the battalion’s intelligence 
section and the RAP at Amahusu.
At 1600 hours, Macrae reported to Newnham that he had just returned from a patrol to 
Ambon Town without seeing any Japanese after checking rumours that they had taken 
the town. Macrae also told Newnham that he had heard shooting coming from the hills 
above Ambon. Following Macrae’s report Newnham decided to place 4B pl between his 
position and the approaches from Ambon Town.351 At 0900 hours on 1 February, 
Jinkins’ platoon reported to Bn HQ that B Echelon at Kudamati was taking heavy fire 
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telephone to find out what was happening but he could not make contact.352
As the attack was developing at Kudamati on 1 February it became obvious to D Coy 
headquarters that the Amahusu line, instead of being in the rear, had now become the 
front. Newnham adjusted his lines and moved the 18th pl together with a MMG section 
at the 8 kilometre line back into the vicinity of D Coy HQ to strengthen the Amahusu 
line and to cover the road leading from Ambon Town. At 1100 hours the 16th pl and 2 
Bren carriers went forward in an attempt to contact B Echelon. As the patrol moved 
forward it met with the advance guard of the Japanese 9th Coy 3rd Bn coming from 
Benteng barracks on bicycles and in commandeered vehicles. The patrol opened up on 
the Japanese at 200 meters with small arms fire and a Vickers machine gun as a runner 
was sent back with coordinates for the mortars to use in engaging the enemy. After 
receiving three casualties the 16th pl was forced to break contact with the Japanese and 
withdraw back to the Amahusu line.353
When Macrae received a report at Bn HQ about the contact at Amahusu, he went 
forward from Batuanjut, ordered the dismounting of MMGs from two of the Bren 
carriers there and had them moved to the Amahusu line to cover the road. The MMGs 
and the 16th pl subsequently held up the Japanese advance despite receiving further 
casualties from grenade attacks. The mortar section, assisted by rifle grenadiers on the 
Amahusu line above, came into action, rained down bombs on the Japanese 3rd pl 3rd Bn 
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353 Ibid.and forced it to withdraw. Mortar and LMG fire and sniping from the Amahusu Line 
continued for the rest of the day and held the Japanese forces at bay.354
Mortar fire continued to be directed along the road until 1430 hours when the Japanese 
were seen advancing along a facing ridge. Using automatic weapons and mortar fire the 
Japanese began filtering through the jungle cover to a position opposite D Coy’s HQ. 
From here the Japanese directed heavy fire against the 2nd pl, the 16th pl and D Coy HQ, 
which were located in fire positions overlooking the Tuhametan creek. Sgt Martin’s 2nd 
pl detachment challenged the Japanese with rifle-grenade fire as they advanced further 
up the ridge into the cover of coconut palms. Once undercover of the palm trees 
Japanese snipers began shooting at the mortar detachment positions and D Coy HQ. D 
Coy HQ and the 2nd pl returned fire with Tommy gun and light machine gun fire until 
mortar fire could be directed against the area to displace the snipers.355
At 1600 hours Macrae advised Newnham that he was sending the 10th pl from Batuanjut 
to relieve Martin’s detachment on the front. At the same time some Dutch and 
Ambonese soldiers began ‘drifting’ back through the lines from Kudamati, Batumerah 
and from as far away as Paso. Newnham estimated that during the next two hours at 
least 100 KNIL troops passed through his lines. The withdrawing KNIL troops, some 
panicking, caused confusion as they filtered through the firing positions. The anxious 
troops were ordered through the lines back to Eri while the others were placed into 
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576/6/1A, p. 27.troop dispositions for the night, as they had become mixed during the day’s fighting. He 
called a conference with his platoon commanders and Macrae. Here it was decided to 
reorganise the platoon positions to protect the front and rear of the Amahusu line and to 
relieve those engaged in the days fighting. 
At 1830 Jinkins reported to Scott that approximately 300 Japanese troops were massing 
below Mount Nona and advancing on his position. Scott ordered Newnham to send a 
platoon up to reinforce Jinkins’ position. The 18th pl under Lt Anderson was 
immediately sent to assist Jinkins. Lightly armed with three Tommy gun sections and a 
grenade section (1 officer and 21 other ranks) the 18th pl passed through the 17th pl 
position to Mount Nona at approximately 2000 hours. Around hours later the 18th pl 
returned and Corporal Land reported to headquarters that Anderson had been killed in 
an ambush up at the ‘Banana plantation’.357
At 2000 hours further reports came in that the Japanese troops were chopping down 
trees to the front of the 2nd pl’s positions. It was assumed they were clearing the area for 
tracks or at least for the placement of mortars. Sgt Foley was appointed to cover the area 
and control the sector and he was joined by Dutch and Ambonese troops. At 2100, Sgt 
Smith’s mortar detachment reported that Japanese troops had been seen forming up in a 
gully two ridges away to the front of the Amahusu line and next to the Ambon Road. 
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Japanese were concentrating nearby. Newnham believed that this indicated the Japanese 
were preparing for an attack on the line that night. Lt Green of the 17th pl later reported 
to headquarters that Japanese troops could be seen ‘moving on the skyline in the 
direction’ of the Nona positions. He asked Lt Pullen to lay down mortar fire on the 
‘Banana plantation’ in support of the 5th pl Pnr/s, but Pullen was unable to comply as 
the designated position was out of his mortar section’s range.358
Back at Bn HQ Scott, Westley and Macrae discussed the D Coy’s situation at Amahusu. 
The group discussed the option of counter attacking the Japanese on the following 
morning with troops from A Coy. This was rejected, however, on the basis that an attack 
on the Amahusu line would cost too many lives against the small hope of making any 
gains. Then inexplicably, based on optimism that Australian air and or naval support 
would be arriving the next day to save Ambon, Scott contacted Newnham by field 
telephone at 2230 hours to ask his opinion about withdrawing D Coy back from 
Amahusu to the Eri Line.359 What made Scott believe that relief was on its way from 
Australia is very difficult to understand, as he had participated in the isolation of Roach 
when he was making demands for adequate support and equipment at Ambon and 
where he knew he was expected to remain and to hold the Island until it was taken. It 
seems here that Scott was either very tired, losing his grip on reality or had made the 
story up in an attempt to bolster morale.
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359 National Archives of Australia, Report on Ambon and Hainan Part 1, AWM54, 576/6/1A, p. 28.Nevertheless, when Scott contacted Newnham he said:
I have a suggestion to make to you which I would like you to think over and your decision 
will be dependent on circumstances, conditions of the tr[oo]ps etc. at your end. It appears 
that the enemy are in possession of “Nona” and therefore dominate the line. It is that all 
t[roo]ps at “A[mahusu]” withdraw to “E[ri]” where the unit could make a stand for two or 
three days. I will give you ½ hour to think it over if your care to and cannot stress strongly 
enough how very careful you would have to be in order not to give any idea to the enemy as 
to what is taking place. Transport details I will be able to give you when you let me know 
your decision.360
When asked, Scott assured Newnham there was a sufficient supply of both water and 
food for his troops at Eri.361
Newnham called Captains Major and Gabriel, Lts Chapman, Pullen, Mellor and van 
Nooten to his position headquarters to discuss the question of withdrawal from 
Amahusu. He told the assembled officers what Scott had asked of him regarding the 
situation. The officers asked Newnham what rations at Amahusu should be taken back 
to Eri. Newnham explained that Scott had assured him there were ample stores at Eri to 
support both A and D companies and the transport of extra stores from Amahusu was 
abandoned. Considering the outcome of these discussions Newnham informed Scott at 
2300 hours of his decision to withdraw to Eri.362 
Scott immediately organised for road transport from Eri to be assembled at the 
Amahusu rest area. Scott was concerned about the Bn HQ personnel still at Amahusu 
and enquired about plans for their movement back to Eri. Newnham assured Scott that 
they would be on the first transports leaving Amahusu. Capt Hooke then passed onto 
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362 Ibid.Newnham information regarding the transport arrangements for the withdrawal. 
Newnham in turn passed the message along to all his unit commanders along the 
Amahusu line.363
Capt Hooke organised the withdrawal back to Eri in three stages:
First Stage The three sections of 18 pl at that time attached to 17 pl (having returned from 
the patrol to ‘Nona’). 17 pl – Bn HQ Personal from centre sector – Sgt Martin’s Det from 
reserve position, left flank.
Second Stage VD HQ [D Company Headquarters] at position 3 – Sgt Foley’s attachments 
including Dutch and Ambonese - Remainder of 18 pl – Sgt Smith’s Mortar Det – 2 pl from 
centre sector – 16 pl from left (thinning out two sections).
Third Stage 7 pl vicinity ‘Position HQ’ – Cpl Winnell’s Mortar Det – 10 pl from left – 4B pl 
who were to cover withdrawal to the road and if necessary a truck would be sent up to pick 
up the guns and crews.364
Newnham placed Capt Gabriel in charge of embussing the troops from the Amahusu 
rest area. Major, Corporal McKellar and two signals orderlies at position headquarters 
organised the timing of and the checking out of each unit. After the 18th pl had passed 
through the positions, Newnham took control of withdrawing troops from the base of 
the Amahusu line and directed them to the bussing point. He also liaised with Gabriel to 
control any adjustments that needed to be made in case the Japanese moved against the 
Ambon Road positions and created any holdups in the withdrawal.365 Using all available 
A and D Coy trucks and antitank motor transports Newnham began withdrawing D Coy 
to the Eri Line at midnight. The RAP was the first to move and it was relocated to a 
Church at Eri. The 10th pl remained in the most vital section of the Amahusu left flank 
line to block the Japanese until all other troops could safely withdraw to Eri.
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365 Ibid.As the 10th pl prepared to withdraw, one section became embroiled in a close range 
exchange of hand grenades with the leading elements of the Japanese 9th Coy and one 
Australian soldier was killed. On breaking contact and withdrawing, the 10th pl and the 
17th pl climbed aboard the waiting trucks and escaped to Eri. Major, together with a 
motley party of personnel, having missed the transports owing to difficulties in 
organising the Ambonese soldiers, walked back from Amahusu and reached Eri the next 
morning. The Indonesian troops brought confirmation with them to Scott that Kapitz 
had in fact surrendered his forces at Paso.366
When the troops arrived Capt Hooke crowded D Coy amongst the A Coy lines. The 
dispositions on the Eri line now became:
(a) In a platoon's trench nearest to Amahusu - 17 pl (Green) A/Tk Tp (Rowland) plus some Q 
detail; this formed the right beach position).
(b) Left beach position 16 pl (Stewart)
(c) Central pl position about halfway up Eri Hill covering the road as it crossed the bridge 
from Latoehalat. Bn HQ, A Coy HQ, Q and other HQ Coy detail, 2 carriers on beach 
road.
(d) Left pl position covering Tjenke plateau 9 pl (McCutcheon).
(e) In positions making a perimeter on round Bn HQ 18 pln 8 pl and D Coy HQ.
(f) About MMG position on ridge covering road approach and beach landings, 4 MMGs, 2 
mortars.
(g) In “Cocos” [under the command of Gabriel] - A trench system dug to cover the exposed 
flank 7 pl (van Hooten) 2 pln (Mellor).367
On the morning of 2 February, Macrae attempted to readjust the overcrowded Eri 
positions. He moved a standing patrol under Lt Russell forward to a position on a ridge 
above the dead ground to give warning of any approaching Japanese patrols. Russell's 
orders were to withdraw if the enemy approached towards Eri and to report the move to 
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367 National Archives of Australia, Report on Ambon and Hainan Part 1, AWM54, 576/6/1A, pp. 29-30.headquarters. Later in the day Lt Chaplin's 10th pl was send up and it relieved Russell's 
position.368
At 0900 hours, Chaplin observed a Japanese reconnaissance patrol advancing towards 
the lines. The 10th pl and the 7th pl KNIL under van Hooten, engaged the Japanese with 
machine gun, mortar and rifle fire and forced the patrol to withdraw. Following this 
engagement Macrae moved two MMGs to the Ambon Bay side of Eri hill. At 1200 
hours, after repositioning the MMGs, Macrae witnessed five to six destroyers and two 
cruisers steaming into Ambon Bay.369 The destruction of the 6-inch guns at Benteng the 
day before had opened the bay for the Japanese warships to enter and they began 
bombarding the Australian positions at Eri. As the ships arrived, three Japanese 
seaplanes flew over Eri to help direct the naval shelling while nine aircraft carried out 
bombing and strafing runs on the Eri positions. One of the destroyers and a 
minesweeper struck sea mines laid in Ambon Bay and sank to the bottom while taking 
most of their crews with them.370
The shelling from the destroyers continued through the day and set fire to the Eri slopes. 
The fire forced the withdrawal of troops from the west of the Eri line back for two-
kilometres.371 The Australian forces were now in a precarious crowded conditions that 
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and Ambon [Two Copies] Volume 3, AWM54, 229/1/7 PART 5, p. 65.left no room for further withdrawal. The situation was now becoming hopeless as water, 
food rations and ammunition stocks on the Eri slopes had been abandoned to the fire 
leaving the troops hungry, thirsty and exhausted. This situation began causing unrest 
among the quartermaster staff. It was reported that:
On the evidence of CQMS [Company Quarter Master Sergeant] Nugent (HQ Coy) and Sgt 
Finn …  (WO II Ryan) addressed  a group of “Q” personnel and  others and  urged  them to 
“toss  it in”, Nugent says Ryan was without a rifle and  asked  Nugent how  he could  be 
expected to fight without one. Nugent got him a rifle and told him if he left the position he 
would report him immediately.
Ryan may have been close to mutiny but it demonstrated he had a good appreciation of 
the situation. As it happened this was the same Ryan who had earlier deserted his post at 
Kudamati.
Nevertheless, Ryan was not the only soldier voicing concerns about their position, for at 
this time Scott's handling of the battle began drawing criticism from some of the 
Australian troops. Noticing the drop in morale Scott, Hooke and Macrae walked among 
the men and had those that were wandering about return to their positions. Many of the 
men amongst A and D companies complained to Scott that 'there had been too much 
“sitting down and taking it”, they wanted to “get stuck into”’ the Japanese. When 
Macrae returned to the RAP he found another group that had left the line. He was forced 
to fire his pistol above their heads and order them back to their posts.372
At 2000 hours on 2 February, Scott held a conference with Macrae, Newnham and 
Westley to plan what to do next, to discuss the acute lack of food and water at Eri and to 
discuss the option of counter attacking the Japanese early the next morning. Macrae put 
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372 National Archives of Australia, Report on Ambon and Hainan Part 1, AWM54, 576/6/1A, p. 32.it to the meeting that despite some incidents morale was still high among the companies 
and he suggested counterattacking the Japanese forces. He argued that to make a stand 
at Eri would be fruitless as water was scarce, the Japanese ships and planes were 
attacking the Eri positions with impunity and the area was overcrowded. He suggested 
that the troops would be better served if they were used to attack towards Amahusu. 
This suggestion, however, was rejected by the group because of the supply issues at Eri, 
the nature of the terrain, the exhaustion of the troops and there being little hope of 
profiting from such an attack.373
Owing to the insurmountable problems discussed above the issue of capitulation was 
finally raised. Macrae maintained his resolve in opposing capitulation because the 
troops had suffered few casualties, A Coy had yet to participate in battle and to stay 
where they were without the ability to retaliate would be futile. Considering his 
assessment of the troops he said they would be delighted to make a thrust towards the 
Japanese. Scott agreed that he too would be ‘delighted’ if an attack could be thrown 
against the Japanese but he failed to make any arrangement for an attack that night.374
A factor contributing to the lack of resolve in attacking the Japanese was the exhausted 
state of the officers present at the meeting. Newnham later wrote:
It was apparent that all commanders and officers present were nearing exhaustion and on two 
occasions a senior officer dropped off to sleep through sheer fatigue. The conference lacked 
a definite spirit and I can recall saying to the C.O. that in the present condition, having only 
had  four  hours' [sic]  (approx.) sleep since Thursday,  29 January (it was then 8 p.m. on 
Monday) it was difficult to think along offensive lines.375
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375 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust: Series One - Australia in the War of 1939-1945, p. 433.Following the conference, Macrae received a report that the Japanese were landing at 
Latuhalat. At 0100 hours on 3 February, he led a fighting patrol of 23 volunteers in three 
sections towards Latuhalat to check out the report. After patrolling for three hours the 
group could find no trace of Japanese landings. Macrae then decided to stand down the 
patrol and rest until the next day. The next morning he became ill after eating wild 
berries and was forced to return for medical attention at the RAP. Before leaving he 
gave his consent for the patrol to attempt an escape from Ambon under the leadership of 
Lt Chapman. Chapman's party took advantage of the offer and somehow managed to 
escape to Palau Emu and eventually made it back to Australia.376
Meanwhile, at around 2200 hours Gabriel identified a gap in the Eri line at the Cocos 
position and recognised there was a danger that a Japanese patrol could infiltrate the 
line between that point and Bn HQ. Westley gave Gabriel permission to withdraw the 
2nd and 7th pls from their positions to fill the gap. Before Gabriel withdrew the platoons 
from their positions, he asked Westley whether the company had been made aware of 
the move. Westley assured Gabriel that they had. This was important, as Gabriel was 
required to bring the 7th pl across the 8th pl’s front to reach Cocos. 
As Gabriel led the 7th pl back towards the lines and after cresting the skyline, an 8th pl 
machine gunner opened fire on the group killing private ‘Snowy’ Balcomb, who took 
three rounds through the head. Another private threw Gabriel into a ditch as Balcomb 
fell to the ground beside him. An unknown witness remarked after the incident that:
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Thrust: Series One - Australia in the War of 1939-1945, p. 443.Snowy  Balcomb  was  shot earlier  in  the  night,  through  criminal  neglect ...  During  the 
morning I saw where two bullets had struck the rim of young  Inksters tin hat, one going 
through it and the other leaving a large dent. Guess that bears out the idea of the fatal bullet, 
for he was next to Balcomb who was killed when he took four bullets in the head.377
As it transpired the 8th pl was not warned of the move and following the incident 
Gabriel questioned Westley on why his patrol had been fired on. Westley simply replied 
that ‘the information had not got down to the company’.378 Macrae later wrote that 
Gabriel:
Was given permission to withdraw and did so using a different route for each of 2 and 7 pls. 
As far as I can see 7 pl should not have crossed any platoon’s line of fire but in actual fact it 
did cross that of 8 pl AWL. MG of 8 pl opened fire and a Pte of 7 pl was mortally wounded. 
8 pl had not been informed of the movement ...379
Although Macrae was correct in saying that a platoon should not cross another platoon’s 
line of fire, it was Westley who gave permission for the move and it was he who had 
failed to inform the 8th pl of Gabriel’s intentions to move across its front.
On the morning of 3 February, a Japanese flag was observed flying above Laha and as 
no further sounds of battle could be heard it became apparent to Scott that the Japanese 
had taken the airfield. Then between 0800 and 0930 hours two Japanese transport ships 
were seen entering Ambon Bay where they anchored near Eri. Landing craft were put in 
the water and they headed towards Ambon Town as well as the Laha airfield. Scott 
surmised that they were going to Laha to repair the recently taken airfield.380
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Newnham, CF, Capt, AWM67, 3/285, p. 18.Around this time it was reported that Ryan, by now a recidivist deserter and trouble 
maker, had organised a surrender party of his own before marching off towards 
Amahusu with a white flag. When Scott heard of Ryan’s actions and the possibility of 
mutiny he decided to surrender. According to Newnham at the time; ‘parties carrying 
white flags moved towards Amahoesoe. Meanwhile the C.O. hearing of these desertions 
decided there was nothing left but to surrender. He come down to the RAP and sent the 
Doctor in an Ambulance to the Japanese.381 On the way to Amahusu Aitken met with 
Ryan’s surrender party. Aitken ordered Ryan to remain where he was. Ryan explained to 
Aitken that ‘he was going to Amahusu because he believed the battalion had already 
surrendered’. This turned out to be untrue on Ryan’s account as the party were found at 
Amahusu after the surrender despite being told by Aitken to remain where they were as 
no surrender had occurred. McBride later found Ryan to be a deserter after convening a 
court of inquiry at the Tantui POW camp following the surrender. McBride concluded 
that ‘ ... I have small doubt in my mind that RYAN deliberately moved back without 
orders’.382
At 1030 hours Scott ordered Capt Hooke to deliver the order that all weapons, 
compasses, binoculars and any objects of use to the Japanese were to be destroyed. 
Thirty minutes later the platoons were ordered to form up for the move to Amahusu. 
When Newnham reported to Scott he was told ‘this is a very humiliating business. I 
hope these fellows realise what surrender means, but I don’t think I could have rallied 
the unit and made a further stand’.383 It is fair to say Scott had a right to be humiliated 
owing to the role he played in Gull Force remaining at Ambon in the first place and for 
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purpose of usurping his command in the second.
When the companies marched into Amahusu they picked up members of the 5th pl Pnr/s 
from Mt Nona and Ryan’s surrender party. At Amahusu the Australians were put under 
guard but were allowed to swim in the bay and clean up before camping in the village 
overnight. At 0800 hours 4 February, around 803 Australian POWs marched off to be 
interned in their barracks back at Tantui. When they arrived they found that B Escalon 
had also surrendered the previous day. As it transpired, at 1200 hours on 2 February, 
Turner had sent Capt Rose to contact the Japanese headquarters to negotiate the 
surrender of B Escalon. Rose returned two hours later to inform Turner that the 
Japanese had accepted their surrender and that B Escalon was to disarm and march into 
Ambon Town. The remnants of the 100 AASC, engineers and transport personnel duly 
complied and were marched into the Tantui barracks.
197Chapter Five - Incompetence in Command
It sometimes happens of course that someone who made his reputation in one rank carries it 
with him when he is promoted, without really deserving to. If not much is demanded of him, 
and  he can avoid exposing  his incompetence, it is  difficult to decide what reputation he 
really deserves. Such cases  often cause one to hold  in low  estimate soldiers who in less 
responsible positions might do excellent work.
Appropriate talent is needed  at all levels  if distinguished  service is to be performed. But 
history and posterity reserve the name of ‘genius’ for those who have excelled in the highest 
positions  – as  commander-in-chief  –  since  here  the  demands  for intellectual  and  moral 
powers are vastly greater.384
Carl von Clausewitz
In the case of Ambon, Sturdee expected defeat not only at Ambon but at Rabaul and 
Kupang also. He sent small ill-equipped task forces to defend isolated island outposts 
without the required support in military aircraft, ships, reinforcement or the prospect of 
withdrawal while having knowledge beforehand that overwhelming Japanese forces 
were expected to attack these garrisons. Sturdee’s default position was sending small ill-
equipped forces to isolated islands to be swept up by the advancing Japanese divisions. 
The point of concern here is not that Sturdee and the War Cabinet were irresponsible 
enthusiasts playing a game of chance, but rational, responsible planners of high strategy 
who had planned and carried out what seems to be an irrational, or at least, an 
incompetent military campaign of line observation and position fighting theory within 
the designated operational areas of the Malay Barrier.
In war, a military sacrifice is a strategic or tactical act of giving up a unit, space, time or 
object in the hope of deriving more important and worthy gains that are calculated at a 
price commensurate with the losses. Clausewitz believed that ‘war is no act of blind 
passion, but is dominated over by the political object, therefore the value of that object 
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384 von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Peter Paret, p. 129.determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased’.385 These 
principles seem to have been abused by Sturdee where his formulation of strategy for 
garrisoning the islands was not worth the sacrifice of forces balanced against what 
would be the limited gains of just a few days delay to the Japanese advance. In other 
words, when Australia faced a possible Japanese invasion, Sturdee was sacrificing the 
last of the 2nd AIF’s 8th Division brigades for a few days delay to the Japanese, an 
incommensurate transaction in relation to Australia’s military capabilities at the time.
It seems that Sturdee derived his formulaic strategy of forward observation for Ambon 
from Clausewitz’s chapters seven and eight in Book Five of On War, which together 
discuss the advance guard and the operational use of advanced corps in eighteenth 
century warfare. These chapters of On War were written for relatively antiquated 
seventeenth and eighteenth century warfare where armies were limited to advancing on 
foot or by horse, not by sea or air. In Clausewitz’s time when ‘a troop’s range of vision 
[did] not usually extend much beyond the range of fire’ the purpose of advanced guards 
and outposts in land warfare were to act as the eyes for an army ‘to detect and 
reconnoiter the enemy’s approach before it [came] into view’ and to avoid surprises.386 
Clausewitz advised the reader that the use of outposts was dependent on ‘the extent, 
time and place, circumstances and the type of war being conducted’. Clearly Sturdee 
overlooked or ignored these contingencies at Ambon where wireless telegraphy, ships 
and aircraft now acted as instruments in modern warfare on land, air and sea for 
reconnoitring the enemy’s approach long before they came into view of a main force.
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386 von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Peter Paret, p. 359. The grand strategy laid down by the War Council and Sturdee on 12 December 1941 
was archaic and flawed when applied to line observation and fighting at Ambon, 
because it was derived from antiquated principles of warfare, especially where they had 
failed properly to consider the type of warfare being conducted. In this case, Gull Force 
was isolated from its main body through an inappropriate subdivision of force, a lack of 
secure supply routes, a lack security to its rear, a lack of ability to shield the main body 
in gaining time and a lack of ability to withdraw into the main body once the enemy had 
overcome any resistance. At the time of the Ambon campaign RAAF aircraft alone 
could have fulfilled this role where they had the mobility and scope to withdraw once 
threatened, as they actually did when the Japanese fleet approached Ambon in January 
1942.387
Furthermore, other than acting as observation posts, advanced guard posts are often 
used as points of resistance to give the main force time to prepare for battle or to 
withdraw to another more advantageous position if required or to act as rear guards to 
the main force during a withdrawal. The size of the advance guard units and outposts 
are therefore configured according to whether the main body requires more time to 
prepare or not and if action is required to delay the enemy.388 Sturdee’s claim that he 
was sending troops to delay the enemy at Ambon was overstated, from a Clausewitzian 
perspective, when Gull Force was expected to holdup a Japanese division for no more 
than a few days. In the context and scope of the Pacific War a delay on this scale was 
unlikely to achieve any practicable gains. In any case, as far as advanced guards and 
outposts were concerned, Clausewitz was focusing on large armies moving across the 
200
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid., p. 360.fields of Europe with divisional sized advance guards, not small ill-equipped 
detachments sitting in isolated outposts on far-flung islands.
Clausewitz explained that the operational use of advanced corps ‘is to observe the 
enemy and slow down his advance’.389 He made it clear that their role is to influence the 
enemy into revealing its size and objectives and then delaying their advance before 
falling back. In the era of Clausewitz’s study these tactics were possible, because an 
advance guard on the fields of Europe ostensively had space to fall back into. In the 
case of Ambon, however, Gull Force had no space to fall back into apart from the sea. 
Clausewitz also advised that the requirements of an advance guard to resist attack is 
dependent on the nature of the terrain and the proximity of support. Because Ambon 
was completely isolated from the main support force it had only one of the above 
requirements for the security of an advance guard and that was mountainous jungle 
terrain. Nevertheless, in this case the terrain at Ambon worked against Gull Force 
because it is a small island where there was no room to manoeuvre troops effectively, a 
fact pointed out to Sturdee in Scriven’s report.
Furthermore, Clausewitz maintained that defensive fighting by an advanced guard 
rarely has any great consequence in itself, because such a minor engagement, in his 
words, ‘rarely gains enough time’. The gains of using advanced guards therefore are 
dependent on making the enemy more cautious, extending the duration of resistance and 
using the withdrawal itself to slow down the enemy’s advance and to make time for 
preparing for a more decisive battle.  Clausewitz advised that;
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389 Ibid., p. 367.The withdrawal must be made as slowly as safety will permit. Any good natural position that 
is available should be used. It will compel the enemy to work out fresh attacks and turning-
movements, and so gain more time. Even a real engagement may prove acceptable in a new 
position. It will be obvious that the delaying action is closely linked to the withdrawal. The 
frequency of the engagements will have to make up for the shortness of their duration. This 
is  the  way  an advance  corps  can resist.  Its  effectiveness  depends  primarily on  its  own 
numerical strength and the terrain; also on the distances it has to cover, and the support and 
protection it receives.390
When Gull force is considered in this context it was placed in an untenable position; its 
isolation limited its capacity to resist; its numerical and material strength was weak; it 
was subject to a decisive blow by a larger force; it had no room to manoeuvre; it could 
not withdraw; there were no means for its support; and consequently, there was no 
effective means for resisting the Japanese at Ambon for more than a few days.  
Clausewitz’s conclusion on the operational use of the advanced guard was that:
An advance guard derives its operational value more from its presence than from its efforts; 
from the engagements  it might offer rather than from those it actually fights. It is  never 
intended  to stop  the enemy’s  movements, but rather,  like the  weight of a  pendulum,  to 
moderate and regulate them so as to make them calculable.391
This statement may be true, but it must be taken in the context in which it was offered 
and the particular circumstances of the operations being considered. The advice given 
above by Clausewitz relates to operations on land only and was never presented as 
formulae or scientific law; rather it was advice given in the context of the battles studied 
by Clausewitz where advanced guards were the size of divisions and where they had 
room to safely manoeuvre and fall back. Of course Gull Force and the presence of the 
RAAF would have regulated the Japanese advance to some degree simply by the nature 
of its position. The price of moderation, however, in adjusting an enemy’s movement 
must be weighed in proportion to any gains accrued in delaying their advance. 
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391 Ibid., pp. 370-80. Clausewitz also held that:
11. These isolated posts serve in large operations partly as outposts, in which case they serve 
not as absolute defense but only as a delay to the enemy, and partly to hold points which are 
important for the combinations we have planned for our army. Also it is often necessary to 
hold on to a remote point in order to gain time for the development of active measures of 
defense which we may have planned. But, if a point is remote, it is ipso facto isolated.
12. Two more observations about isolated obstacles are necessary. The first is that we must 
keep troops ready behind  them to receive detachments that have been thrown back. The 
second is that whoever includes such isolated obstacles in his defensive combinations should 
never count on them too much, no matter how strong the obstacle may be. On the other hand, 
the military leader to whom the defense of the obstacle has been entrusted must always try to 
hold  out, even under the most adverse circumstances. For this there is needed  a spirit of 
determination and self-sacrifice, which finds its source only in ambition and enthusiasm. We 
must, therefore, choose men for this mission who are not lacking in these noble qualities.392
Clausewitz advises here that an outpost should have support to fall back into and that 
they should not be considered as immoveable objects placed in the path of the enemy. 
The expectation is that they would put up strong resistance in proportion to their 
strength and then tactically withdraw. Clausewitz never condoned the unnecessary 
sacrifice of such detachments especially where there was no other planned combinations 
for the Army in train as in the case of Ambon. Fredrick the Great, Clausewitz’s Prussian 
predecessor in the art of war, denounced this kind of folly when he observed that as fas 
as detachments were concerned ‘It would afford fine amusement to the enemy, if they 
were able on these occasions to attack us to our disadvantage, and it would certainly 
happen, but for the well-chosen situation of our camp’.393 In other words, outposts and 
main camps are mutually supportive of each other and should not be allowed to be 
isolated from each other to the point that they can be defeated in isolation.
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Generals, trans. Lt-Col Foster, 5th ed., (London: J. Cruttwell, 1818), p. 34.It is plausible, however, that Sturdee was applying these desperate measures to the 
island’s strategies in the hope that the American Navy would suddenly arrive to 
reinforce the garrisons and occupy the bases. The Chiefs of Staff’s appreciations of 
December 1941 seems to demonstrate that Sturdee was optimistic, or at least hopeful, 
that this would happen if Rabaul could be held long enough. The recommended 
measures were:
That the joint United States-Australian proposals for strengthening Rabaul to make it a well 
fortified Naval base should be reinforced to provide an Army Brigade. An Air  Force  General 
Purpose Squadron also be stationed there. Should these proposals not be proceeded with, it is 
still  necessary to reinforce  the  existing  garrison in the  manner indicated  to  prevent the 
acquisition of Rabaul as a base from which an attack upon Port Moresby and the Australian 
mainland could be isolated.394
Arguably, Rabaul was a strategic outpost that should have been reinforced if for no 
other reason than it was a mandated Australian territory important to the morale of the 
Australian people and that attacks could be launched from there against Australia by the 
enemy after it was taken. It was also the key to approaching New Guinea and it was 
strategically critical for Australia in maintaining its links with the US, especially when 
the Chiefs of Staff were now beginning to build up Australia’s defence resources with 
American aid against a possible Japanese invasion.395 
The strategic and tactical principles standing against the deployment of Gull Force to 
Ambon, however, were that Sturdee did not have the resources properly to secure the 
garrison with a sufﬁcient balance of troops, aircraft or naval forces. Ambon was not 
Australian territory and Gull Force was still in Australia when the above decision was 
being made to despatch it to Ambon after war broke out. In holding such concerns over 
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395 Ibid., Appendix “D” .Rabaul, there was just cause for Sturdee to postpone the sending of Gull and Sparrow 
Forces to their respective garrisons in case they were required at Rabaul or perhaps to 
protect Australia against any later perceived threat to its mainland from New Guinea or 
Timor.
As it was, Lind, Tanner and Roach had all reported the above shortcomings of 
garrisoning Ambon to AHQ in Melbourne, but they were either ignored, threatened or 
removed from command. In the Clausewitzian context above, Sturdee’s ill-considered 
strategy of forward observation and fighting was clearly unworthy of him. He had the 
training and knowledge provided to him commensurate with his position as Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence (DMOI) at AHQ throughout the 1930s and yet in 
his role as CGS he had planned and executed Operational Instruction No. 15 with an 
inexplicably stubborn determination in breach of contemporaneous strategic principles. 
Where there was no positive outcome for Australia in garrisoning Ambon, it seems the 
only rational sacrifice that should have been made was Ambon itself. 
Sturdee was no fool and there is much evidence in support of his qualifications as 
Australia’s CGS. Sturdee’s son-in-law, Colonel John Buckley, held him in high praise 
when relating to his roles in the military as Chief of the General Staff leading into the 
Pacific War, the officer delegated to the Australian Military Mission at Washington in 
1942, as Commander of the First Australian Army in 1944, as acting Commander in 
Chief in 1945 and as Chief of the General Staff again in 1946. Bearing witness to 
Sturdee’s character, Buckley explained that ‘when the Burma show opened up Sturdee 
was absolutely horrified, because he realised that if Australian troops did go there 
205without equipment or anything else, and no air support, it would be an absolute disaster 
of the first order’.396 According to Buckley’s unsubstantiated claim, Sturdee threatened 
to resign at the 18 February 1942 War Cabinet meeting if the 2nd AIF troops were not 
brought back to Australia.
Rowell similarly praised Sturdee’s attributes as CGS. He considered Sturdee a ‘realist 
of the highest degree’. In his 1966 Australian Army Journal article on the early war 
years, Rowell highlighted Sturdee’s role as DMOI and his contribution to the War Book, 
to Australia’s overall strategic plan for raising overseas units, the strategic concentration 
of force in Australia, the build up of the home based militia, the equipping of those 
forces with modern weapons on a limited budget and coastal defence and training. 
Rowell further praised Sturdee for his precise mind, his problem solving ability, his 
clarity of thought and his willingness to delegate to junior officers.397 In other words, 
Rowell considered Sturdee sharp, intelligent, well educated and a practised military 
organiser and strategist of the highest order.
The Australian Dictionary of Biography also admits that Sturdee was a competent well-
educated and experienced military officer. It lists his prodigious accomplishments in the 
Australian army from the time of his commission in 1908 until his retirement as a 
Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1951. According to this 
biographical account; 
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397 Rowell, "General Sturdee and the Australian Army," pp. 3-10.Sturdee’s  sheer  professionalism  earned  him  the  trust  of  politicians  of  all  parties  His 
steadfastness in the anxious months that followed Japan’s entry into the war had won him 
widespread admiration, and he was described as ‘the rock on which the army, and indeed the 
government rested during the weeks of panic in early 1942’. His resolute insistence that the 
A.I.F. divisions intended for operations in the Far East should be returned to Australia helped 
ensure that troops were available to halt the Japanese  advance in Papua.398 
From the above descriptions it is clear Sturdee’s peers considered him an excellent 
general, one who was on top of the game and unlikely to compromise his principles if 
he thought the security of Australia was at risk. He was a general of clear mind, had a 
purposeful character and was a planner capable of weighing up the probable 
consequences of military action.
According to the above examples, Sturdee clearly had the knowledge and experience to 
be fully cognisant of the risks involved in sending undersized, under-equipped and 
under-supported troops to isolated island outposts like Ambon, Timor and Rabaul. This 
was demonstrated by his horrified reaction to the prospect of Australian troops being 
sent  to Burma, a lesson he perhaps learned earlier from the debacle of the Greece 
campaign or from the failed operations at Rabaul, Ambon and Timor.399 
It would be unfair to Sturdee to expect that he could see a year into the future to 
determine that would be the case in February 1941. Even so, the fact remains that he 
was aware of the unfolding circumstances of the Pacific War by December 1941 and in 
the time before he had embarked Gull and Sparrow forces to Ambon and Timor 
respectively. This was confirmed by his discussions with Curtin at the War Cabinet on 8 
December 1941 and by Curtin’s letter to Roosevelt on 13 December 1941, which stated 
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pp. 6-7.that Rabaul was in a hopeless situation and was facing a Japanese scale of attack too 
large for the garrison to defend. Curtin explained to Roosevelt that the naval situation in 
Australia had ruled out any support for Rabaul and by implication Ambon and Timor. In 
any case, Sturdee had predicted at the War Cabinet meeting that Timor would likely 
face a Japanese division and clearly if that was so it applied to Ambon also, as it lay 
between the Japanese advance and its objective at Timor.400
Rowell later attempted to dismiss the Rabaul debacle as the unanticipated consequence 
of war. He is reported to have remarked that ‘they [the ‘they’ being Sturdee and Rowell] 
had the scale of attack all wrong. The Japanese employed a division against a battalion. 
It was bad luck for the [Lark Force] battalion that the Japanese intended making Rabaul 
their main base’.401 This account was patently misleading as Sturdee had earlier forecast 
that the Japanese would use such a division in its attack on Rabaul. Military historian 
David Horner, to whom Rowell had written the above, was scathing of this remark. He 
wrote;
One is left with the impression that this token contribution [at Rabaul] to forward defence, 
and it was repeated in Ambon, Timor and New Ireland, was merely grasping at straws. Army 
Headquarters must be indicted for failing to assess realistically the chances of these garrisons 
… Furthermore, it is clear that Army Headquarters was not organised to control operations. 
There was confusion over orders, roles and equipment, leading, in the case of Ambon, to the 
replacement of the commander.402
Clearly, Horner’s remarks condemn Rowell’s and Sturdee’s competencies and abilities 
regarding their direction of the Islands operations.
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402 Ibid.Colonel EG Keogh in his book The South West Pacific 1941-45 raised similar concerns 
as those of Horner regarding the competency of AHQ in the execution of their island 
operations:
Taking the prevailing circumstances into full account, it is hard to justify the   detachments 
at Ambon and  Rabaul. Neither place was a vital link in the defences or communications. 
Certainly it was highly desirable to deny the enemy access to them, but once command of 
the sea had been lost any forces stationed at those places could not be supported until the 
navy situation had been restored. In neither case was the force anything like strong enough to 
survive for the required length of time, or even to impose delay on the powerful forces the 
enemy was employing. It is true that the arrangements for the despatch of these forces were 
made before Japan struck, before the  strength  of  the  blows  she  would  deliver  had  been 
appreciated.  But after  her probable  course  of  action  and  her  methods  had  been  amply 
demonstrated there was still time to reconsider the situation. Despite this demonstration, it 
would appear that Army Headquarters persisted in believing that these lone battalions could 
impose delay on the  enemy. Consequently the maxim, enunciated it is believed by one of the 
early Pharaohs, operated in full– “Detachments beyond effective supporting distance usually 
get their heads cut off.” There are, of course, occasions when something worthwhile can be 
gained by the sacrifice of a detachment. This was not one of them.403
As both Horner and Keogh suggest, the Chiefs of Staff could have realistically assessed 
the efficacy of setting up and maintaining garrisons in the islands and could have 
perhaps reserved the 23rd Brigade for later service in Australia or New Guinea.404 This 
should have been Sturdee’s goal when considering the defence of Australia at a time 
when he was building up the Australian militia forces to oppose the Japanese threat and 
when troops and equipment were badly needed on Australia’s mainland. 
History demonstrates, however, that this did not happen in the case of Ambon, Timor or 
Rabaul despite the discussions of 13 December regarding the consequences attached to 
the possible fall of Singapore. Under the circumstances there seemed to be little excuse 
for Sturdee to send Gull and Sparrow Forces to Ambon and Timor respectively or for 
Lark Force to remain at Rabaul without hope of support or withdrawal, but he did this. 
From as early as 8 December Sturdee had had time to re-evaluate the strategic situation. 
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404 Horner, Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943, p. 36.He had had the support of Curtin in not dissipating troops to Ambon and Timor in 
December 1941 should he have required it, yet he ignored these opportunities. At the 
time of this decision Sturdee was aware of the dangers of sending inadequate troops to 
the islands, yet he seems to have done so regardless of the consequences. 
This was never a case of overlooking unforeseen consequences; it was a deliberate 
decision by Sturdee when he knew that Gull and Sparrow forces, before their departure 
from Australia, faced the probability of opposing overwhelming Japanese forces in the 
islands. He nevertheless sent Gull and Sparrow Forces to the islands without any hope 
of enduring such conditions. Sturdee later admitted his mistake in his paper the Future 
Employment of AIF on 15 February 1942. He had had to admit that his sloppy approach 
to the Malay Barrier had failed, which he acknowledged after receiving Lieutenant 
General John Lavarack’s and General Wavell’s appreciations on the situation in Sumatra 
and Java at 0750 and 2050 hours respectively on 14 February.
Lavarack and his staff had arrived from the Middle East at ABDACOM HQ in Bandung 
on 27 January 1942 as advance party for the returning I Australian Corps. Lavarack had 
been appointed acting GOC AIF ABDA Area until Blamey could arrive in Java from the 
Middle East. Lavarack’s job was to assess the situation in the NEI before the proposed 
Australian reinforcements arrived. Accordingly, between 1 to 9 February Lavarack and 
his GSO, Brigadier Frank Berryman, toured areas of southern Sumatra and central Java 
to prepare situation reports on the defence of the NEI.
210On 2 February, while Lavarack toured Sumatra and Java, his senior intelligence officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel KA Wills, prepared a paper that predicted the Japanese would 
attack:
(a) Timor (thus to cut air communications between Java and Australia) and (b) the Sumatra 
airfields and refineries; and that the enemy could attain these objectives by 2   March.  Java 
would  then  be  isolated  …  and  the  small  Dutch  Garrison,  ‘split up  into  pennypackets 
throughout the island’ and of problematical fighting value, would not  hold out for long.405
Wills calculated that the returning AIF convoys from the Middle East could not arrive in 
time to counter the Japanese attacks on Sumatra let alone Java. He pointed out that ‘On 
the information available, the leading Australian divisions could not be ready for action 
in the NEI before 15th March at the earliest’.406 The conclusions were that the 
Australian divisions did not have time to prepare for battle at Sumatra and Java; that 
they were at risk of being lost piecemeal; and, that this eventuality would jeopardise 
Australia’s own defence. 
On 13 February, with Rabaul and Ambon captured and Singapore facing imminent 
defeat, Lavarack prepared an appreciation of his own to send to Curtin by way of 
Sturdee. Lavarack stated that in ‘My opinion in event of fall of Singapore completely 
new situation results. Major element of this situation would be loss of approximately 
three imperial divisions and release of Japanese forces Malaya for further ventures’.407 
Lavarack estimated that:
(a)  The  Japanese  would  be  free  to  take  both  north  and  south  Sumatra  without  much 
resistance.
(b) The Japanese could take Sumatra before the full complement of 7th Division arrived.
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Employment of the AIF, A2671, 106/1942, 1942, Appendix C.(c) One Australian division and all Dutch troops on Sumatra combined  could not stop the 
Japanese taking the island for long.
(d) The loss of 7th Division equipment and  personnel to such an expedition could  not be 
justified.
(e) Dutch forces were unlikely to put up a strong resistance to Japanese attacks.
(f) The addition of 6th Division AIF would not prolong the land defence of Java.
(g) The defence of the NEI under the above circumstances did not warrant the sacrifice of I 
Australian Corps when it could not make any useful gains.
(h) Employing this strategy would demonstrate to the Japanese that I Australian Corps was 
the only viable land striking force remaining in the Far East.
(i) That 6 Division would not be ready for full scale operations until middle of April.408
He concluded that under these conditions and if Singapore fell it would be necessary to 
reconsider the future role of I Australian Corps in the NEI.
On reading the appreciation, Wavell asked Lavarack to delay sending the report so that 
he too could present a similar appreciation to the British Combined Chiefs of Staff and 
the War Office in Britain. In concert with Lavarack’s report Wavell concluded that:
1. Singapore was likely to fall and release substantial Japanese forces to fight in Burma as 
well as to move south, making southern Sumatra untenable.
2. It was unlikely Australian forces  from the Middle East could  arrive in time to secure 
southern Java let alone Sumatra.
3. Sumatra was essential to the defence of Java 
4.  Air  force  resources  available  to  the ABDA  area  were  insufficient to repel  Japanese 
advance on Sumatra and Java.
5. That Java was untenable if Sumatra fell, that an attempt to hold Sumatra should be given 
serious consideration unless  it was found  useless  to do so and  that further consideration 
should be given to diverting the Australian convoys away from the NEI if this was found to 
be the case.
6. Under these circumstances  it would  be better strategically if Australian convoys  were 
diverted to Burma or Australia.
7. That the fall of Singapore would require the complete reorganisation of plans.409
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and Wavell:
   PAPER BY THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF ON FUTURE 
EMPLOYMENT OF A.I.F.
In view  of the present position in the S.W. Pacific Area and of information which has just 
come  to  my  knowledge,  I  consider  that  the  future  employment  of  the  A.I.F.  requires 
immediate reconsideration by War Cabinet.
2. At the present moment we are in the process of transferring 64,000 troops of Aust. Corps 
from M.E. to the ABDA Area. The first flight of 17,800 is now in Bombay being restowed 
into smaller ships for disembarkation in the N.E.I. If any change is to be made, action 
must be taken immediately.
3. So far in this war against Japan we have violated the principle of concentration of forces 
in our efforts to hold numerous small localities with totally inadequate forces which are 
progressively  overwhelmed  by  vastly  superior  numbers.  These  small  garrisons  alone 
without adequate  reinforcement  or  support never  appeared  to  have  any  prospect  of 
withstanding even a moderate scale of attack. In my opinion, the present policy of trying 
to hold isolated islands with inadequate resources needs review.
4. Our object at the present time should be to ensure the holding of some continental area 
from which we can eventually launch an offensive in the Pacific when American aid can 
be fully developed. This postulates the necessity for keeping open the sea and if possible 
the air reinforcing routes from U.S.A. This area to be held must be large enough so that, if 
we are pressed seriously by the Japanese, we will have room to manoeuvre our defending 
forces and  not get them locked up in series  of small localities, eg. islands, where the 
garrisons are overwhelmed piecemeal and are consequently lost as fighting resources for 
the  duration  of  the  war.  Sacrifices  of  this  nature  can  only  be  justified  if  the  delay 
occasioned to the enemy’s advance is such that the time gained enables effective measures 
to be organised for taking the offensive.
5. Present indications are that in the near future the only portion of N.E.I. that is likely to 
remain in Allied hands is Java. The Dutch Military Forces there amount to some 55,000 
organised into two divs (according to information dated Nov 1941), concentrated in two 
groups around Batavia and Surabaya. The centre of the island is devoid of troops except a 
few small posts. These forces consist of a small proportion of Dutch whites, the remainder 
being native. They are entirely immobile in the sense that they cannot fight out of the area 
in which they are at present located, as they rely very largely on civil resources for their 
supply,  transport,  repair,  signals,  provost and  other  services.  In fact,  they  should  be 
regarded  more  as  well  equipped  Home Guards  than an Army capable of  undertaking 
active operations in the field according to the developments of the strategic situation .
6. The Dutch themselves will probably fight well, but are inexperience and  probably not 
highly trained. The rank and file are natives whose fighting qualities are doubtful under 
conditions of modern warfare. It is unlikely that they are as good as British Indians, who 
so far have not been very successful against the Japanese. 
7. General Wavell’s  present plan is  to distribute the A.I.F. and the accompanying British 
Armoured Bde as follows:–
South Sumatra: 7 Div and some Corps Troops.
Central Java: 6 Div and balance of Corps Troops. British Armoured Bde.
South Central Java: Depots and Base Units.
The prospects of 7 Div being able to reach South Sumatra in time seem doubtful even at 
the best estimate. If they are unable to go to Sumatra, it seems probable the whole Corps 
would be located in Central Java. Assuming that the move of the A.I.F. can be completed 
in time, the  defence  of the whole of Java would  then depend  on Aust Corps of  two 
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Dutch divs tied by lack of maintenance services to Batavia and Surabaya respectively.
8. Java is  some  600 miles  long with an average width of about  100 miles. It  is  highly 
developed with internal communications (roads and railways) and possesses few of the 
topographical obstacles encountered in Malaya. Its natural resources are well distributed 
and very favourable to Japanese forces living on the country. With the present command 
of the  sea enjoyed by the Japanese  and the local air superiority they can concentrate, 
landings can be effected in any portion or portions of the island they choose.
9. It is known that Japan has several divisions in reserve in addition to those that could be 
spared from Malaya and the Philippines. Her limitations therefore appear to be shipping, 
her losses of which to date are comparatively small.
The prospects of the successful defence of Java are therefore far from encouraging.
10. Even assuming the successful defence of Java,  this island does not provide us with a 
continental base from which we could build up Allied strength to take the offensive. It 
would be open to continuos attack from the Japanese naval and air forces from near-by 
bases.
Valuable as the holding of Java would impede the Japanese advance southwards, it cannot 
provide  a  strategic  base  upon  which  Allied  strength  can  build  up  owing  to  its 
comparatively  small  size,  the  long sea route from the  U.S.A.  and  the  uncertainty of 
keeping  such a  route  open  for  the enormous  quantity of  shipping  needed to develop 
U.S.A. resources in manpower and ﬁghting equipment.
An equally important factor is  that,  if Timor is lost,  we are unable to ferry ﬁghter and 
medium bomber aircraft by air to Java from their assembly bases in Australia.
11.The most suitable location for such a strategical base is Australia. It has the shortest sea 
route with U.S.A. of any considerable area of continuous land. Its extent is such that it 
cannot be completely overrun by the Japanese if we concentrate our available resources 
for its immediate protection whilst American strength is  arriving. It has an indigenous 
white population which provides considerable ﬁghting forces. It has sufﬁcient industrial 
development to form a good basis for rapid expansion with American aid. Its northern 
shores are sufﬁciently close to Japanese occupied territory to make a good “jumping off” 
area for offensive operations, whilst its southern areas are sufﬁciently far from Japanese 
bases  to  ensure  a  reasonable  degree  of  immunity  from  continuous  sea  and  air 
bombardment bearing in mind the growing strength of U.S.A. Naval and Air forces.
It can therefore be accepted that Australia meets the requirements of a strategic base from 
which to develop our ultimate and decisive offensive.
12. The only other alternatives  seem to be India  and its  neighbour Burma. The  latter is 
already in the frontline, more difﬁcult of access even than Java, and possesses insufﬁcient 
development to be capable of rapid expansion. It is, however, most important to keep the 
Burma Road open to retain China in the war. India is a long sea route from U.S.A. and 
approaches  via the Bay of Bengal will probably be difﬁcult to access. It is a “black” 
country,  and the attitude of its population is  likely to be uncertain if the whole of the 
N.E.I. falls into Japanese hands in addition to Malaya and Singapore.
Therefore, Australia provides the logical answer.
13. Our immediate problem is how  best to assure the security of this country pending the 
arrival of sufﬁcient American forces not only to safeguard this strategic base, but also to 
develop the offensive against Japan.
The A.M.F. is  progressively being built up to some 300,000 but  it  lacks  much of its 
essential ﬁghting equipment and is inadequately trained at present. Having regard to the 
size of the continent, it is inadequate against a maximum scale of attack by Japan. The 
cream of its trained and experienced ofﬁcers have gone abroad with the A.I.F. and large 
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trained, a matter of many months, its numbers are inadequate to defend vital areas within 
the 12,000 miles of coastline.
14. It is therefore very evident that considerable risks are at present being taken with the 
security of this  country,  which appears to be the only practicable base from which the 
offensive can ultimately be launched. The return of the available A.I.F. from abroad, some 
100,000 trained and war experienced troops,  complete with war equipment and trained 
staffs, would in my opinion more than double the present security of this country.
15. To hold Java  (if  this  is  practicable) and  to  lose Australia  would  be little  solace  to 
Australia, the British Empire or the Allied cause.
Alternatively,  if Australia  is  held  and Java  lost  together with over three-ﬁfths  of the 
Australian Corps, the Australian potential for providing its quota of military forces for the 
eventual offensive would be very greatly reduced.
16. In view of the foregoing, I have no alternative but strongly to recommend that the Govt 
give immediate consideration of:–
(a) The diversion to Australia of:–
(i) that portion of the A.I.F. now at Bombay and en route to Java;
(ii) the British Armoured Bde in the same convoy.
(b) The diversion of the remaining two ﬂights to Australia.
(c) Recall of 9 Aust Div and remaining A.I.F. in M.E. at an early date.
17. Since the above was written,  a cable has been received from General Lavarack (copy 
attached) which endorses the basis of the views I have expressed. He refers therein to an 
appreciation by General Wavell. This is not available to me.
!! ! ! ! ! ! (Sgd) V. A. H. Sturdee
!! ! ! ! ! ! Lieutenant-General,
!! ! ! ! ! ! Chief of the General Staff.
15 Feb. 42
Addendum by Chief of the General Staff:
! General Wavell’s appreciation just received, which only conﬁrms the views submitted. 
! (init’d) V.A.H.S. 410
This paper marked a turning point in Sturdee’s approach to strategy in the Pacific War 
and his conduct as CGS. The paper revealed a clear contrast between how Sturdee had 
planned and executed the islands strategy and how he approached the new and 
developing situation regarding the imminent fall of Singapore and the further advance 
of the Japanese. The seriousness of the Singapore situation, and thus the direct threat of 
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Appendix 5.Japan to Australia’s defence, seems to have motivated Sturdee to adjust his strategic 
thinking. 
From the beginning Sturdee was adamant that the island strategy be adhered to up-to the 
point that he ignored Lind, threatened Tanner and removed Roach from command. In 
his above paper Sturdee acknowledged that he had violated the principle of 
concentration by sending inadequate forces to hold numerous isolated islands to be 
progressively overtaken by vastly superior numbers. He revealed that Gull, Sparrow and 
Lark forces had had little prospect of holding out against even a moderate attack 
without adequate reinforcement or support and that his policy now required review. 
Sturdee had now come to the conclusion that a defensive attitude to the war was the 
better strategy.  He recommended that a new approach to the situation demanded the 
consideration of mainland Australia as a defensive base from which to prepare for later 
offensive action against the Japanese forces. He condemned the piecemeal sacrifice of 
small garrisons in the islands where there was no gain in delaying the enemy without a 
coordinated plan to exploit those delays. The consequence of such action, he noted, was 
that those fighting units would be lost for the duration of the war. The best strategy then 
was to keep the sea lanes and air routes from the USA to Australia open, to concentrate 
Australia’s 2nd AIF and AMF forces on the mainland and to use Australia’s vast areas 
for manoeuvring troops to prevent them from becoming pinned down should the 
Japanese launch an attack on Australia. Under this arrangement Sturdee recommended 
the abandonment of dispersing the returning elements of I Australian Corps to Burma, 
Sumatra and Java and insisted that they should be returned to Australia.
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Japanese overrunning Singapore. He cabled Churchill on 15 February to explain the 
effect that the loss of Singapore would have on Australia’s strategic plans and on the 
recall of I Australian Corps to Australia. Curtin’s summary contained echoes of 
Clausewitz’s lessons on defence being stronger than offence, as was explained at the 
beginning of Chapter Two. Curtin summed it up in this way:
12. It can be argued that it is good defensive-offensive tactics to meet the enemy as far afield 
as possible and withdraw whilst inflicting losses on him, though suffering losses oneself. 
The enemy is ultimately driven back by a counter-offensive from a suitable base by 
forces drawn from the main reservoirs  of strength or,  if the  enemy is  dependent on 
remote sources of reinforcement and supply, his lines of communication may be cut.
13. It is however risky to hazard  one’s  main base and largest reservoir in the theatre of 
operations by stringing out the resources of this reservoir along the line of the enemy’s 
advance where, owing to superior sea power, air power and greater military strength, he 
can bring stronger forces to bear. This strategy invites progressive defeat along the line 
and ultimately imperils the capacity to defend the main base through the dispersion of 
forces.
(ix)The conclusions expressed above are fully co-operative. Their purpose is to ensure as far 
as  possible the  certainty of  ultimate  victory by  defending  Australia  as  a  base, even 
though ground may be given to the enemy. We avoid a “penny packet” distribution of 
our limited forces and their defeat in detail. When we are ready for a counter-offensive, 
superior sea power and the accumulation of American Forces in this country will enable 
the A.I.F. again to join in clearing the enemy from adjacent territories he has occupied.411
This disclosure to Churchill was in effect a repudiation of Sturdee’s Forward 
Observation Line campaign strategy. There is little doubt that Sturdee was advising 
Curtin on the new approach to Australia’s defence and it demonstrates that Sturdee fully 
understood the principles as explained in Curtin’s cable, principles that were not applied 
to the earlier Islands campaign.
Demonstrably, Sturdee’s knowledge of strategy is confirmed here and underlines the 
question of why he allowed the Malay Barrier Strategy, under his personal command, to 
continue to the point that Australia’s last remaining brigade of the 2nd AIF was thrown 
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Employment of the AIF, A2671, 106/1942, Appendix A.away piecemeal at places like Rabaul, Timor and Ambon when Japanese raids 
threatened Australia. He had had the grace of time to consider his plans for almost ten 
months before the opening of the Pacific War, yet he allowed the Malay Barrier Strategy 
to stagnate until he abandoned the 23rd Brigade to its fate during the months of 
December 1941 to February 1942. Sturdee’s actions cannot be explained away by the 
argument that the islands fell owing to unforeseen circumstances according to the laws 
of probability in war as explained by Clausewitz.
Clausewitz stated that, ‘from the enemy’s character, from his institutions, the state of his 
affairs and his general situation, each side, using the laws of probability, forms an 
estimate of its opponents likely course and acts accordingly’. This is what Sturdee failed 
to do in embarking Australian troops to Ambon and Timor and in abandoning Lark 
Force at Rabaul as war broke out with Japan. Sturdee was aware of the Japanese 
character, their institutions, their state of affairs and their general situation toward the 
Southwest Pacific. He was aware of the laws of probability and the likely outcome of a 
Japanese thrust towards the NEI and possibly Australia, yet he chose to ignore the likely 
outcome by dissipating soldiers to isolated outposts in the face of overwhelming 
Japanese forces. 
Notwithstanding the above, it seems Sturdee had inextricably bound himself to the 
Malay Barrier Strategy despite a probable outcome that the islands would inevitably fall 
to the Japanese under such conditions. The planning, logistics and follow-through of the 
Malay Barrier strategy in the islands lay with Sturdee and clearly he had expected the 
islands to fall. He had held executive control over the island strategy and the battalions 
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throughout the islands. He had never threatened to resign over his failures at Rabaul, 
Ambon or Timor, as he apparently had when requesting the recall of the 2nd AIF, nor did 
he seek to or was asked to explain his role in planning the disasters post-bellum (he 
destroyed his personal papers in 1951 commenting ‘I have done my job. It is over’). He 
embarked Gull Force to Ambon without instructions and it was not until two weeks 
before the Japanese attacked that Gull Force supposedly received AHQ Operation 
Instruction No. 15 regarding the defence of Ambon. 
These were the well thought-out actions of a clear minded general who had expected the 
islands to fall to the Japanese, so much so that he did not even bother to send operating 
instructions until the last minute. It seems possible that in exchange for his 
commitments to the Dutch, the Singapore Strategy and the Malay Barrier Strategy, 
Sturdee had sacrificed military prudence and duty of care for Australian troops to his 
self-determined commitment to expediency. After all, this justification of the sacrifice of 
Ambon and Timor contributed little to Australia’s defence apart from putting on a show 
of resistance to the Japanese advance. However, this does not fully explain his actions.
A possible explanation of why an otherwise competent, intelligent well-educated 
general such as Sturdee continued with a questionable military strategy, which he must 
have known was bound to fail, seems to derive from his lack of competency in 
commanding operations in war. Currently, the question of whether Sturdee was 
incompetent in managing the Island strategy can now be evaluated by applying Norman 
Dixon’s thesis On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. Dixon served in the Royal 
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psychology. He received his Doctorate in Philosophy in 1956, a Doctorate of Science in 
1972 and is a 1974 recipient of the University of London Carpenter Medal for his work 
in experimental psychology. Nixon’s book On the Psychology of Military Incompetence 
is currently considered a seminal study on military incompetence.
According to Dixon’s theories, an explanation of Sturdee’s failure as commander of the 
Islands strategy can be derived from his personality, the military culture in which he 
was imbued and his actions as commander of the island forces at Ambon, Timor and 
Rabaul. Dixon’s thesis argues that military incompetence can be directly linked to 
systemic authoritarian culture combined with commanders possessing complementary 
personality traits, where that combination adversely influences otherwise seemingly 
competent generals to implement and carry through incompetent actions.412
He proposes that the traits of authoritarianism, dogmatism, rigidity and anal-obsession 
lies at the core of military organisation, which in turn predisposes officers who have 
acquired such personality traits in life towards military incompetence once they achieve 
high levels of command. Military organisations, according to Dixon, are ‘inflexible 
machines’ instilled with the processes ‘of “bull”, authoritarianism, codes of honour, 
anti-intellectualism, anti-effeminacy, sensitivity to criticism and fear of failure’ which 
contribute to ‘incompetence, both directly and indirectly … because, since their primary 
object is control and constraint, they themselves tend to become inflexible and 
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412 Dixon, N., On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (Sydney: Pimlico, 1994), pp. 19-20.unmodifiable’.413 This suggests that placing an authoritarian, inflexible and 
unmodifiable personality type at the top of an inflexible authoritarian military hierarchy 
provides ripe conditions for incompetence. 
Dixon therefore proposes that a strong correlation exists between the personalities of 
military commanders and military incompetence, where a contradistinction lies between 
autocratic behaviour, which allows the military to function in an orderly manner, and 
irrational authoritarianism, which can be linked to the personality traits of certain 
commanders where those traits lead towards incompetence (the first being functional 
the second psychopathological notwithstanding intellectual considerations). The 
distinction is that, ‘the autocrat exercises tight control when the situation demands it, 
the authoritarian is himself tightly controlled [internally], no matter what the external 
situation’.414 
Dixon proposes that:
Because organisations which are invested  with the  task of managing  a nation’s  violence 
develop devices for controlling aggression, they will tend to attract into their ranks people 
with  similar  personal  problems  of  control.  Such  people  will  tend  to  be  conformists, 
conventional and over-controlled. They will also tend to seek approval, enjoy occupying a 
position in a dominance-submission hierarchy, and derive satisfaction from the provision of 
legitimate outlets for their normally repressed aggression. They are in short, authoritarian. 
But because the roots of authoritarianism lie far back in childhood such people also tend to 
manifest those other residues of early socialisation: orderliness, parsimony and  obstinacy–
the so called anal-obsessive triad. Finally, because such people are threatened by the possible 
breakthrough of instinctual impulses they tend to be over-controlled, rigid and possessed of 
‘closed’ as opposed to ‘open’ minds. They like to be governed by rules and abhor what is 
spontaneous, flexible or unusual. 
Clearly there  is  much in military organisations  which might be expected  to attract such 
people, and clearly their personality-traits will, because highly consistent with the needs and 
demands of the group, facilitate their promotion.415
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415 Ibid., pp. 285-86.Accordingly, he found four extant characteristics in commanders that he believes 
directly contribute towards military incompetence. First, they will support, reinforce 
and preserve a restrictive approach towards militarism. Second, they lack empathy 
towards others, lack social leadership abilities and are prone to wasting human life. 
Third, they are antagonistic towards accepting unexpected or new information and hold 
fast to their previously held convictions. Finally, they become anxious on reaching a 
level of command to which they are unaccustomed and overcompensate by tightening 
control over their aggressive tendencies.416 
Adding to above traits, Dixon listed fifteen other enduring characteristics that indicate 
incompetency as expressed by authoritarian military leaders:
1. A serious wastage of human resources and failure to observe one of the first principles of 
war – economy of force. This failure derives in part from an inability to make war swiftly. 
It also derives from certain attitudes of mind which we shall consider presently.
2. A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition, an inability to learn from 
past experience (owing in part to a refusal to admit past mistakes). It also involves a 
failure to use or tendency to misuse available technology.
3. A tendency to reject or ignore information which is unpalatable or which conflicts with 
preconceptions.
4. A tendency to underestimate the enemy and over estimate the capabilities of one’s own 
side.
5. Indecisiveness and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision-maker.
6. An obstinate persistence in a given task despite strong contrary evidence.
7. A failure to exploit a situation gained and a tendency to ‘pull punches’ rather than push 
home an attack.
8. A failure to make adequate reconnaissance.
9. A predilection for frontal assaults, often against an enemy’s strongest points.
10. A belief in brute force rather than clear ruse.
11. A failure to make use of surprise or deception.
12. An undue readiness to find scapegoats for military set-backs.
13. A suppression or distortion of news from the front, usually rationalized as necessary for 
morale or security.
14. A belief in mystical forces – fate, bad luck, etc.417
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417 Ibid., pp. 152-3.Evidently, as the above narrative of events has shown, Sturdee’s management of the 
Island campaign during the period between formulating Operation Instruction No. 15 in 
March 1941, implementing the plan in December 1941 and following it through into 
February 1942 he, at least at some level, expressed many of these characteristics. 
Dixon’s criteria will now be examined as they apply to Sturdee’s actions in 
commanding the Forward Line Observation strategy, not to determine whether he was 
an authoritarian anal obsessive per se, but to judge the competence of his actions as they 
apply to Dixon’s criteria of incompetence. According to Dixon’s standards Sturdee 
qualifies as an incompetent commander on several accounts. 
Previous discussion has shown where Sturdee failed to adhere to the principle of 
economy of force. The principle of economy of force, according to the American 
Army’s Field Manual 3-0 is:
the  reciprocal  of  mass.  It  requires  accepting  prudent  risk  in selected  areas  to  achieve 
superiority—overwhelming effects—in the decisive operation. Economy of force involves 
the discriminating  employment and  distribution of forces.  Commanders never leave any 
element with-out a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks 
to perform.418
This maxim applies to what Clausewitz meant by ‘The aim will then be to take in the 
greatest possible strength, either in order to get the upper hand, or at least in order to 
make sure that the enemy does not’, where this relates to the full employment of the 
military services in fighting the war and to the superiority of that force at a decisive 
point.419 This of course depends on having available forces for opposing an enemy. In 
Sturdee’s case, he had only the 23rd Brigade with which he could oppose the Japanese as 
they attacked across the Southwest Pacific theatre towards Australia. Nevertheless, the 
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area of operations then under Australian control.
For example, while taking into account that he did not employ the superiority of force 
principle, Sturdee could have made use of available Australian forces to mass his troops 
and obtain relative superiority of force at an otherwise more decisive point. In other 
words, had he withheld the remnants of the 23rd Brigade from Ambon and Timor he 
may have been able to make better use of them elsewhere, such as Rabaul or Port 
Moresby in New Guinea, where he had already recognized the need of reinforcements. 
At these places Sturdee could have also employed the Australia militia for reinforcing 
both Rabaul and Port Moresby, which happened in the latter case, as these areas were 
considered Australian mandated territory to which those forces could be sent. In doing 
this, rather than leaving militia troops idle on mainland Australia, Sturdee could have 
employed the principle of economy of force by using all available forces in opposing 
the Japanese at a more decisive location rather than leaving them idle in Australia, but 
he chose not to follow that path.
Nevertheless, Dixon was more focussed on the wastage of human life which resulted 
from not observing what he called the first principle of war, economy of force, rather 
than on how to apply it. He rated the ‘second class’ of human resources wastage as 
those actions ‘involving casualties from enemy action as a result of the incompetent 
planning of senior military commanders’.420 He argued that authoritarian personalities 
with anal obsessive traits, to varying degrees, lack the capacity to empathize with other 
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resources. 
Importantly, Dixon made a distinction between wasting human resources and the use of 
sacrificing troops to the greater good. He explained:
On the one hand it could be argued that senior commanders should ‘hate’ the enemy and not 
be  squeamish  about sacrificing  the  lives  of their  men  for the  sake  of  a  greater good. 
Conversely it could be maintained that it is not hatred so much as understanding the enemy, 
and not a conscienceless squandering but a humane conserving of his own forces, which are 
the hallmarks of an efficient commander.
Perhaps, as with other aspects of authoritarianism, it is just a matter of degree. Certainly such 
great leaders as Wolfe, Wellington, Shaka, Lawrence, Monash, and  Montgomery not only 
displayed a general absence of authoritarian traits but also showed a lively regard  for the 
prime  responsibility of  a  commander:  conservation of  his  force  and  a  concern for  the 
psychological and physical welfare of his troops. …  in contrast to these highly competent 
commanders, many less talented military leaders have, along with other authoritarian traits, 
betrayed a singular disregard for the welfare of their troops and unnerving capacity to remain 
apparently unmoved by losses.421
According to this criterion, Sturdee resembles a commander who demonstrated a lack of 
empathy for the welfare for his troops by ignoring the principle of economy of force to 
Australia’s north as he wasted his troops on isolated island outposts during 1941-1942.
In wasting his human resources, Sturdee dispatched Gull and Sparrow Forces to Ambon 
and Timor respectively to face a Japanese division at a time when those forces could 
have been withheld, because he knew they were undersized, had no lines of support, no 
naval protection, insufficient artillery and no chance of being withdrawn. This inaction 
rested in opposition to the role of a responsible commander under Dixon’s criteria, 
where Sturdee acted contrary to the principle of conservation of his forces and where he 
demonstrated little concern for the psychological and physical welfare of his troops. He 
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sending troops to Ambon and Timor could serve no good purpose. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the Dutch in NEI had already demonstrated their will to fight by 
announcing publicly in May 1941 that they would support the British at Singapore, a 
statement that effectively made the Ambon strategy redundant. The dissipation of forces 
and sending of troops to Ambon without a strategic purpose constituted a wastage of 
men and material in contravention of good military strategy and tactics.
Sturdee’s lack of concern for his troops was compounded by his failure to ensure Gull 
and Sparrow forces were provided with AHQ Operations Instruction No. 15. These 
battalions were sent to their destinations with no information or orders with which to 
carry out their roles in the Islands. This failure to inform Gull Force alone on its role 
undermined the morale of Roach to the point where he was sacked for persistently 
asking AHQ for orders or at least an explanation of Gull Force’s role at Ambon. The 
lack of orders for Gull Force also had the effect of undermining the working 
relationship between Roach and Kapitz to the point that the principle of unity of 
command broke down and Allied unit cooperation at Ambon faltered. In failing to 
provide orders and information for the role of Gull Force, in sacking Roach and in 
affecting the relationship between the Australian and Dutch commanders, Sturdee 
effectively demonstrated a complete disregard for the welfare of his forces. 
When the Gull, Sparrow and Lark Forces were taken by the Japanese, Sturdee remained 
apparently unmoved by his losses. Rowell went some way to confirming AHQ’s attitude 
in wasting human resources when he reportedly commented ‘it's not the first time a few 
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confirms that Gull, Sparrow and Lark forces were wasted and infers that it was of no 
great consequence because thousands of men had been squandered by generals in the 
past. This uncaring approach expressed by AHQ to the wastage of what amounted to a 
brigade indicates both administrative and planning incompetence, where the effect of 
dissipating forces to the islands paid no account to the principle of concentration of 
force, the conservation of forces, the economy of force or the psychological and 
physical welfare of the troops. 
Sturdee had also demonstrated his fundamental conservatism by clinging to outworn 
World War I traditions of line holding strategy and not learning from the past mistakes 
of that war. This type of fundamental conservatism applies to the old military history 
aphorism that generals always fight the last war. For example, Sturdee’s 1933 exercise 
on the concentration of force in NSW demonstrated his tendency for planning outdated 
rigidly based linear and position holding type warfare that he had gained from his World 
War I experience. This point was demonstrated by the accepted Australian policy of the 
time, which stated that in the case of Rabaul, ‘we [the government and the Chiefs of 
Staff] consider it essential to maintain a forward air observation line as long as possible 
and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than abandon it at first threat’.423 It was 
not until later that Sturdee was forced to follow the lead of Lavarack and Wavell during 
February 1942, where they had outlined a plan for the returning 2nd AIF Divisions to 
bypass Sumatra and Java and go back to Australia, that he adopted a more vigorous 
approach to strategy.  
227
422 Horner, Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943, p. 36.
423 National Archives of Australia, [1941 File - Yellow Tab] New Caledonia (&other Pacific Islands): 
Defence of, A3300, 218A, p. 202.He also demonstrated his tendency to reject or ignore unpalatable information which 
conflicted with his perceptions when despatching Gull Force to Ambon, where he 
ignored Lind’s requests for an interview regarding concerns about the efficacy of 
sending Gull Force to Ambon without the required support and materials. It seems 
Sturdee was insecure about the fact that there were questions being raised about his 
plans. After Sturdee received cables from Lind and Roach pointing out the inadequacies 
in men, artillery, Bren carriers, stores, naval support, the inability to hold out for more 
than three days on the isolated outpost when there were no orders outlining the role of 
Gull Force and questioning whether he was there to hold the island or not (together with 
the request from Tanner to withdraw the task force), he reacted negatively by rejecting 
both Lind’s and Roach’s advice and ignoring the actual situation.
Dixon’s explanation of why such conflicting tendencies may lead a subject into 
rejecting or ignoring any new or unpalatable information is that:
One  particularly hazardous  aspect of  the  relationship  between information and  decision 
processes concerns  the revising of decisions. It seems that having gradually (and perhaps 
painfully) accumulated information in support of a decision people become progressively 
more loath to accept contrary evidence. As Edwards and  his colleagues have shown, the 
greater the impact of the new information the more strenuously will it   be resisted. There  are 
several reasons for this dangerous conservatism. 'New' information has, by definition, high 
informational  content,  and  therefore  firstly  it will  require  greater  processing  capacity, 
secondly it threatens  a  return to an earlier  state  of gnawing  uncertainty,  and  thirdly it 
confronts  the  decision-maker  with the  nasty thought that he  may have  been wrong.  No 
wonder he tends to turn a blind eye!424
Perhaps Sturdee was too stressed to handle difficult situations and became unwilling to 
review his work on Operation Instruction No. 15, because it required assessing new 
information and adjusting his plans; he felt threatened by his subordinates’ questions 
about his plans; and, he chose to remain obstinate in proving his subordinates wrong.  
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expressed by Sturdee when he sought to ignore the litany of questions being raised by 
both Lind and Roach about the efficacy of the Ambon operations. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that Lind’s and Roach’s questioning of the plan had affected Sturdee’s 
confidence to the point where he became indecisive about how to deal with the above 
issues as evidenced by his writing but not sending his letters.
In these letters Sturdee prevaricated about enlisting the militia artillery’s 18 pounders 
and sending them to Ambon when he knew time went against such a plan. He admitted 
to Forde that Ambon required artillery but failed to act decisively in arranging to send it 
to the island. He prevaricated about sending Veale to assess both the military and morale 
situation at Ambon, but failed to follow through with the plan to carry out the required 
reconnaissance. Much like the proverbial phrase ‘killing the messenger’, his answer to 
addressing these concerns was to sack Roach and turn a blind eye to questions he had 
raised. The point is not that Sturdee was unaware of the situation at Ambon, but that he 
failed to act on Lind’s and Roach’s concerns responsibly. By not sending the letters, 
Sturdee demonstrated his indecisiveness and abdicated his responsibilities to Lind, 
Roach and the Army by not addressing the real situation being revealed to him. 
Sturdee also demonstrated an obstinate persistence by holding to the Forward Line 
Observation strategy despite strong contrary evidence suggesting it was bound to fail. 
According to Dixon, this kind of dogmatic behaviour suggests incompetence where:
This distinction between an inherently efficient mechanism distorted by 'noise' and third-rate 
mechanism which is doing its best is also implied by contemporary studies of the military 
mind. Similar adjectives tend to recur in every case - 'over-controlled, aloof, rigid,' 'orderly, 
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occur in statements about personality, not intellect, about psychopathology, not cognitive 
disability. As  one  review  of this  work has  said:  'These  "anal" characteristics  …  would 
suggest restricted and rigid childhood training, a child who was expected to be seen and not 
heard, to conform without rebellion, to fit into the schedule prescribed by authority without 
question or wonder, in short the same sort of childhood  training  that has been found for 
authoritarian and dogmatic personalities.'425
Sturdee was obstinate and over-controlling where he expected Roach to conform to his 
rigid plans in spite of the situation at Ambon and to carry out his orders without 
question. Sturdee’s frugal approach had left Ambon, Timor and Rabaul without the 
artillery, support, men and materials required to make the plan workable and he was 
rank conscious where he saw Roach as a rebellious insubordinate who had to be 
removed from Ambon.
Another of Sturdee’s traits was to ignore reconnaissance, which according to Dixon is 
‘the first duty of a commander’.426 Sturdee’s ‘aversion to reconnaissance, however, 
coupled with a dislike of intelligence (in both senses of the word)’427 was demonstrated 
by his lack of it when formulating the Forward Observation Line strategy. He had never 
personally visited the Islands and had ignored the intelligence provided to him by Veale, 
Lind and Roach stating the Islands were undefendable with the means provided to them. 
Realistically, if Sturdee, acting as commander-in-chief of the Malay Barrier theatre of 
operations, was serious about defending the Islands to delay the enemy for any 
substantial time, he perhaps could have visited the Islands to assess the situation for 
himself and planned accordingly. If the expectation was that the Islands would be 
overrun, any reconnaissance was unnecessary because the battalions were already 
marked for defeat. Either way, it was unprofessional to throw away a brigade for a little 
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427 Ibid., p. 67.time gained in delaying the Japanese forces when Australia was struggling to conserve 
its military personnel and materials for later engagements. As it turned out Sturdee’s 
fallback position was that he could blame others for any military setback resulting from 
the loss of the Islands.
When Sturdee’s military plans failed he used Air Chief Marshal Burnett and Roach as 
scapegoats for his military setbacks at Ambon. Sturdee wrote to Long on 8 February 
1955 regarding the Forward Observation Line strategy claiming:
With regard to what you call the Chiefs of Staffs Forward Observation Line, you will  realise 
that it was  most important that we should  have the  earliest warning  of the  approach of 
Japanese Forces, and for this purpose air forces had  to be established in the islands as far 
North as possible. However the Chief of the Air Staff declined to establish air forces there 
unless there were army garrisons to protect their air fields. With great  reluctance I agreed  to 
send a battalion group to each of Rabaul, Timor and Ambon (the last two could  only be 
despatch- after the outbreak of war with Japan) This decision was made fairly early in 1941. 
I realised at the time that these forces would be would be swallowed up if the Japs made a 
determined attack in force, but these garrison were the smallest self-contained units then in 
existence …
I think that you  have let Roach off lightly, he was a squealer from the moment he got to 
Darwin and I was concerned with his effect on the fighting moral of his battalion. 
From the time that he arrived at Ambon he never let up.
His final message was demanding that ships be sent to Ambon to take the force out, that was 
before the Japs  arrived. Not only did  he sent [sic] to me but he repeated it to Wavell at 
ABDACOM HQ (a channel he was not authorized to use) indicating to me that he had lost 
his punch. As it turned out I should have left him there to go in the bag and saved a man like 
Scott for further useful service.
Anyway I do not press for the case against Roach to be painted any blacker. I might say I did 
not receive any similar squeals from Timor or Rabaul.428
Arguably, in this letter to Long, Sturdee expresses Dixon’s criteria that incompetents 
have ‘an undue readiness to find scapegoats for military setbacks’ and act-out in 
blaming others for their own setbacks.
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3/384, pp. 5-6.For example, in 1955 Sturdee suggested that, although he had been reluctant at the time, 
he was acting under pressure to accommodate Burnett’s plan to send the garrisons to 
Ambon, Timor and Rabaul to protect the airfields. Burnett had conceived of this plan 
when meeting the Dutch Chiefs of Staffs on 21 February 1941 at Batavia and ratified it 
four days later at the Singapore Conference. After the delegates at Singapore accepted 
the proposal Burnett insisted that the army provide security forces for his airfields 
otherwise he was not prepared to further ratify the previously agreed to arrangements. 
Notwithstanding Burnett’s insistence, Sturdee had the authority to reject the scheme if 
he felt it was not in the Army’s interests or if it was strategically unsustainable and he 
had had ten months to reconsider that commitment before the war broke-out. The point 
is, Burnett suggested the Army should supply troops to provide security for his airfields 
in the Islands but Sturdee had the independent authority to accept or reject the plan and 
as CGS the final decision was his alone to make.
Misdirecting the blame for the Ambon disaster onto Roach was another example of 
Sturdee’s reluctance to take responsibility for his own military setbacks. Roach was 
acting responsibly at the time in requesting information from AHQ for the role of Gull 
Force after Sturdee abnegated his responsibilities as nominal Commander-in-Chief of 
the island forces by failing to provide Operation Instruction No. 15 to his task forces. 
Sturdee’s rejection of reports from Roach that the Island could not be held longer than a 
few days stemmed from his conservative tendency to ignore unpalatable information 
which conflicted with his own perceptions. Sturdee’s answers to the problem were to 
ignore intelligence that conflicted with his plans, or threatened his authority, and to 
attack Roach rather than reassess the plan. Notwithstanding Roach’s and Lind’s 
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committed to the Forward Observation Line strategy despite the warnings of his 
subordinates. After the war Sturdee had found a convenient scapegoat in Roach, despite 
his recall from Ambon before it was lost to Ito’s forces.
Sturdee’s sending of troops to Ambon was incompetent where he sacrificed Australian 
troops ostensibly to obtain a few days of forward observation. This claim is upheld by 
Australian policy of the time which stated that, in the case of Rabaul, ‘we [the 
government] consider it essential to maintain a forward air observation line as long as 
possible and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than abandon it at first 
threat’.429 This policy was repeated by Rowel when he wrote to Roach that, ‘your 
staunch defence [of Ambon] will have important effect especially in regard to future 
Australia Dutch cooperation’. Wavell also endorsed this policy when he wrote to 
Sturdee concerning Roach’s imminent dismissal stating that, ‘I am opposed to handing 
out important objectives [like Ambon] to enemy without making them fight for it’. 
Even Scott believed that he was fighting at Ambon for the above reasons. He wrote that:
Gull is the first objective chosen by the enemy & where A.I.F. troops are assisting the Dutch! 
The repercussions likely to follow either a good or a bad show by Australia are going to be 
considerable  &  far  reaching.  A  stubborn  resistance  and  a  good  fight  even  against 
overwhelming odds now, must stiffen resistance everywhere and clinch our association with 
the N.E.I. not to mention the effect on the U.S.A. Withdrawal or a weak resistance will set 
the pace for future threats or worse, in the near Pacific Ocean  area & Australia itself.430
And following the Ambon battle he expressed his opinion that:
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430 Ibid.I desire to place on record my unalterable conviction that the task allotted to “Gull Force” 
which was  a  simple one, viz; “You  will  assist the  Dutch Forces to defend  the Island  of 
Ambon with the object of delaying  for as  long  as possible the southward  advance of the 
enemy with the available troops and equipment under your command”, was entirely justified. 
“Gull  Force”  did  in fact hold  up a complete  Japanese  Division  with  its  transports  and 
adequate Naval and Air support for at least two weeks and inflicted heavy loss upon the 
enemy.431
Contrary to Scott’s claims, however, the putting up of resistance against overwhelming 
forces made little difference to the war effort and failed to delay the Japanese for more 
than a week or two as they advanced on schedule to take Ambon and eventually Java. 
As it transpired, the Japanese had originally planned to take Ambon before 6 February 
to maintain their schedule for taking the larger prize of Java. The latest time Ambon 
needed to be taken before delaying the planned invasion of Java was 16 February. Ito’s 
regiment invaded Ambon within the allotted schedule on 31 January and had completed 
his objectives by 3 February; arguably there was no delay to the Japanese advance as 
claimed by Scott.432 As for Scott’s further claim that the Ambon battle had ‘inflicted 
heavy loss upon the enemy’, it seems little consolation when compared with the larger 
picture where the overall Malay Barrier area of operations had cost Australia an entire 
brigade for no appreciable gains.
The suppression and distortion of news from the front rationalised as necessary for 
morale and or security also came under Sturdee’s control after the Australian public 
learned something of the loss of Rabaul, Ambon and eventually Dutch Timor. It was at 
this time that Sturdee and the Curtin Government faced a problem in controlling 
political fallout regarding the loss of the three battalions in the Islands. During this 
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Mar. 1942, p. 12.period the government needed to conceal its military failures regarding the Malay 
Barrier. The first indication that the government was manipulating the press on this 
issue came on 28 January 1942 following a Sydney Sun newspaper article headline 
claiming the ‘R.A.A.F. shocks Japs: Militia Holds Out in Rabaul; New Air Blows 
Likely’. The article ended with the statement claiming ‘military experts believe that 
Rabaul garrison should be able to hold out until sufficient aid arrives, and thus prevent 
the Japanese from establishing an important base on New Britain’.433
The military expert in this instance must have been Sturdee, or someone approved by 
him, otherwise the story could not have been published owing to government imposed 
wartime censorship. From a position of hindsight, this was obviously propaganda put 
about by Sturdee to mitigate the loss of Rabaul, an island campaign that came directly 
under his command. The article was misleading because both the Government and 
Sturdee knew there would be no aid directed towards the garrison at Rabaul. The 
Government and Sturdee had misled the press where they were aware that there was no 
aid for Lark Force because there were no militia holding out at Rabaul.
The day after the article was published Sir Archdale Parkhill434 wrote to Frank Forde, 
the Minister for the Army, raising concerns about his son, Lieutenant Bruce Parkhill, 
who was serving at Rabaul. He also raised several issues about the Sydney Sun story. 
Parkhill complained that when he asked the editor of the newspaper where he had 
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from the Department of Information. Under further pressure from Parkhill, however, the 
editor confessed that AHQ had supplied the story. Accordingly, Parkhill complained to 
Forde that AHQ should refrain from publishing such stories as it had had an upsetting 
effect on the relatives of the soldiers involved, especially when there seemed to be no 
basis of truth in the article.435
If the Sydney Sun article was propaganda aimed at mollifying the Australian people it 
had the opposite effect. On 6 February, Forde wrote to Curtin explaining that he had 
received repeated requests for information from ‘parents, brothers and wives’, as well as 
from the public in general, about the troops at Rabaul and whether anything was being 
organised to relieve them. Forde informed Curtin that close relatives were becoming 
‘bitter and hostile’ owing to the lack of information being distributed, especially where 
they harboured the perception that although the government had said something could 
be done to relieve Rabaul this was not happening.436
Reacting to the growing concerns of the public Forde wrote to Curtin that if the public 
became aware of how the matter of Rabaul was ‘being handled’ it would be a great 
shock to them. As it stood the government was not prepared to or could not do anything 
about relieving Rabaul under the prevailing circumstances. Forde feared the relatives of 
the men at Rabaul would make their concerns public and he warned Curtin that the War 
Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff must be asked to gather information about the situation 
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extract of a letter addressed to his attention from Rabaul, by way of Maurice Blackburn, 
condemning the state of the military dispositions at Rabaul before it was attacked. 
Interestingly, the letter described similar concerns to those Roach had expressed for the 
defence of Ambon garrison and that Leggatt had held for the defence of Dutch Timor.438 
The anonymous writer of the letter described the military position at Rabaul as hopeless 
where there was a lack of adequate artillery, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns (there were 
two; one with a cracked breach block) and mortars, sickness was taking its toll on the 
troops and reinforcements were needed to bolster the garrison where it needed to cover 
over 65 kilometres of coastline. This letter served to undermine Sturdee’s claim to Long 
in 1955 that there were no ‘squealers’ at Rabaul or Timor.439 Nevertheless, the letter 
finished with the opinion that three battalions could barely hold the island if they did 
not obtain adequate field artillery and antiaircraft guns.440 
On 3 February, RW Robson, the managing director of Pacific Publications had obtained 
information about the battle for Rabaul from people who had managed to escape to New 
Guinea. He mailed Forde a summary of the events and suggested to the minister that he 
should inform the Australian public of the whole truth behind the disaster. Forde’s 
response was to assure Robson that, pending national security issues, he would provide 
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extent of what happened at Rabaul from the public because of the potential political 
ramifications.
On 11 February, the Advisory War Council met again with the Chiefs of Staff to discuss 
the question of relief for the Rabaul garrison, or as far as possible, to make an official 
statement for the benefit of mollifying the relatives of those abandoned at Rabaul. 
Nothing recorded in the minutes suggests that any discussion took place on the subject 
of the relief of Rabaul. The Advisory War Council simply recommended that no public 
statement should be made on the basis that any information revealed to the Japanese 
could alter the dispositions of Japanese troops required to hold Rabaul.442 
Following the above Advisory War Council meeting Percy Spender, member of the 
opposition United Australia Party and member of the Advisory War Council, wrote to 
Curtin regarding the decision of making no public statement about Rabaul. Oddly, 
Spender seemed to have misapprehended the Curtin/Sturdee policy of abandoning 
Rabaul to the Japanese when he was at the meeting. He wrote:
I thought much of this over-night together with the position of the A.I.F. at Ambon. There is 
no doubt whatever that there is a rising  restlessness amongst the people whose sons and 
relatives are in those places and it is certain that the Government will, at some stage, have to 
satisfy the public that all means were taken to render succour to them … with respect to the 
Australian Military Forces at Rabaul, there has been no news as to their fate since the time 
the Japanese entered Rabaul harbour. The views of the Chiefs   of Staff  is  that no assistance 
can be sent to them as we have not the facilities available … are we in danger ourselves of 
following with our limited resources the policy which you yourself described, in respect to 
other matters, as penny packet policy? We have but limited resources of our own, but I am 
sure that the Australian people will, at some   stage,  demand  to  know  in  what  way  we 
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seems to me, when our minds should be crystallised upon it.443
Spender’s prediction here would prove partially correct, as over the following two 
weeks pressure grew on the Government, and consequently Sturdee, to reveal to the 
public something of what they knew about the men and women abandoned at Rabaul. 
Spender’s concerns that the Australian Government would be required to justify the way 
it had discharged its duty to the men and women in the islands, however, did not happen 
and remained hidden behind secrecy regulations and media suppression for decades to 
come. Patsy Adam-Smith highlighted this point when she wrote: 
Not until forty-seven years later was the official report on this matter released, and then it 
was scarcely mentioned in the news; some of the media believed it was too ‘sensational’ (not 
in the sense of disbelieving the facts but of ‘titillating the senses of those no better than the 
perpetrators  themselves’). Others  believed that, as  it happened  almost fifty years ago, we 
should not “open up old wounds’. Those victims still living, say, “Whose wounds?”444
Because of government secrecy and the media’s suppression of the ‘sensational’ truth 
behind the Rabaul debacle, it not only helped to prevent the ‘titillation’ of the 
‘perpetrators’ but also protected the reputations of those responsible for sending the 
troops to the islands from the beginning.
The conclusions drawn from the official inquiry into the Japanese landings at Rabaul, 
Timor and Ambon were a detailed look at what happened in the islands, not why the 
troops were sent there or whether it was a sensible grand strategy or military 
deployment. Sturdee escaped the scrutiny of the enquiry and any negative assessment of 
his management of the Islands strategy, as the inquiry never questioned his failed 
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effects of Japanese internment on Australian prisoners of war from the islands had 
become known, Sturdee’s role in the islands debacle remained unapproachable.
This lack of accountability in Sturdee’s case seems strange considering the ruthless way 
in which the military usually weeded out its weary or incompetent officers. As 
demonstrated in Chapter One, Lind sacked Youl because he felt he was not up to the 
standard of a lieutenant colonel commanding a battalion. Sturdee sacked Roach for his 
apparent undermining the morale of the Ambon garrison. After the fall of Singapore on 
15 February 1942, Sturdee instigated an inquiry against Bennett ostensibly because he 
had escaped to Australia and abandoned his troops. There seemed to be a double 
standard being applied to Sturdee after he had abandoned the 23rd Brigade to his failed 
strategy. Garth Pratten’s book Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World 
War demonstrated the pragmatism of the military in its disposal of many World War I 
vintage battalion commanders for younger better-experienced veterans with more recent 
Middle East service.445 Pragmatism ruled in the disposal of Australian Army officers in 
the interest of military efficiency except, it seems, in the case of Sturdee.
Had there been an inquiry into Sturdee’s management of the Malay Barrier debacle it 
would have been difficult for him to claim that the islands had fallen owing to bad luck. 
Roach, Tanner and Lind had all tried to warn Sturdee that the decision to send Gull 
Force to Ambon was loaded with the foreseeable consequences of failure. If Sturdee had 
claimed he did not anticipate the failure of the Ambon campaign he would have been 
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about the potential fall of Ambon weeks or months before it happened. Sturdee had led 
what was arguably one of the great disasters in Australia’s military history, yet he 
escaped the consequences of his ineffective leadership and the failure of the Malay 
Barrier strategy.
Ultimately, Australian men and women of the 23rd Brigade paid dearly for Sturdee’s 
incompetent approach to the Malay Barrier strategy and his eight months of inaction 
regarding the Forward Observation Line plan. His AHQ Operation Instruction No. 15 
was drawn up as early as March 1941 and remained basically unaltered until it was 
supposedly issued to Ambon on 13 January 1942. Little if any consideration was given 
to preserving the 2/21st and 2/40th battalions on mainland Australia despite the 
protestations of Lind, Roach and Tanner to Sturdee that Ambon could not stand against 
a determined attack. This happened because of Sturdee’s incompetence where he had 
held fast to the outdated Forward Observation Line strategy formulated at Singapore the 
year before. He understood the likely consequences of his decision to continue with 
sending troops to Ambon and Timor and with maintaining the Rabaul garrison. This 
point is underscored by Curtin’s letter to Roosevelt explaining Australia’s policy of 
abandoning its troops at Rabaul. It seems Sturdee ignored the consequences of his 
actions in the case of Ambon because his expectations were that it would not stand 
against a determined Japanese attack. In taking for granted that Ambon would fall it 
seems that weighing the effects of any future consequences were superfluous to 
Sturdee’s considerations. 
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should be indicted for its failure in military planning when it came to Rabaul, Ambon 
and Timor. In this case, Sturdee failed to listen to his commanders on the spot, ignored 
the principle of the concentration of forces, dissipated his troops to unsupported isolated 
outposts to be gathered up piecemeal by Japanese forces. He had sacrificed what 
amounted to be a brigade at a time when Australia was considered at its weakest and at 
a time of its greatest threat of hostile military invasion. 
He allowed his torpor to continue until he was shaken out of it by the news that 
Singapore had fallen. It was on this day that he, albeit obliquely, admitted failing in his 
leadership by violating the principles of the concentration of forces by sending 
inadequate Australian troops against overwhelmingly stronger Japanese forces when he 
knew it would have been better to withhold them in Australia. He later admitted that the 
small garrisons to which he had sent the inadequate 23rd Brigade’s battalions were 
incapable of withstanding even a moderate scale of attack. Under the prevailing 
circumstances Scott’s persistent support of Sturdee’s strategy was of little consolation. 
The fact remains that the Malay Barrier was a disaster of the highest magnitude in 
Australia’s military history during the Second World War and Sturdee was its architect.
The final example according to Dixon’s criteria is cognitive dissonance (‘belief in 
mystical–fate, bad luck etc’). Neither the historical documents nor the inquiry evidence 
into the fall of Ambon, Timor and Rabaul following aftermath of the Islands campaign 
fully addressed Sturdee’s responsibility for planning the campaign or its consequent 
failure. In representing AHQ, the nearest explanation Rowell could give was that it was 
242sheer bad luck that the scale of attack was all wrong, that the Japanese employed a 
division against a battalion and that the Japanese intended taking Ambon, Timor and in 
making Rabaul their main base. This example of cognitive dissonance, where people 
rationalise an irrational situation by inventing a comfortable illusion, further 
underscores the incompetence of AHQ at the time. 
The facts are, the planning and execution of the Forward Observation Line strategy was 
not carried out by the hand of ‘bad luck’, but through the living agency of general 
military officers. Bad luck did not send understaffed, under resourced and unsupported 
battalions to Ambon, Timor and Rabaul; it was AHQ that carried out that role in the 
personages of Sturdee and Rowell. In explaining this phenomenon, Dixon suggested 
that, ‘an inability to admit one has been in the wrong will be greater the more wrong 
one has been, and the more wrong one has been the more bizarre will be subsequent 
attempts to justify the unjustifiable’446 and this certainly applies to Rowell in ascribing 
those events to bizarre bad luck.
Sturdee also demonstrated cognitive dissonance by ignoring conflicting intelligence 
provided to him by Lind and Roach. Once Sturdee had made the decision to occupy the 
Island garrisons he became fixed on that course of action. According to Dixon, that type 
of commitment changes the psychological situation decisively, because there becomes a 
situation where less emphasis is placed on objectivity and more on partiality and bias in 
the way in which the person views and evaluates any unpalatable alternatives.447 The 
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risks involved, emotionally based cognitive dissonance behaviour takes over to 
negatively influence the subject from making the required adjustments and causes them 
to remain fixed to the original decision. It seems the more work that is required to 
rectify a bad decision the stronger the urge is to resist the uncomfortable alternatives. 
‘In other words, decision-making may well be followed by a period of mental activity 
that could be described as at the very least somewhat one-sided’.448 The conclusion 
under this criteria is that the emotions of the anal obsessive exercises control over the 
intellect to the point of incompetence where the authoritarian personality possesses 
knowledge or beliefs which conﬂict with a decision they have made but are unable to 
adjust to the new situation.
The contrasts between Sturdee as the competent Chief of the General Staff and Sturdee 
as the incompetent nominal Commander-in-Chief of the Malay Barrier area of 
operations are stark when examined against Dixon’s criteria of incompetence. As 
demonstrated above, Sturdee exhibited traits that correlate with Dixon’s list of 
incompetence where he displayed a propensity as nominal Commander-in-Chief to:
1. Waste human resources and ignore the principle of economy of force.
2. Be conservative and cling to outworn tradition.
3. Ignore or reject information which conﬂicted with his preconceptions.
4. Indecisiveness and abdication of responsibilities when seriously challenged.
5. Obstinate persistence in the face of contrary evidence.
6. Not carry out reconnaissance when required.
7. Apportion blame for military setbacks onto scape goats.
8. Suppress or distort news from the front (ostensibly for morale or security).
9. Fail in overcoming cognitive dissonance by ignoring contrary evidence and 
attributing military setbacks to mystical forces such as bad luck.
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testimonials of his son-in-law Buckley as well as by Rowell and the biographical texts 
and remains uncontested. However, Sturdee’s role as nominal Commander-in-Chief of 
the failed the Forward Observation Line strategy during 1941-1942 demonstrates his 
incompetence in that role. 
Clearly, Sturdee’s push to occupy the Islands under the prevailing circumstances was 
militarily unsound. As the man on the spot, Roach pointed out these shortcomings to 
Sturdee when he suggested the battalions on Timor and Ambon should not be wasted 
but withdrawn and concentrated to fight at another place where there was at least a 
better chance of delaying the Japanese advance more decisively. Arguably, Ambon was 
lost in the planning and follow through stages where the isolated outpost stood no 
chance of repelling the overwhelming Japanese forces expected to attack the Island. It is 
obvious that Ambon was a tragedy by design rather than by accident where battalions 
were intentionally placed in the path of a Japanese Divisions to be taken piecemeal. The 
responsibility for the fall of Ambon and the other Island garrisons at Timor and Rabaul 
lies with Sturdee’s incompetent management as nominal commander-in-chief of the 
Forward Observation Line disaster.
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In August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staffs produced an appreciation outlining their 
plans to deter Japan from declaring war on British, Australian, Dutch NEI and American 
interests in the Far East and Southwest Pacific regions. Assumption 3 of the 
appreciation considered whether Far East Command should go to war with Japan should 
it attack the NEI in isolation. This question was raised at the October 1940 Singapore 
conference and resulted in a mutual air cooperation pact being agreed to five months 
later between Far East Command, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia on the basis 
that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Called the Malay Barrier 
strategy, the Far East and Southwest Pacific regions were divided into three areas of 
operations under British, Dutch and Australian commands. To compensate for the lack 
of a substantive fleet arriving at Singapore the strategy was formulated to dominate the 
region with nonexistent aircraft drawn from each domain. Having only 118 mostly 
outmoded aircraft available between the parties, however, the plan fell short of its 
projected needs by 1,153 aircraft. Far East Command informed the British Government 
of their projected requirements but were told they could expect no more than 336 
aircraft to be made available to Singapore/Malaya before the end of 1941. 
Because Far East Command feared the Dutch would not fight, the British Government 
asked Australia to help persuade the NEI Government to become partners under the 
scheme so that they could gain access to their aircraft. Owing to circumstances and 
despite having no more than one available brigade, Australia offered to provide one 
brigade group each and four squadrons of aircraft to defend the Dutch islands of Ambon 
and Timor. However, the garrisoning of Ambon with Australian troops later became 
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to support Far East Command against Japanese aggression and after the NEI’s Chiefs of 
Staffs demonstrated their willingness to reinforce Ambon with their own troops. These 
two events, in correlation with the weak military situation in Australia, should have 
triggered the Australian government to review its policy towards Ambon where it had 
too few military resources realistically to carry out its commitments to the NEI let alone 
protect mainland Australia. Notwithstanding these facts, Australian policy towards the 
Malay Barrier remained fixed and Sturdee carried through the plan to garrison Ambon 
with the last remaining battalion of the 2nd AIF’s 2/23rd Brigade then located at Darwin.
In March 1941, Sturdee, without prior War Cabinet approval, produced Operation 
Instruction No. 15 in which he unilaterally revised the Ambon operation down from one 
nonexistent brigade to one available battalion sized task force. The reduction of forces 
from a brigade group to a battalion proved necessary because the 23rd Brigade was the 
last remaining 2nd AIF brigade in Australia. It was being divided for service at Rabaul, 
Timor and Ambon and the militia were understaffed, under trained, under resourced and 
could not be despatched for overseas military service. Sturdee was aware that Gull 
Force could not hold Ambon against even a moderate scale of attack and demonstrated 
this knowledge by intentionally withholding badly needed war materials from the task 
force to prevent them from being captured by the Japanese. The fact that the bulk of the 
RAN’s ships were away serving in the Mediterranean further weakened the plan where 
no naval support could be made available to Gull Force in protecting its supply route, 
supporting the island against attack from the sea or withdrawing the troops if required. 
247Under these conditions Gull Force would be completely isolated and too weak to be 
expected to delay the Japanese advance for more than a few days. 
This expectation had already been made clear to AHQ through successive reports, set 
down by Veale, Lind, Roach and Tanner, that Ambon could not be defended effectively 
for more than a few days with the military resources then being made available to Gull 
Force, if at all. Furthermore, no clear policy objective existed in sending Gull Force to 
Ambon, as ephemeral policies evolved from creating a mutual air force resources group 
to protect Singapore/Malaya to demonstrating solidarity with the Dutch to induce them 
to fight, protecting the RAAF airfield at Ambon, forward defence, demonstrating to the 
USA a willingness to fight in the hope they would enter the war and save Australia, the 
‘forward observation line’ strategy and, finally, to delaying the Japanese advance for no 
more than a few days. Notwithstanding the overwhelming strategic evidence that 
Ambon could not withstand even a moderate attack, Sturdee ignored the risks and lack 
of a defined policy to press ahead with the plan regardless of the predicted outcome.
The Singapore Conference conclusions and Sturdee’s acceptance of them seemed to 
result from men desperately imagining what could be done with requisite equipment 
rather than men desperately making do with what they had and planning accordingly. 
This was borne out by the fact that they were allocating nonexistent aircraft to defend 
Singapore and Malaya together with the allocation of nonexistent brigades to Timor and 
Ambon under the support of nonexistent naval resources being drawn from the 
Mediterranean or Britain. Despite the discrepancies in allocated resources for the Malay 
Barrier Forward Observation Line, the foreknowledge that Gull Force was too small to 
248hold out against even a moderate force and the stipulation that Australian troops could 
not land on Ambon until after war broke out, both Sturdee and Burnett were somehow 
able to convince the respective Menzies and Curtin War Cabinets that it was a sound 
strategy.
Even though it became increasingly apparent that the Japanese threat to peace and 
stability in the Far East region was increasing, Sturdee maintained his commitment to 
sending ‘small penny packet garrisons’ to the Islands. Never from March 1941 forward 
did he react to the changing strategic circumstances of the Southwest Pacific region and 
review his AHQ Operation Instruction No. 15. Even after war with Japan was declared, 
and after Curtin had questioned the strategy of scattering small garrisons to Australia’s 
north, Sturdee remained committed to sending troops to Timor and Ambon and 
maintaining the garrison at Rabaul. Had Sturdee used this opportunity to request time to 
review AHQ Operation Instruction No. 15 it is possible that Curtin may have allowed it. 
Curtin’s questioning of the Forward Observation Line strategy on 8 December 1941 
certainly indicates that he was open to a review of AHQ Operation Instruction No. 15, 
however, it was Sturdee’s stubborn commitment to the Malay Barrier strategy that 
finally sealed the fate of the men and women at Rabaul and consequently the task forces 
at Timor and Ambon.
Inexplicably, the War Cabinet had allowed Sturdee to continue with his policy of 
scattering penny packet garrisons to the islands insofar that if Rabaul were threatened it 
would not be reinforced or withdrawn but left to face certain capture by overwhelming 
Japanese forces. This policy was confirmed in a letter sent to Roosevelt by Curtin which 
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were attacked. Ostensibly, this decision was justified on the basis that a forward 
observation line was required to warn of enemy movement to the South and to put up a 
show for the USA of Australia’s willingness to fight the Japanese at all costs. By 
implication this policy was applied to Timor and Ambon also. Sturdee had convinced 
the War Cabinet that Australia could afford to throw away an entire brigade group for 
forward observation even though it was beyond the capacity of the small garrisons to 
survive, against prevailing strategic military principles and at a time when the 
Australian mainland was being threatened with an attack.
That Australia found itself in this position stems from the fact that Sturdee seems to 
have obtained substantial influence over the Curtin Government regarding his role as 
CGS and in providing strategic advice. One example of that power and influence was 
demonstrated by Sturdee’s refusal to send the 23rd Brigade to rejoin the 8th Division at 
Singapore. Clearly Curtin held considerable trust in Sturdee’s abilities and allowed him 
the room to maintain the terms of Australia’s commitment in supporting the Malay 
Barrier. However, if the political aims of war are the business of government and one of 
those aims is to maintain its armies, then it seems Curtin was remiss in allowing Sturdee 
to unilaterally control the conditions under which the Australia/Dutch agreement would 
be implemented, especially as it meant throwing away an entire brigade group at a time 
when Japan was advancing on Australia’s doorstep. 
In the Ambon case, Sturdee clearly did not expect to repel the invading Japanese or to 
hold the island for more than a few days. He had provided enough resources to 
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war materials. His motives should not be confused with those of a general who has 
planned a conventional campaign to win battles and conserve soldiers but fails to 
endure because of the unanticipated consequences of war. Sturdee expected defeat, 
which he demonstrated by planning to preserve as many military resources in Australia 
as he could while adhering to his penny packet policy in the Islands. Under these 
conditions it appears Sturdee could afford to ignore the ‘unanticipated consequences’ of 
war when he had already anticipated the probable outcome, that of defeat. 
After Gull Force arrived at Ambon without any orders outlining its role, Roach 
attempted to inform AHQ that holding the island was untenable with the resources 
available to him. He pointed out that without further reinforcements in personnel, 
artillery, stores, weapons and naval support the Island could not hold for more than a 
few days. He, together with Tanner, requested the withdrawal of Gull Force to another 
place, such as Timor or mainland Australia, so that a more decisive defence could be put 
into effect against the advancing Japanese forces. Ostensibly fearing that Roach had 
‘lost his punch’ and was undermining morale at Ambon, Sturdee had him replaced with 
Scott two weeks before the Japanese arrived. As predicted, the Japanese attacked 
Ambon with the equivalent of a division and took the island within three days after 
overwhelming Gull Force with superior military forces, aircraft and ships.
The outcome of the Ambon disaster brings into question Sturdee’s competence as the 
ostensibly self-appointed nominal Commander-in-Chief of the Island forces, which he 
took under his personal command. Sturdee was demonstrably a highly qualified staff 
251general who possessed the knowledge to responsibly consider the consequences of 
sending a small under resourced task force to an isolated island without any hope of 
support against even a moderate attack by Japanese forces. Yet despite all his 
experience, Sturdee demonstrably failed to utilize his talents as CGS realistically to 
address the inadequacies inherent to the Malay Barrier strategy or to prevent its ultimate 
failure. In highlighting this incompetence in command, Clausewitz’s principles were 
cited throughout this dissertation to demonstrate the inadequacies of the Malay Barrier 
strategy. Concerning Clausewitz it has been shown that in a democracy the 
responsibility for formulating policy lay with the government. This principle was served 
in the breach here where the Curtin Government failed to restrain Sturdee’s tendencies 
to act ahead of government approval in the formulation of strategic policy; as happened 
where Sturdee negotiated with the Dutch NEI government to reduce the Australian 
commitment at Ambon and Timor respectively from one brigade to one battalion each 
and where he withheld crucial information from the War Cabinet that these forces could 
not effectively fulfill their roles until after the war with Japan had begun. 
Sturdee later accepted that the Islands strategy was all wrong in his paper the Future 
Employment of the AIF, where he admitted that so far as the war against Japan was 
concerned he had violated the principle of concentration of forces by trying to hold 
numerous small localities with totally inadequate forces that had had little prospect of 
withstanding even a moderate scale attack; the principle of cost benefit ratios where the 
Islands campaign accrued no gains against the sacrifice of a brigade; the principle of 
economy of force where units were left idle in Australia or were wasted rather than 
conserved for future battle; the principle on not isolating outposts from the main body 
252as happened when he left the garrisons at Ambon, Timor and Rabaul without supplies, 
military support or the opportunity to fall back into the main force; the principle of 
reconnaissance where he ignored the reports of his subordinates Lind, Roach and 
Tanner even as they revealed the predictable loss of Ambon to incompetent strategy; 
and the principle of defence, where withdrawing to a more decisive point to deal out 
blows against an enemy at a more decisive point is considered wiser than losing units 
piecemeal in isolated positions. 
The Malay Barrier strategy was flawed because it was based on imaginary aircraft 
numbers. It was principally aimed at obtaining Dutch air support for Singapore/Malaya 
and encouraging the Dutch to fight (a policy supporting the defence of Singapore/
Malaya not Australia or the NEI). Once the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs M 
Van Kleffens broadcast the intentions of the Dutch NEI to fight alongside Far East 
Command the requirement to garrison Ambon became redundant, as far as Australian 
interests were concerned, where the object of the British policy had been achieved after 
the Dutch openly committed to militarily supporting Singapore/Malaya. Ambon was 
never on the Australian strategic agenda until the British Government asked for help in 
obtaining Dutch air support for Singapore/Malaya and after it was proposed to the 
Australian Singapore Conference delegates by the Dutch CGS at Bandung.
Clearly, Australia was never inextricably bound to the Malay Barrier strategy and could 
have rejected the garrisoning of Ambon. The Australian government had full 
independence to formulate military policy and strategy concerning its Malay Barrier 
area of responsibilities and to Australia’s defence without fear of British and Dutch 
253influence, as was openly stated at the Singapore conferences. Nevertheless, it was 
mainly Sturdee acting in his role as strategic advisor to the War Cabinet who led the 
Australian government to bind itself to the ill advised policy of sending Gull Force to 
Ambon without the necessary requirements to satisfy the needs of such a strategy. The 
Ambon fiasco must rest on Sturdee’s incompetence where he failed adequately to 
consider the military situation for what it was and where he failed to use that analysis to 
avoid the likely outcome.
254Appendix One – Ambon Dispositions Map
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